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With the advent of globalization and the resulting horizontal integration, present-day electronic
component supply chain has become extremely complex and called for immediate solutions to
eliminate counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs). Such counterfeit ICs have raised serious concerns
regarding the safety and security of military systems, financial infrastructures, transportation,
communication, household appliances, and many more applications. Various types of counter-
feit ICs – recycled, remarked, overproduced, out-of-spec/defective, cloned, forged documenta-
tion, and tampered – have made the supply chain vulnerable to various attacks. However, due
to the lack of efficient detection and avoidance techniques, many more instances of counterfeit
ICs evade detection than those that are actually detected. Over the past few years, standards and
programs have been put in place throughout the supply chain that outline testing, document-
ing, and reporting procedures for counterfeit IC detection. However, these test methods are
mostly designed to detect only recycled and remarked ICs. Moreover, there is little uniformity
in the test results among the various entities involved in the test process. Currently, there are
no metrics for evaluating counterfeit detection methods. In addition, excessive cost and time to
implement these tests make the detection process even challenging. In this research, we have
addressed the aforementioned issues by assessing existing test methods with newly developed
test metrics, and developing different design-for-anti-counterfeit (DfAC) measures.
For the assessment of test methods, we have proposed taxonomies for (i) all different coun-
terfeit IC types currently infiltrating the electronic component supply chain, (ii) defects present
in different counterfeit ICs, and (iii) currently available test methods for detecting these ICs.
Based on these taxonomies, we have introduced relevant and novel test metrics to evaluate the
effectiveness of test methods. We have developed a comprehensive framework (i) for assessing
a set of test methods to evaluate their effectiveness based on the newly developed metrics, (ii)
selecting a set of test methods to maximize counterfeit defect coverage considering test cost and
time budget, and (iii) deciding on the best set of test methods for achieving maximum counter-
feit defect coverage (CDC).
Due to the sheer number of different component types (digital, analog, and mixed-signal) and
sizes (large or small), it becomes extremely difficult to develop a one-size-fits-all DfAC mea-
sure to detect and prevent counterfeit ICs. Thus, we have proposed a suite of DfAC measures,
which can help us to detect these counterfeit ICs without the need for conventional test meth-
ods. First, we propose a group of solutions for combating die and IC recycling (CDIR). These
solutions include light-weight, on-chip structures based on ring oscillators (RO-CDIR), and
semiconductor fuses (F-CDIR). Each structure meets the unique needs and limitations of differ-
ent part types and sizes, providing excellent coverage for recycled ICs. Recycled digital ICs can
be effectively detected by using RO-CDIR. Any recycled ICs, specifically analog and mixed-
signal ICs, can be identified by testing our F-CDIR with very low cost measurement devices,
e.g., a multimeter. Second, we have proposed two improved versions of RO-CDIR as it is ex-
tremely challenging to detect a recycled IC that has been used for a very short period of time.
These versions address the fact that process variations outpace the degradation caused by aging
especially in lower technology nodes, making it harder to detect potential recycling by aging
degradation. Simulation results demonstrate that these CDIRs can detect ICs used even for a
few hours. Finally, we present FORTIS: a comprehensive solution for protecting semiconduc-
tor intellectual properties (IPs) and ICs by ensuring forward trust between all entities involved
in the system-on-chip (SoC) design and fabrication process. FORTIS is designed to prevent
IC overproduction; however, it can be used to prevent other counterfeit types (except recycled
ones). FORTIS uses an existing logic encryption technique to obfuscate the netlist of a SoC or
a third party IP and allows manufacturing tests before the activation of chips, a feature that is
lacking in other competing techniques. In addition, we also propose to attach an IP digest to
the IP header to prevent modification of an IP by the SoC designers. We have shown that our
approach is resistant to various attacks with the cost of minimal area overhead.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ever increasing problem of counterfeiting and piracy are of great concern to government and
industry because of – (i) the negative impact they can have on innovation, economic growth, and
employment, (ii) the threat they pose to the welfare of consumers, (iii) the substantial resources
that they channel into criminal networks, organized crime, and other groups that disrupt and
corrupt society, and finally, (iv) the loss of business from the trade in counterfeits [4]. Based
on a 2008 report by the International Chamber of Commerce, it was estimated that the cost of
counterfeiting and piracy for G20 nations was as much as US$775 billion every year and will
grow at an astonishing rate to $1.7 trillion in 2015 [5].
Counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs), which constitutes a significant part of counterfeit
products, pose a significant threat to the government and industrial sectors of the economy be-
cause they undermine the security and reliability of critical systems and networks. They have
a negative impact on corporate identity and reputation, and they can trigger massive revenue
losses. Due to the widespread use of electronic components in our day-to-day lives - both di-
rectly and indirectly - counterfeit ICs also pose major threats to the health, safety, and security
of the population at large. For example, the failure of a pacemaker due to a counterfeit compo-
nent can potentially take someone’s life. Similarly, the anti-lock braking system (ABS), which
1
2is found in most cars today and is controlled by sensors and electronics, could possibly fail due
to the use of a counterfeit IC. This not only causes reliability issues, it could potentially lead to
life-threatening accidents. A pilot could lose control of an airplane, jeopardizing the lives of all
on board. A rogue nation could even disable air defense systems with the help of counterfeit
components.
In addition to the impact on public safety and security, counterfeit ICs could also cause
significant damage to the economy. For example, semiconductor companies spend billions of
dollars every year to develop technologies, manufacture products, and provide support for the
products they create. In contrast, counterfeiters spend minimal money on developing technolo-
gies. Instead, counterfeiting practices allow private individuals to remake an existing product
for their own benefit, which only hinders the research and development of new products. Also,
as the counterfeiters do not take responsibility for their counterfeit components, the failure of
these components damages the corporate reputation of the original component manufacturers
(OCMs). In many cases, the OCM can even bear the financial responsibility and logistics of
replacing the failed components.
A recent report from the Information Handling Services Inc. (Englewood, CO, USA)
shows that reports of counterfeit parts have quadrupled since 2009 [6] (see Figure 1.1). This
data has been compiled from two reporting entities - The Electronic Resellers Association In-
ternational (ERAI) Inc. (Naples, FL, USA) and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Pro-
gram, GIDEP (Corona, CA, USA). It is mentioned that the five most commonly counterfeited
components (e.g., analog ICs, microprocessor ICs, memory ICs, programmable logic ICs, and
transistors) represent $169 billion in potential annual risk for the global electronics supply chain
3based on all reported counterfeit incidents in 2011 [3].
Fig. 1.1: Counterfeit incidents reported by IHS.
The rapid growth of IC counterfeiting is due to the widely available electronic waste (e-
waste). In the United States, only 25% of e-waste was properly recycled in 2009 [7]. This huge
resource of e-waste allows counterfeiters to pile up an extremely large supply of counterfeit
components. Counterfeiters recycle electronic components from this e-waste and sell them in
the open market as if they were new or even of a superior grade (for example, commercial
grade components are sold as military or space grade components). In addition to that, as
the complexity of electronic systems and their components have grown significantly over the
past few decades, these components have been increasingly assembled (fabricated) globally to
reduce production costs. For example, large foundries located in different countries can offer
lower prices to the design houses. Untrusted foundries and assemblies can also be capable of
selling extra components outside of the number they were contracted to manufacture. Thus, this
complex supply chain leads to an illicit market willing to undercut competition with counterfeit
parts.
With counterfeit incidents on the rise, it is increasingly important to understand what ICs
4Table 1.1: Top-5 most counterfeited semiconductors in 2011 [3].
Rank Commodity Type % of Reported Incidents
#1 Analog IC 25.2%
#2 Microprocessor IC 13.4%
#3 Memory IC 13.1%
#4 Programmable Logic IC 8.3%
#5 Transistor 7.6%
#6 Others 32.4%
are most likely counterfeit and what industries are impacted the most. Table 1.1 shows the five
most commonly counterfeited components that represent $169 billion in potential annual risk
for the global electronics supply chain. The components are as follows: analog ICs, micropro-
cessor ICs, memory ICs, programmable logic ICs, and transistors. Together, these five types
of components make up around 68% (or, slightly more than two-thirds) of all the counterfeit
incidents reported in 2011.
Table 1.2 shows the industries where these top five components are used. They in-
clude computing, consumer electronics, wireless and wired communications, automotive and
industrial sectors. Automotive and industrial sectors involve critical systems and, thus, the
appearance of unreliable counterfeit components in these applications is quite alarming. Un-
trustworthy counterfeit components are also a concern for consumer applications where we are
increasing becoming more reliant on electronic devices for computing, communication, online
banking, handling personal data, etc.
5Table 1.2: Percentage of market revenue for most commonly counterfeited product types by
application market in 2011 [3].
Part Type Industrial Automotive Consumer Wireless Wired Compute Other
Analog IC 14% 17% 21% 29% 6% 14% 0%
Microprocessor IC 4% 1% 4% 2% 3% 85% 0%
Memory IC 3% 2% 13% 26% 2% 53% 1%
Prog. Logic IC 30% 3% 14% 18% 25% 11% 0%
Transistor 22% 12% 25% 8% 10% 22% 0%
1.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we have systematically addressed the problems of counterfeit ICs. First, we have
analyzed the entire threat space for counterfeiting and developed taxonomies of counterfeit
types, the defects present in these ICs, and test methods to detect these ICs. Second, we take
a novel approach to assess the effectiveness of all the test methods for the detection of these
counterfeit ICs and develop a comprehensive framework to select a minimum/best set of tests
for maximizing test coverage. Finally, we propose different design-for-anti-counterfeit (DfAC)
measures to detect these ICs without using conventional test methods. We propose combating
die and IC recycling (CDIR) to detect recycled ICs. In addition, we present FORTIS to detect
other counterfeit ICs. The main contributions of the proposed work are as follows:
1.1.1 Development of Taxonomies
We have developed a comprehensive taxonomy of counterfeit types. We have also developed a
detailed taxonomy of the defects present in counterfeit ICs. To the best of our knowledge, this
6is the first approach to analyzing counterfeit ICs with the defects present in them. Our coun-
terfeit method taxonomy describes all the test methods currently available for the detection of
counterfeit ICs. We have classified the counterfeit ICs into seven distinct categories: recycled,
remarked, overproduced, out-of-spec/defective, cloned, forged documentation, and tampered
[8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. Counterfeit defects are those anomalies and changes that are not typically
found in authentic parts. Anomalies vary based on size, shape, type, number, etc., depending
on the capabilities possessed by the counterfeiters. The detection of one or more anomalies
may be an indication of a component being counterfeit. A taxonomy of the counterfeit de-
fects was introduced in [13] [9] [14]. The detailed description of detects can be found in [12].
Counterfeit defects are divided into four categories: procedural, mechanical, environmental,
and electrical. The test methods to detect counterfeit ICs are broadly classified into two distinct
types – physical tests and electrical tests. Physical tests are performed to examine the physical
and chemical/material properties of the component’s package, leads and die of a component in
order to detect procedural, mechanical, and environmental counterfeit defects. Electrical tests
are the only way to determine the correct functionality of a component. They provide a very
efficient and non-destructive way of detecting counterfeit components. Majority of the coun-
terfeit defects can also be effectively detected by electrical tests. We will briefly describe these
taxonomies in Sections 1.2, 1.4, and 1.5.
1.1.2 Development of Test Metrics
We have proposed test metrics for evaluating counterfeit detection methods. These metrics
are counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), counterfeit type coverage (CTC), under-covered defects
(UCDs) and not-covered defects (NCDs). We will introduce them in Chapter 2.
71.1.3 Effectiveness Assessment of Test Methods for the Detection of Counterfeit ICs
We have developed a comprehensive framework to assess the test methods [13] [14]. Different
sequences of test methods have been developed by organizations for the detection of counterfeit
parts. The framework evaluates the effectiveness of a sequence of test methods (test plan) used
to screen for counterfeit parts. This framework works in two different modes. In the static
assessment, it performs the assessment of a preexisting sequence of test methods. The output of
this mode produces the test metrics (CDC, CTC, NCD, and UCD). In the dynamic assessment,
the framework receives all the current available test methods as input and recommends (i) the
best set of tests and (ii) an optimum set of tests that provides maximum coverage within a
certain test time and cost budget. Then the assessment is done on the basis of the same test
metrics. We will briefly describe the assessment process in Chapter 2.
1.1.4 Design-for-Anti-Counterfeit measures (DfAC) for the Detection and Avoidance of
Counterfeit ICs
The efficiency of the physical and electrical test methods rely on finding the defects and anoma-
lies present in the counterfeit ICs. However, these defects are not uniformly present in all the
counterfeit types. In addition, these test methods are extremely expensive and slow. Moreover,
counterfeiting has evolved over the last few years and the level of sophistication in the process
has significantly improved. We believe that this trend will continue and that counterfeiters will
continue to adopt new processes and technologies as time passes, making it more difficult to
detect counterfeit ICs [12]. It may even be possible that we will not find any of today’s gross
defects and anomalies [12] in the counterfeit ICs of the future.
8To address these shortcomings, we propose different lightweight structures for combat-
ing die and IC recycling. We call these structures as CDIRs [15] [16] [17]. These structures
are of ring-oscillator (RO)-based and are similar in spirit to the CDIR proposed in [1]. How-
ever, our new structures are NBTI-aware and exploit aging much more efficiently. In addition,
we present FORTIS [18], a comprehensive solution for establishing forward trust for detecting
other counterfeit ICs. We will briefly describe these DfAC measures in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
1.2 Counterfeit Types
The US Department of Commerce first proposed the definition for a counterfeit part. According
to [21], a counterfeit component – (i) is an unauthorized copy; (ii) does not conform to orig-
inal original component manufacturer (OCM) design, model, and/or performance standards;
(iii) is not produced by the OCM or is produced by unauthorized contractors; (iv) is an off-
specification, defective, or used OCM product sold as “new” or working; or (v) has incorrect or
false markings and/or documentation.
The above definition does not include all possible scenarios where an entity in the com-
ponent supply chain source electronic components that are authentic and certified by the OCMs.
For example, one may copy the entire design of a component by reverse engineering [22] [23],
manufacture them, and then sell them in the market under the OCM’s identity. An untrusted
foundry or assembly may source extra components without disclosing it to the OCMs [24] [25].
An adversary can insert a hardware Trojan [26] into a component to interrupt its normal oper-
ation and satisfy his/her own malevolent interests. All these scenarios impact the security and
reliability of a system utilizing such components. Thus, we have expanded on the above defini-
9tion of counterfeiting and developed a more comprehensive taxonomy of counterfeit types [13]
[9] [11] [10] [8] [14]. Figure 1.2 shows this novel taxonomy of counterfeit types.
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Fig. 1.2: Taxonomy of counterfeit types.
1.2.1 Recycled
The term “recycled” refers to an electronic component that is reclaimed or recovered from an
used system, and is then modified to be misrepresented as a new component of an OCM. Re-
cycled components may exhibit lower performance and have a shorter lifetime due to the aging
from their prior usage. Further, the reclaiming process (removal under a very high temperature,
aggressive physical removal from boards, washing, sanding, repackaging, etc.) could dam-
age the part(s), introduce latent defects that pass initial testing but are prone to failure in later
stages, or make them completely non-functional due to exposure to extreme conditions in an
uncontrolled environment. Such parts will, of course, be unreliable and render the systems that
unknowingly incorporate them equally unreliable.
The recycled components are discussed widely by the government, industry and test
labs. The standards [27], [28], [29], and [30] recommends different test plan to detect these
components. In this thesis, our aim is to highlight the most effective ways of detecting these
components. In Chapter 2, we perform the assessment of existing test methods to find best set
10
of test methods to maximize test coverage with test time and test cost constraints. Chapters 3
and 4 exclusively describe DfAC measures to easily detect recycled components and therefore
prevent them from getting into the component supply chain.
1.2.2 Remarked
The marking of an electronic component contains information such as part or identifying num-
ber (PIN), lot identification code or date code, device manufacturer’s identification, country
of manufacture, electrostatic discharge (ESD) sensitivity identifier, certification mark, and so
forth. Clearly, a component’s markings are very important as they represent component’s origin
and, most importantly, determine how the component should be handled and used. For example,
a space grade component can withstand a wide range of temperatures, radiation levels, etc. that
would cause instant failure for a commercial grade component. The component manufacturer,
grade, etc. also determine how much the component is worth. The price of space and military
grade components can be phenomenally higher than commercial grade components. A counter-
feiter can drive up a component’s price on the open market by changing its markings to that of
a higher grade or better manufacturer. However, such remarked components will not be able to
withstand the harsh conditions of their more durable, higher-grade counterparts. This can create
substantial issues if such components end up in critical systems.
Similar to the recycled counterfeit type, remarked components are also extensively dis-
cussed by the government, industry and test labs. The standards developed thus far recom-
mended the same test plan to detect remarked components. In this thesis, we address the detec-
tion of recycled and remarked components simultaneously.
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1.2.3 Overproduced
Today’s high-density ICs are mostly manufactured in state-of-the-art fabrication facilities. Build-
ing or maintaining such facilities for modern CMOS technologies is reported to cost more than
several billions of dollars and this number is growing with each new technology node [31].
Given this increasing cost and the complexity of foundries and their processes, the semicon-
ductor business has largely shifted to a contract foundry business model (horizontal business
model) over the past two decades. In this model, the design houses outsource their designs
for fabrication and packaging to companies all around the world, mainly to reduce manufac-
turing costs. Although the contracted parties may agree to only manufacture a certain number
of working components, they could in fact exceed this amount. Untrusted foundries and as-
semblies may produce more than the number of components they are contracted to produce.
In addition, they can overbuild components by hiding the actual yield (i.e. the percentage of
defect-free components to the total number of components) information.
This process of manufacturing and selling outside of the agreement with the design house
(i.e., the components’ intellectual property (IP) owner) is known as “overproduction”. A well
understood concern with overproduction is the inevitable loss in profit for the design houses.
Design companies usually invest a large amount of time and effort into research and develop-
ment (R&D) of their products. When an untrusted foundry or assembly overproduces and sells
these components, the design house loses any possible revenue that could have been gained
from those components. However, an even bigger concern with overproduced components is
that of reliability. Overproduced components may simply end up in the market with minimal or
no testing for reliability and functionality. These components may find their way back into the
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supply chain for many critical applications such as military equipment and consumer products,
which raises concern for safety and reliability. Further, since these components bear the same
name of the design houses, failure of these components would then tarnish the reputation of the
original component manufacturer. In Chapter 5, we will briefly discuss overproduction and will
present FORTIS to prevent IC overproduction.
1.2.4 Out-of-Spec/Defective
A part is considered defective if it produces an incorrect response in post-manufacturing tests.
During the manufacturing process, the first test performed is the wafer test to inspect which
ICs, fabricated on the wafer, are defective. If there are too many defective ICs on the wafer,
the foundry sometimes rejects the whole wafer. A wafer generally contains hundreds of dies
depending on the size and type of ICs and may worth hundreds of dollars. An untrusted entity
may source these defective wafers to an assembly and produce defective or out-of-specification
ICs. After wafer tests, the defect free dies are sent to assembly for packaging. The healthy
chips are then sorted out by using package tests and the chips that have been damaged during
the packaging process are discarded. An untrusted entity again can supply these chips into the
supply chain. The final test is performed as a part of quality assurance of the final packaged
chips before sending them to the market. Burn-in, using accelerated temperature and voltage, is
often performed to test latent defects in order to avoid the failures in the early operational stages
of chips.
All the rejected chips from various test process should be destroyed (if they are non-
functional), downgraded (does not satisfy the specification), or otherwise be properly disposed
of. However, if they are sold on the open market instead, either knowingly by an untrusted
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entity or by a third party who has stolen them, there will be an inevitable increase in their risk
of failure. The detection of these defective/out-of-spec components is not an easy task. It may
be easy to detect a defective chip that has been rejected in the early test process by using simple
parametric tests. However, it will be extremely difficult if the chips are rejected in the later
phase of the test process. Rather than depending on the detection of these ICs, we can add
DfAC measures such that they cannot enter into the supply chain for the first place. In Chapter
5, we will present FORTIS to prevent getting these ICs into the supply chain.
1.2.5 Cloned
Cloning is widely used by a range of adversaries/counterfeiters (from small entities to large
organizations) to copy a design in order to eliminate the large research and development (R&D)
costs of a part. Cloning is a major concern for semiconductor intellectual properties (IPs), such
as layouts, netlists and HDL design blocks as well as fabricated integrated circuits. Cloning can
be done by reverse engineering or by illegally obtaining semiconductor intellectual property
(IP) such as layouts, netlists etc. (also called IP theft). Cloning can also occur by unauthorized
knowledge transfer from a person with access to the part’s design. Such cloned components
violate intellectual property rights of the rightful IP owners and could cause them significant
losses in revenue. In Chapter 5, we will briefly discuss IP piracy and provide solutions to
prevent cloning.
1.2.6 Forged Documentation
The documentation shipped with any component contains information regarding its specifica-
tions, testing, certificates of conformance (CoC) and statement of work (SoW). By modifying
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or forging these documents, a component can be misrepresented and sold even if it is noncon-
forming or defective. It is often difficult to verify the authenticity of such documents because
the archived information for older designs and older parts may not be available at the OCM.
Legitimate documentation can also be copied and associated with parts from a lot that do not
correspond with the legitimate documentation. The incentive for counterfeiters and risks asso-
ciated with parts with forged documentation are similar to those discussed above for remarking.
1.2.7 Tampered
The vulnerabilities of ICs to malicious alteration has become predominant due to the globaliza-
tion of the semiconductor supply chain. ICs that have been tampered with can have dangerous
consequences to military infrastructures, aerospace systems, medical, financial, and transporta-
tion infrastructures, and commercial infrastructures. An adversary can insert a hardware Trojan
[26] in a design to interrupt its normal operation and/or disable it in the future, effectively
making it a “silicon time bomb”. A hardware Trojan may also create a backdoor that gives
access to critical system functionality or leaks secret information to an adversary. Hardware
Trojans can be implemented by modifying (i) the hardware in application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), microprocessors, microcontrollers, or (ii)
the bitstream for field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). A hardware Trojan can modify the
functionality of a design in a variety of ways. For example, a hardware Trojan can disable the
crypto module on a design and leak unencrypted plain text which can easily be intercepted,
or disable the system clock of a module for a small duration to launch a sabotage. A detailed
taxonomy for hardware Trojan can be found in [32].
Since the detection and avoidance of tampering is a large problem unto itself, we shall
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consider it beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested readers are suggested to read Integrated
Circuit Authentication: Hardware Trojans and Counterfeit Detection [26] for further informa-
tion on hardware Trojan insertion, detection, and prevention.
1.3 Supply Chain Vulnerability
Typically an electronic component will go through a process as shown in Figure 1.3. This
process includes design, fabrication, assembly, distribution, usage in the system, and finally end
of life. The vulnerabilities associated with each step are discussed in more detail below.
Supply Chain Vulnerability
Design Fabrication Assembly Distribution Lifetime End of Life/ Recycling
Cloned
Tampered
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Recycled
Remarked
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Defective
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Fig. 1.3: Electronic components supply chain vulnerabilities.
1.3.1 Design
The design implementation of large complex integrated circuits has evolved to a stage where it
is extremely challenging to complete the entire design in-house. The flow from RTL to GDSII
is performed in many different places (even in different countries) mainly to reduce the devel-
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opment cost and design-to-market time. Design reuse has also become an integral part of SoC
design. Hard IPs (layout level designs), firm IPs (designers can optimize codes with param-
eterized constraints), and soft IPs (synthesizable register-transfer level (RTL) designs) can be
used for this purpose. Attacks on the design stage can be performed in the two following ways:
(i) the counterfeiter can steal these IPs to create cloned components, (ii) the counterfeiter can
tamper with codes to modify the functionality, create backdoors, etc.
1.3.2 Fabrication
Today’s integrated circuits are manufactured in fabrication facilities (fabs) located all around
the world primarily to reduce the manufacturing cost. The design house contracts a foundry
to fabricate their designs, discloses the details of their IPs, and also pays for mask-building
costs based on their designs. The contract agreement between the foundry and design house is
protected by IP rights [33]. However, this contract foundry business model (namely horizontal
business model) creates a trust issue between the design house and foundry. The design house
must trust foundry not to overproduce ICs or pirate IPs. An untrusted foundry can potentially
(i) make extra/overproduced ICs, by hiding their yield, and selling those extra ICs in the open
market, (ii) tamper the design, and (iii) source defective and out-of-specification wafers to
packaging companies to make finished parts.
1.3.3 Assembly
After fabrication, the foundry send tested wafers to assembly to cut the wafers into dies, package
the dies, and perform final tests before being shipped to the market. An untrusted assembly
can (i) build overproduced ICs by hiding the yield information, (ii) sell the defective/out-of-
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specification ICs, and (iii) remark, forge, or upgrade a component’s marking.
1.3.4 Distribution
The tested ICs are sent either to the distributors or system integrators. The distributors sell those
ICs in the market. There are two types of distributors – authorized and unauthorized – existing
in the supply chain. The threat lies mostly from unauthorized distributors, where the identity of
the distributors are obscure. There are several reports pointing to phony distributors potentially
sourcing all seven types of counterfeit components in the supply chain.
1.3.5 System Integration/Lifetime
System integration is the process of assembling together all the components and subsystems into
one complete system. An untrusted system integrator can potentially use all types of counterfeit
components in their system. They can maximize the profit by using the cheap or tampered
counterfeit components.
1.3.6 End of life/Resign
When electronics age or become outdated, they are typically retired/resigned and subsequently
replaced. Proper disposal techniques are highly advised to extract precious metals and to pre-
vent hazardous materials (lead, chromium, mercury, etc.) from harming the environment [34].
Yet, these techniques are largely ignored, resulting in a large amount of electronic waste or e-
waste. For instance, in the United States, only 25% of electronic waste was properly recycled
in 2009 [7]. That percentage might be lower for many other countries. A profitable business
has grown out of reclaiming used components from this e-waste, remarking them, and then,
18
re-inserting them into the supply chain as new components. According to current reports, these
recycled and remarked components account for over 80% of the reported counterfeit parts in
the supply chain [35] and represent a growing threat [36]. Also, in this stage the counterfeiter
can potentially tamper used components for sabotage or malfunction.
1.4 Counterfeit Defects
Counterfeit defects are those anomalies and changes that are not typically found in authentic
parts. A counterfeit part may often contains one or more different anomalies, deviation from
normal and usual form and/or functionality of a genuine component. These anomalies may be
on the leads/package, degradation in its performance, or a change in its specifications. Since
we assume that the assemblies comprehensively test their components, we should not expect
any defects in genuine parts. Any anomalies or defective behaviors in a part must, therefore, be
attributed to its being counterfeit.
To determine the effectiveness of a test plan, which consists of a sequence of tests (see
Section 1.5), it is necessary to determine how many different defects are detected by it. Not
same defects are simultaneously visible in all counterfeit components. Different defects are
present in this wide variety of counterfeit components. It would be better to detect more defects
to achieve higher confidence of detecting a component as counterfeit. Thus there is an urgent
need to find out all possible defects present in different counterfeit components.
Figure 1.4 shows a detailed taxonomy of the counterfeit defects, which was introduced
in [12] [13] [9] [14]. In this section, we present a comprehensive taxonomy of defects, which
is divided into four categories: procedural, mechanical, environmental, and electrical. The
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Fig. 1.4: A taxonomy of the defects and anomalies present in counterfeit components.
detailed descriptions of these defects can be found in our book Counterfeit Integrated Circuits:
Detection and Avoidance [12].
1.4.1 Procedural Defects
The components are traveled in the supply chain with proper protection against shipping, han-
dling, and environments. Any damage or without that protection may cause the components fail
during operation, and they must not be accepted as reliable components. Again, the customers
should receive documents verifying the authenticity of the components they purchased based
on purchasing requirements. If there is a mismatch exist between the documents received com-
pared to the original, then this would be flagged for further testing. These procedural defects
are related to the packaging and shipping of components and the markings of the component
itself. Figure 1.5 shows a taxonomy of procedural defects.
1.4.2 Mechanical Defects
Figure 1.6 shows a detailed taxonomy of mechanical defects. These defects are directly related
to components’ physical properties. For example, leads on an IC can show how the part has
been handled if it was previously used. Physically, leads should adhere to datasheet specifica-
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Fig. 1.5: Procedural defects.
tions, including straightness, pitch, separation, etc. The leads’ final coating should be consistent
throughout the entire lot, as well. Leads should also have a consistent elemental construction.
The package of an IC provide significant information. For example, this is the location where
all model numbers, country of origin, date codes, and other information are etched. If the pack-
age exhibits any sanding or grinding marks externally, it has likely been remarked. Further
inspection for the blacktop coating should be done to determine whether this is the case. Ghost
markings, color variations, improper textures, and extraneous markings on the package clearly
indicate that a part has been reused.
1.4.3 Environmental Defects
Environmental defects are caused when the environmental parameters interact with the outer
structure of a component. Oxidation and corrosion on leads are caused when a part is kept a
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Fig. 1.6: Mechanical defects.
long time without proper protection. Again, during the recycling process, the leads can easily
get oxidized at higher temperatures and contaminated by other materials. Figure 1.7 shows a
taxonomy of environmental defects.
Environmental
Leads/Balls/Columns Package
NL2: Oxidation/Corrosion
NL1: Contamination
NP1: Abnormal 
Package Conditions
NP2: Contamination
Fig. 1.7: Environmental defects.
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1.4.4 Electrical Defects
Typical electrical defects can be classified into two distinct categories: These are parametric
defects and manufacturing defects, both of which are shown in Figure 1.4. Parametric defects
are the manifestation of the shift of component parameters due to prior usage or temperature .
A shift in circuit parameters due to aging will occur when a chip is used in the field for some
time. Aging of a chip used in the field can be attributed to four distinct phenomena, which are
becoming more prevalent as feature size shrinks. The most dominant phenomena are negative
bias temperature instability (NBTI) [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] and hot carrier injection (HCI) [42]
[43] [44] [41] which is prominent in PMOS and NMOS devices, respectively. NBTI occurs
in p-channel MOS devices stressed with negative gate voltages and elevated temperature due
to the generation of interface traps at the Si/SiO2 interface. Removal of the stress can anneal
some of the interface traps, but not completely. As a result, it manifests as the increase of
threshold voltage (Vth) and absolute off current (Io f f ) and the decrease of absolute drain current
(IDSat) and transconductance (gm). HCI occurs in NMOS devices caused by the trapped interface
charge at Si/SiO2 surface near the drain end during switching. It results in non recoverable Vth
degradation. These effects also lead to out-of-spec leakage current and out-of-spec transient
current. Delay defects are also the direct effect of all the parametric variations mentioned above.
Figure 1.8 shows a detailed taxonomy of electrical defects.
1.5 Test Methods
As the incidents of counterfeit components in the electronic component supply chain are on
the rise, it has become necessary for manufacturers, distributors, and users of electronic com-
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Fig. 1.8: Electrical defects.
ponents to inspect all incoming electronic components for authenticity. All components must
go through a detailed acceptance test before being used in the system to ensure that they meet
the quality and reliability requirements and that they are authentic, especially when they are
used in critical infrastructures such as aerospace, medical, transportation, etc. We introduce a
detailed taxonomy of counterfeit detection methods in [9] [11] [8] [13] [14]. Figure 1.9 shows a
taxonomy of counterfeit detection methods. They are broadly classified into two distinct types
– physical tests and electrical tests. The detailed descriptions of all these physical and electrical
tests can be found in [12].
1.5.1 Physical Tests
Physical tests are performed to examine the physical and chemical/material properties of the
component’s package, leads and die of a component in order to detect procedural, mechanical,
and environmental counterfeit defects (Section 1.4). When an order is received, it first goes
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Fig. 1.9: A taxonomy of test methods for the detection of counterfeit components.
through an incoming inspection. All the components under test are inspected thoroughly. The
exterior part of the package and leads of the component are analyzed by using exterior tests.
The physical dimensions of the components are measured either by hand-held or automated test
equipment. Any abnormal deviation of measurement from the specification sheet indicates that
it may be a counterfeit component.
The internal structures, die and bond wires of the components are inspected by delid/
decapsulation. There are three mainstream methods commercially available for decapsulation.
These are chemical, mechanical or laser-based solutions. Chemical decapsulation involves etch-
ing away the package with an acid solution. Newer laser-based techniques can remove an area
of the package. Mechanical decapsulation involves grinding the part until the die is exposed.
Once the part has been decapsulated and the required structures exposed, the interior tests need
to be performed. The chemical composition of the component is verified using material analy-
sis. This is the only category of tests that can detect defects and anomalies related to materials.
Defects such as wrong materials, contamination, oxidation of leads and packages, etc., can be
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detected. There are several tests that can perform material analysis including X-Ray fluores-
cence, energy dispersive spectroscopy, etc.
1.5.2 Electrical Tests
The correct functionality of a component is efficiently verified by electrical tests. The non-
destructive nature of these tests, they can be very efficient of detecting counterfeit components.
Electrical tests are the only way to determine the correct functionality of a component. These
tests are a very efficient and non-destructive way of detecting counterfeit components. Majority
of the counterfeit defects (see Section 1.4) can effectively be detected by electrical tests. Cur-
rently, there are curve tracing, key electrical parameters testing, and burn-in tests are widely
used for counterfeit IC detection.
Curve tracing is gaining popularity in the detection of counterfeit components as it tests
ICs non-destructively and without requiring extensive details of the ICs under test. It is not nec-
essary to require a golden IC during authentication. In a typical curve tracer, standard voltage or
current curves can be generated for any combination of pins of the ICs. These traces are formed
by sweeping voltage V over a specified range and plotting the current I. The traces follow the
Ohm’s Law of V = I ∗Z, where Z is the impedance between the pins of an IC.
Testing of the key parameters, along with functional testing for evaluating the parameters,
is the most effective way of verifying the functionality of a component. These tests, which are
usually conducted at room temperature (25◦C) or even higher temperatures, are generally used
to test components on the manufacturing floor of assemblies in order to increase confidence that
the packaged ICs are free from defects and anomalies. These tests can be useful in detecting
counterfeit components, especially those re-marked to a higher grade part. A counterfeit com-
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ponent may fail under these tests if any defects and anomalies are present within it. By checking
the correct functionality of a component, a glut of gross defects related to leads/balls/columns,
bond wires, and die related defects can easily be detected. However, these tests are perhaps
the most expensive test methods available for the detection of counterfeit components when
performed on complex devices. For the functional tests, a series of algorithms that exercise and
test specific elements of the design are needed which requires an expensive test setup and the
development of complex test programs.
The reliability of a device is mainly ensured by burn-in tests [45]. In burn-in tests, the
device is operated at stressed conditions to accentuate infant mortality and other unexpected
failures. Such failures are often due to the latent defects, which do not necessarily expose them-
selves and may be skipped during manufacturing tests. Due to the electrical and thermal stresses
during the usage in the field, these defects eventually expose themselves and, consequently, the
devices shall fail to produce the correct functionality. During burn-in tests, the devices are op-
erated at elevated levels of electrical (higher supply voltage) and thermal (higher temperature)
stresses which accelerates the device’s degradation. As a result, months to years of life time of
the device are consumed in hours, allowing one to detect the presence of latent defects. Thus,
by performing such tests, one can assure the reliability of a device over time as well as harsh
conditions.
1.5.3 Challenges and Limitations of the Test Methods
The counterfeiting of ICs is a multifaceted and evolving problem. Counterfeiters are enriching
their knowledge and technology as they are getting mature in this illegal business. The test
methods that are capable of detecting counterfeit ICs today, may not be efficient in the near
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future. Thus, it is important to analyze the limitations and challenges to implement these tests.
The physical and electrical test methods described above provide some unique challenges for
the detection of counterfeit ICs.
Physical Tests
Physical Tests suffers from several limitations and implementation challenges. In the following,
we will describe them in details.
• Counterfeit Types: The physical inspections are primarily designed to detect recycled
and remarked ICs. These tests are not applicable for authenticating any other counterfeit
(overproduced, cloned, and out-of-spec/defective) types.
• Dynamic Nature: The dynamic nature of counterfeiting makes the detection even more
challenging. Counterfeiters are evolving and adapting to new ways of making more de-
ceptive counterfeit product. Currently, detection is mostly based on inspecting the physi-
cal appearances of devices. It is hardly a matter of time before these test methods will be
ineffective in the near future.
• Sampling: Most of the physical tests are destructive. Sample preparation is extremely im-
portant as it directly relates to test confidence. If a few counterfeit components are mixed
with a large batch, the probability of selecting the counterfeit ones for test is extremely
small.
• Test Time and Cost: The test time and cost are major limiting factors in the use of physical
tests for counterfeit detection. The equipment used for physical inspections (e.g., SEM
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and SAM) are not custom-designed to detect counterfeit parts. It takes several hours to
test a single component in detail.
• Automation: These tests are done in an ad-hoc fashion with no metrics for quantifying
against a set of counterfeit types, anomalies, and defects. Most of the tests are carried out
without automation.
• Metrics: Currently, there are no metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of physical inspec-
tions. The test results mostly depend on the subject matter experts (SMEs). The decision-
making process is entirely dependent on the operator (or SMEs) – this is indeed error
prone. A chip could be considered counterfeit in one lab while it could be marked as
authentic in another lab. This was proven by a test run by Honeywell, where some labs
reported a chip as counterfeit and others labeled it authentic [46].
Electrical Tests
Electrical tests have the potential to be an efficient means of counterfeit detection, as they do
not have the same limitations of physical inspections. However, there are major challenges that
are unique to electrical tests and they are as follows:
• Process Variation: Due to increased process variations and environmental variations
(temperature, noise, aging, etc.), the electrical parameters of a component vary signifi-
cantly. It will be very difficult to conclude whether the variations in the parameters of a
component are due to the aging (for recycled and remarked components) or to the process
variations in the circuit. One can perform a statistical analysis based on the data observed
from the parametric tests to determine the confidence level that a part is counterfeit with
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or without a golden IC. The efficiency of such analysis must be proven on a large number
of golden and counterfeit parts.
• Test Time and Cost: Burn-in tests are useful in detecting infant mortality failures of com-
ponents [12]. However, because of excessive test time (tens of hours) and cost, these tests
are only attractive and useful only for critical and high-risk applications.
• Function Verification: Test program generation for obsolete and active parts with limited
knowledge of the part will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The requirement
of having a high-speed tester in order to apply functional test patterns to chips make it
extremely expensive. It is nearly impossible to get the complete set of test vectors for
an obsolete part from the OCM. In some cases, the OCM may no longer exist or the
information required may no longer be available in archived records at the OCM.
• Counterfeit Types: These tests not designed for the detection of overproduced ICs. The
cloned ICs cannot be detected by these tests if the device operates within the specification.
1.6 Design-for-Anti-Counterfeit Measures
The detection of counterfeit ICs poses a significant challenge to securing global electronic com-
ponent supply chain due to the lack of efficient, robust, and low-cost detection and avoidance
technologies. While there are electrical and physical tests described above (Section 1.5) to iden-
tify counterfeit ICs, these approaches are usually suffered by several challenges and limitations
(Section 1.5.3). In this section, we discuss alternative approaches that can be integrated into
new components to detect and prevent different counterfeit ICs. These approaches are a part of
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the design methodology to detect counterfeit components, which we term as Design-for-Anti-
Counterfeit (DfAC) measures.
Components
Type State
Obsolete
Active
New
Size
Small
Medium
Analog
Digital
Mixed-Signal Large
Fig. 1.10: Taxonomy of component types.
Different types of components (shown in Figure 1.10) can significantly impact the imple-
mentation of DfAC measures. Components can be classified by their type, size and state. The
descriptions for the type and size are self-explanatory. We categorize state into three distinct
types – obsolete, active, and new. Obsolete refers to components which are no longer man-
ufactured by original component manufacturers (OCM) as they may switch to newer designs
to improve performance, reliability, and/or manufacturing cost. These components are only be
available through OCM authorized or independent distributors of electronic components. Ac-
tive components are still being manufactured by OCMs, but their designs cannot be changed
because of – (i) the extra cost of developing new masks and (ii) performance and reliability
concerns. New components are very flexible in implementing avoidance measures as they are
still in the design phase where the OCM can – (i) validate the performance and reliability pa-
rameters and (ii) modify masks.
Figure 1.11 shows the taxonomy of currently available DfAC measures. It can be broadly
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classified into two categories – die level and package level.
Design-for-Anti-Counterfeit 
(DfAC) Measures
Die Level Package Level
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF)
Hardware Metering (HM)
Combating Die and IC Recycling (CDIR)
Electronic Chip ID (ECID)
DNA Markings (DNA)
Nanorods (NR)
Secure Split Test (SST)
Fig. 1.11: A taxonomy of DfAC measures.
1.6.1 Die Level
Techniques to design DfAC measures are based on extracting unique features and parameters
from a circuit to help uniquely identify each chip. These solutions needs to be embedded into
the die during the manufacturing of ICs. These die level technologies are described below:
Physically Unclonable Functions
PUFs have received much attention from the hardware security and cryptography communities
as a new approach for IC identification, authentication, and on-chip key generation [47] [48]
[49] [50] [51]. Silicon PUFs exploit inherent physical variations (process variations) that exist in
modern integrated circuits. These variations are uncontrollable and unpredictable, making PUFs
suitable for IC identification and authentication [52] [53]. These variations can help generate
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a unique signature for each IC in a challenge-response form, which allows later identification
of genuine ICs. In recent years, various PUF architectures have been proposed. They are the
arbiter PUF [54] [55], the ring oscillator PUF [48] [54], the SRAM PUF [56] [57], memristor
PUF [58]. etc.
PUFs can be used to detect cloned ICs as they generate unique IDs resulting from ran-
domness in the IC manufacturing process that cannot be controlled or cloned. These unique IDs
of the genuine ICs can be stored in a secured database for future comparison. Overproduced ICs
can also be detected, by searching the chip IDs under authentication in these secured databases.
If no match is found, there is a high probability that the IC is not registered and is a member of
an overproduced type.
Hardware Metering
Hardware metering is a set of security protocols that enables the design house to achieve post-
fabrication control of the produced ICs. The design house can distinguish different ICs produced
with the same masks, as hardware metering provides a unique way to tag each chip and/or its
functionality [59] [24]. Hardware metering approaches can be either passive or active. Passive
approaches uniquely identify each IC and register the IC using challenge-response pairs. Later,
suspect ICs taken from the market are checked for proper registration [48] [50] [59] [60] [61]
[62]. Active metering approaches, however, lock each IC until it is unlocked by the IP holder
[53] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67]. This locking is done in a variety of ways, including: (i) initializing
ICs to a locked state on power-up [53], (ii) combinational locking by, for instance, scattering
XOR gates randomly throughout the design [65–67], and (iii) adding a finite-state machine
(FSM) which is initially locked and can be unlocked only with the correct sequence of primary
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inputs [64] [68].
Secure Split-Test
Due to the globalization of the semiconductor industry and the prohibitively high cost of cre-
ating foundries and assembly companies for packaging, test, and burn-in processes, foundries
now often fabricate the wafers/dies, test them, and ship them to the assembly. The assembly
then packages the dies, tests them, and ships the ICs to the market. The foundry/assembly,
however, can ship defective, out-of-spec, or even overproduced chips to the black market, as
described in Section 1.2. Secure Split-Test (SST) secures the manufacturing test process to pre-
vent counterfeits, allowing intellectual property (IP) owners to protect and meter their IPs [25]
[69] [70]. SST introduces hardware components for cryptography and to block the correct func-
tionality of an IC until it is activated by the IP owner. In SST, IP owner/trusted party decides
whether a chip is functionally correct or not. Besides, SST is designed to be resilient against
different types of attacks to prevent the IC from being activated without IP owner’s key. SST
introduces the IP owner back into the manufacturing test process. SST is designed to prevent
different types of counterfeited ICs such as cloned, overproduced, defective/out-of-spec ICs.
Combating Die and IC Recycling (CDIR)
The first CDIR to prevent parts from being recycled has been presented in [1] [71]. The tech-
nique in [1] inserts a light-weight sensor in the chip to capture the usage of the chip in the field
and provides an easy detection capability. This type of sensor relies on the aging effects of
MOSFETs to change a ring oscillator frequency in comparison with the golden one embedded
in the chip. As a part used in the field ages because of the wearout mechanisms such as NBTI
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and HCI, the shift in the frequency of this sensor indicates the level of aging and provides a
simple readout of the value.
The antifuse-based CDIR sensor first proposed for recycled IC detection appeared in
[72]. It is composed of counters and an embedded antifuse memory block. The counters are
used to record the usage time of ICs while its value is continuously stored in an antifuse memory
block. Since the antifuse memory block is one time programmable, counterfeiters can not erase
the context during the recycling process. Two different structures of the AF-based sensor have
been proposed to measure the usage time of ICs. CAF-based sensor records the cycle count
of the system clock during chip operation. The usage time of recycled ICs can be reported by
this sensor, and the measurement scale and total measurement time could be adjusted according
to the application of ICs. On the other hand, SAF-based sensor uses circuit activity as trig-
ger (clock) to the counter. A number of signals with low switching probability is selected to
calculate the usage time. It generally requires less area overhead than the CAF-based sensor.
Electronic Chip ID (ECID)
To track ICs throughout the supply chain, each IC needs to be tagged with a unique ID. This
electronic chip ID (ECID) can be easily read during the chip’s lifetime. The conventional
approach for writing the unique ID into a non-programmable memory (such as One-Time-
Programmable [OTP], ROM, etc.) requires post-fabrication external programming, such as
laser fuses [73] or electrical fuses (eFuses) [74]. The eFuse is gaining popularity over the laser
fuse because of its small area and scalability [74]. ECID can only be useful to detect remarked
ICs only and can be subjected to cloning.
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1.6.2 Package Level
The DfAC measures discussed so far only target new ICs. However, a large portion of the supply
chain is populated by active and obsolete components (see Figure 1.10). There is no opportunity
for adding any extra hardware to create DfAC measures in those designs. For tagging such active
and obsolete components, we need to create DfAC measures on the package level such that one
does not require the access to designs. No package modifications should be allowed during the
implementation of such measures. DNA markings, and Nanorods are three viable options for
creating such measures.
DNA Markings
Plant DNA is scrambled to create new and unique genetic sequences, and these new sequences
integrated with inks. These inks are then applied on the packages of the ICs at the end of
the packaging process. Authentication includes first checking whether the ink fluoresces under
specific light, and second sending a sample of the ink to a lab to verify that the DNA is in the
database of valid sequences [75]. Recently, DoD mandated [76] the DNA marking be placed on
the components in order to track them throughout the supply chain. DNA markings have several
limitations that introduce some serious concerns of their applicability in counterfeit avoidance.
The fast authentication achieved by observing the fluorescence of the marking under specific
light can be imitated by counterfeiters, either by invalid DNA or by other materials. But detailed
DNA validation is extremely time-consuming and costly [77].
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Nanorods
IBM researchers introduced gold nanorods on a surface using a simple printing process [78].
In this technique, a microscopic pattern is created by growing an array of nanospheres into
nanorods that are less than 100nm long. Each time the process is repeated, the same pattern
is created, but the exact angle and length of each individual nanorod varies, so that each set
of nanorods is distinct. After the array of nanorods is grown, it is applied to a chip using a
specialized printer. A chip with gold nanrods on its surface can be authenticated by comparing
the overall pattern and visual properties of each nanorod to a database. Along with nanorods,
IBM researchers also created different patterns using red, green and blue fluorescent spheres
[79]. A fluorescence microscope image (channel overlay) is formed, which consists of 1-m
diameter fluorescent polystyrene spheres assembled in a corner array. Here, the color of the
sphere is not predictable even though the position of single particles is known. It is impossible to
reproduce the same colored arrays as the number of possible color combinations is considerably
large.
1.6.3 Challenges and Limitations
We believe that research in the DfAC measures to prevent counterfeit ICs is still in its infancy.
There are major challenges that must be overcome in the development of effective test methods.
In this section, we will discuss the challenges, which urgently need to be resolved in the near fu-
ture. Table 1.3 presents a comparative study of all the different counterfeit DfAC technologies.
We have assigned each technology a score of high, medium, or low, depending on effectiveness
[9] [10].
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Reliability
A major issue that must be overcome for many of these techniques is reliability. For example,
the response of a PUF must be constant for a given challenge over a wide range of environmental
variations, ambient noise, and aging effects. Hardware metering approaches may also have
similar reliability problem as they use PUFs. Reliability and robustness are the major challenges
to incorporate the PUF in real applications [80] [81] [82]. Several designs have been proposed
to make the PUF robust, unique, and reliable [81] [82] [80]. We still believe that much work
needs to be done in the reliability domain. There is a serious reliability concern regarding
DNA marking, as environmental conditions such as high temperatures can potentially damage
the DNA and either make the sequence unreadable or change the sequence. The reliability of
nanorods are not yet been verified.
Uniqueness
It is a measure of randomness between two IDs produced from DfAC measures. Ideally, two
IDs should differ with a probability of 0.5 under the same test conditions. Better uniqueness
makes it difficult for counterfeiters to guess new IDs after obtaining a set of IDs. PUFs and
magnetic PUFs produce responses nearly equal to the ideal case [83]. In DNA, due to the very
large number of base pairs, there are enough sequences to support billions of unique markings.
However, in the fast-authentication mode of DNA testing, the observation of a specific “light”
can be easily imitated by an adversary. For nanorods, the uniqueness of the marking is based
on the number of nanorods in the pattern and the sensitivity of the measuring device to color
and intensity of light. Since the exact angle of each individual nanorod is random, it is very
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unlikely that the same process will produce the same result, and manually cloning the marking
at nanoscale is not practical.
Tamper resistance
The difficulty faced by the attacker/counterfeiter when attempting to disable the counterfeit
avoidance system is referred to as tamper resistance. It is extremely difficult to physically clone
the IDs generated by PUFs. The CDIR sensors also provide high tamper resistance because they
employ unavoidable aging. It is easy to clone the ECID as it is static and readable. It is easy
for counterfeiters to imitate the color generated by DNA markings during fast-authentication
mode. The tamper resistance of nanorods has not yet been verified.
Area overhead
It provides the area required on the die to implement a counterfeit avoidance measure. PUFs,
CDIR sensors and ECID require low area overhead whereas hardware metering, and SST offer
medium area overhead. DNA markings, nanorods, and magnetic PUFs do not require any area
overhead on the die.
Target counterfeit types
Different available technologies target different counterfeit types. PUFs can detect remarked,
overproduced, and cloned counterfeit types. SST can likely detect overproduced, out-of-spec/defective,
and cloned component types. CDIR sensors are designed to target recycled and remarked types.
ECID can potentially detect remarked type. DNA markings, and nanorods can detect recycled
and remarked counterfeit types.
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Target components
Another challenge to consider is what type of components should be targeted for implement-
ing DfAC measures. DNA markings, and nanorods may be implemented in both analog and
digital components whereas the other DfAC measures can only target the digital components.
From Figure 1.12, it is clear that we have only DNA and NR to address the avoidance of small
component types (small digital, entire analog and mixed signal components). However, as we
described earlier that the authentication and reliability issues with DNA and NR, these entire
spectrum of components need much more attention to the research community. Again, there
are no technologies available to us to address the authentication of these components to prevent
overproduced and out-of-spec/defective types getting into the supply chain.
Implementation cost
The cost for implementing a PUF would entail storing and maintaining the challenge-response
pairs in a secure database, along with its area overhead. For hardware metering and SST, back-
and-forth communication between the design house and foundry make it expensive to imple-
ment. For CDIRs, the cost comes from the area overhead. To authenticate the ICs, low-cost
equipment is required. We need only a secure database to store the ECID. Thus, the cost from
area overhead is negligible. The detailed authentication for identifying the plant DNA applied
to the IC is expensive.
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1.6.4 Summary of DfAC Measures
The prior work for detecting counterfeit ICs can be categorized in different groups discussed
above. As all the previously discussed DfAC measures have limitations, we propose new DfAC
measures to detect the complete spectrum of counterfeit ICs. Figure 1.12 illustrates the DfAC
technologies we have identified to detect various counterfeit ICs. The x-axis and y-axis rep-
resent the counterfeit types and component types respectively. The component types on the
y-axis are arranged top to bottom from lowest to highest frequency of counterfeit incidents in
the supply chain [3].
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Fig. 1.12: Counterfeit avoidance technologies.
We develop the technologies which are represented in red and will be presented in Chap-
ters 3, 4, and 5 in detail.
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1.7 Organization
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The motivation, background, and contributions are pro-
vided in Chapter 1. This chapter provides a detailed introduction to counterfeit ICs, and all the
information necessary to know about counterfeit ICs. A comprehensive taxonomy of counter-
feit ICS, the vulnerabilities present in the different stages of the electronic component supply
chain, all counterfeit defects, and an overview of the current state-of-the-art test methods for
counterfeit IC detection. The challenges and limitations for existing tests and test procedures
are also discussed in this chapter. We also describe orthogonal approaches for addressing coun-
terfeit detection and avoidance. Rather than relying on expensive test equipment and setups,
these approaches integrate new test structures and primitives into the die and/or package (i.e.,
DfAC measures) to actively target different counterfeit types with much greater ease.
Chapter 2 introduces novel test metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of currently available
physical and electrical tests. We have developed a web-based tool called Assessment Framework
for this purpose. The framework provides two options - (i) static assessment where an user can
evaluate a preexisting test plan based on our newly developed test metrics; and (ii) dynamic
assessment where the user finds an optimum set of test methods to maximize CDC under test
time and cost constraints.
Chapter 3 presents several low-cost solutions for combating die and IC recycling (CDIR)
and to detect recycling in wide range of electronic component types (from large digital ICs to
small analog and discrete components). These solutions include light-weight, on-chip structures
based on ring oscillators (RO-CDIR), and fuses (F-CDIR). Each structure meets the unique
needs and limitations of different part types and sizes providing excellent coverage of recy-
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cled parts. We present the effectiveness of our proposed negative-bias temperature instability
(NBTI)-aware RO-CDIR for detecting ICs. Small analog and digital recycled components can
be identified by testing our F-CDIR with very low cost measurement devices, e.g., a multimeter.
Chapter 4 introduces two improved CDIRs, which can efficiently detect recycled ICs
with little misprediction when the chips are aged for a very short period of time. We present
a new N-CDIR with multiple reference and stressed RO-pairs. We introduce an averaging ap-
proach to reduce the impact of process variations during the estimation of a threshold which will
be used in the authentication process. We call this design multiple-pair NBTI-aware RO CDIR
with averaging (AN-CDIR). This design provides a much better detection for ICs used for only
few hours in the field with the cost of small misprediction. In addition, we propose another
modified design of N-CDIR by adding multiple NBTI-aware reference and stressed RO-pairs
like AN-CDIR. However, in this case we propose a selection algorithm to find the best ref-
erence and stressed RO-pair. We call this design multiple-pair NBTI-aware RO CDIR with
selection (SN-CDIR). This CDIR with the best selected RO-pair, provides even better detection
(no misprediction) of recycled ICs, even if they have been used only for a few hours, unlike
the AN-CDIR. These CDIRs (AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR) are based on multiple NBTI-aware
reference-stressed RO-pairs.
Chapter 5 presents a comprehensive solution for preventing IP piracy and IC overproduc-
tion by assuring forward trust between all entities involved in the system-on-chip (SoC) design
and fabrication process. We propose a novel design flow to prevent IC overproduction and IP
overuse. We use an existing logic encryption technique to obfuscate the netlist of an SoC or
a 3PIP and propose a modification to enable manufacturing tests before the activation of chips
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which is absolutely necessary to prevent overproduction. We have used asymmetric and sym-
metric key encryption, in a fashion similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), to transfer keys from
the SoC designer or 3PIP owners to the chips. In addition, we also propose to attach an IP digest
(a cryptographic hash of the entire IP) to the header of an IP to prevent modification of the IP
by the SoC designers. We have shown that our approach is resistant to various attacks with the
cost of minimal area overhead.
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 6 with suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Assessment of Counterfeit Detection Methods
Because of the deficiencies in today’s testing mechanisms, the detection of counterfeit inte-
grated circuits has become a major challenge [8] [9] [10]. The detection of such components is
still in its infancy, and there are major challenges that must be overcome in order for effective
counterfeit detection methods to be deployed. Because counterfeiting is an evolving problem
with counterfeiters acquiring increasing amounts of experience with each passing day, we must
make every effort to stay ahead of them so that we can prevent the widespread infiltration of
counterfeit parts into our critical infrastructures. By detecting counterfeit parts efficiently, we
can also enhance the public’s confidence in the security of systems that surround them. In order
to achieve this goal, we must be able to continuously monitor counterfeiting activity and assess
counterfeit detection methods in order to evaluate their effectiveness in detecting counterfeit
components. We also need to develop a common platform to evaluate the efficacy of a set of
test methods.
In this chapter, we will first develop metrics for evaluating test methods. These test met-
rics are (i) counterfeit defect coverage (CDC) to represent the confidence of detecting defects
by a set of test methods, (ii) counterfeit type coverage (CTC) to represent the confidence of
detecting specific counterfeit types by the same set of test methods, (iii) under-covered defects
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(UCDs) and not covered defects (NCDs) to identify the defects those are partially detected and
missed for a given set of tests. We will then present Assessment Framework for (i) assessing
a set of test methods to evaluate their effectiveness based on these newly developed metrics.
We call this as static assessment. (ii) selecting a set of test methods to maximize the test cov-
erage considering test cost and time budget and (iii) deciding on the best set of test methods
for achieving maximum test coverage. We call the combination of (ii) and (iii) as dynamic
assessment. The assessment of test methods was initially introduced in [14] [13].
2.1 Test Lab Comparison Analysis
Assessing the capabilities of different test labs is now an urgent requirement. Honeywell per-
formed round robin testing in 2012 and 2013 to certify different test laboratories (labs) and
evaluate their capabilities [46] [84]. In 2012, they gave five samples of one counterfeit part
(National Semiconductor DAC1230LCJ) and one authentic part (Tundra CA91L860B-50CE)
to twelve test labs. The labs were encouraged to process the parts as per their standard flow
with no special processing. It is of great surprise that some test labs failed to detect the coun-
terfeit components and few others could not identify the authentic ones. In 2013, Honeywell
performed this assessment again with six test labs providing five samples of two counterfeit
parts (Intel TB28F400B5T80, and TDK C5750Y5V1H226Z). All the test labs correctly identi-
fied these counterfeit parts. However, they missed several defects (see Section 1.4) present in
these counterfeit components.
The following were the conclusions drawn from the above test lab comparison [46]:
(i) the test labs showed improved performance in identifying counterfeit parts as they gained
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greater experience and exposure to different counterfeit parts, and (ii) these labs accurately
detect some easy-to-detect counterfeit defects related to blacktopping, dimension and color
variations, and solder issues, but they had more difficulty with hard-to-detect defects related to
lead finish, dimple depth, improper materials, and electrical parameters. For some labs, defect
identification was as low as 32%. Thus, there is an urgent need to assess test labs’ capability in
terms of quantitative measures, which will finally lead to the development of test metrics.
2.2 Terminologies used for Assessment Framework
The purpose of assessing test methods is to establish the effectiveness of the testing currently
being performed to detect counterfeit components. To make it easy to understand the assessment
process, we will first describe several key elements that will be used as inputs to our proposed
assessment framework (see Section 2.4).
2.2.1 Tier Level
Tier level (T L) was introduced in AS6171 [28] as a means of assessing the risk associated
with the use of a part while also determining the recommended level of testing that should be
performed. While assessing risk, three main factors was taken into consideration: (i) the final
product in which a part is used, (ii) the functionality of a part within a product, and (iii) quality
attributes associated with the supplier that sells or distributes parts to various entities in the
electronics supply chain. One can find a detailed description of T L in [28]. It is extremely
important for user/requester to know the tier level they belong, before implementing a test plan
for the screening of counterfeit parts.
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Table 2.1: Target confidences for different Tier Levels.
Tier Level Risk Category Target Confidence (TC)
4 Critical 0.90
3 High 0.8
2 Moderate 0.65
1 Low 0.5
0 Very Low 0.35
2.2.2 Target Confidence
The target confidence (TC) for each defect is the level of confidence achieved after performing
a set of tests. The value of TC for each tier level is shown in Column 3 of Table 2.1. The value
of TC increases from very low to critical tier applications. We need to have higher levels of
test confidence for each defect in order for higher tier levels to increase the overall level of test
confidence. Based on this confidence, we will develop under-covered defects (Section 2.3.4)
and guide dynamic test assessment (Section 2.4.2).
2.2.3 Test Methods
The test methods (M) are outlined in Section 1.5. One can find a detailed description in [12]
[28]. All test methods are associated with their corresponding cost (C) and time (T ). The test
cost and time are defined as the cost and time involved in testing one batch of components.
2.2.4 Counterfeit defects
Counterfeit defects (D) are defined as the defects and anomalies seen in electronic components.
These defects are presented in Section 1.4. One can find a detailed description of these defects
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in [12]. Test methods are assessed based on their ability to detect one or more defects, and test
confidence increases as the number of detected defects increases.
2.2.5 Confidence Level Matrix
The confidence level matrix (CL) represents the capability of test methods to detect counterfeit
defects. When a test is performed, it detects some of the counterfeit defects. However, it does
not necessarily follow that the same test will detect the same defects in different counterfeit
components. Generally a confidence is involved in this detection process. In this CL matrix,
each entry represents a certain level of confidence for detecting a defect by a given test method.
CL = [xi j]m,n
where, xi j is the probability of detecting a defect j by a method i. Here, the rows and columns
of CL are denoted as the methods and the defects, respectively.
If two or more methods detect the same defect, then the resultant confidence level will
be increased and is given by the following equation,
xR j = 1−
ms
∏
i=1
(
1− xi j
)
for defect j (2.1)
where ms represents the number of tests in the recommended test set. The vector for resultant
confidence becomes,
xR = [xR1 xR2 . . . xRn] (2.2)
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2.2.6 Defect Frequency
Defect frequency (DF) is defined as how frequently the defect is visible in a counterfeit com-
ponent. This is one of the key parameters for evaluating test coverage, as the detection of high
frequency defects has more of an impact than the detection of low frequency defects.
2.2.7 Decision Index
The decision index (DI) is defined as the probability that a counterfeit type contains one or more
known counterfeit defects. It can also be interpreted as the probability of identifying a compo-
nent belonging to a counterfeit type after targeting all defects. It is not necessarily true that
every occurrence of a counterfeit type will contain a one or more defects. For example, DI may
approach zero for certain counterfeit types - such as overproduced and cloned counterfeit types
- due to the rare occurrence of defects. Table 2.2 shows the DI values for different counterfeit
types.
Table 2.2: Decision index for each counterfeit type.
Counterfeit Type Decision Index
Recycled 0.98
Remarked 0.90
Overproduced 0.03
Out-of-Spec/Defective 0.50
Cloned 0.10
Forged Documentation 0.70
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Table 2.3: Terminologies used in our proposed method selection algorithm
Terminology Notation
Test Methods M = [M1 M2 . . . Mm], where m is the number of test methods.
Test Cost C = [C1 C2 . . . Cm]
Test Time T = [T1 T2 . . . Tm]
Counterfeit Defects D = [D1 D2 . . . Dn], where n is the number of defects.
Tier Level T L = [L1 L2 . . . L5],
L1: Critical, L2: High, L3: Moderate, L4: Low, L5: Very Low
Target Confidence TC = [TC1 TC2 . . . TC5],
TC1: Critical, TC2: High, TC3: Moderate, TC4: Low, TC5: Very
Low
Confidence Level CL = [xi j] =

x11 x12 . . . x1n
x21 x22 . . . x2n
...
...
...
...
xm1 xm2 . . . xmn

where, xi j = Pr (Detecting a defect j by a method i). Here, the rows
and columns of CL are denoted as the methods and the defects.
Defect Frequency DF = [DF1 DF2 . . . DFn]
Defect Mapping DM = [wi j] =

w11 w12 . . . w17
w21 w22 . . . w27
...
...
...
...
wn1 wn2 . . . wn7

where, wi j ∈ {0,1}={Not Present, Present}, and rows and
columns represent defects and counterfeit types respectively.
2.2.8 Defect Mapping Matrix
The defect mapping (DM) matrix represents the presence of a defect in a counterfeit type. It is
not necessary for a defect to be visible in all the counterfeit types simultaneously. For example,
52
the defect Invalid Lot/Date/Country Code may not be present in overproduced, or cloned types.
Here, each entry of DM equals 1 if the defect may be present for a counterfeit type and 0 if the
defect is never present.
In summary, Table 2.3 summarizes all the key elements that will be used in the assess-
ment framework.
2.3 Test Metrics
To evaluate the effectiveness of these test methods, it is of the utmost importance to develop test
metrics. These metrics are described below:
2.3.1 Counterfeit Defect Coverage
Counterfeit defect coverage (CDC) is defined as the ratio of all probable detectable defects by
a set of (single) test methods (method) to the total number of known counterfeit defects. It
provides a cumulative confidence of identifying a component as counterfeit by a sequence of
test methods. CDC can be expressed as:
CDC =
Probable Detectable Defects
Total Defects
×100% (2.3)
A level of confidence is involved when a test method detects a counterfeit defect, and
this is captured in the CL matrix. When a defect is detected by multiple test methods, the
confidence of identifying it increases. The maximum value of this confidence is bounded by
“1”, which signifies this particular defect will surely be detected by these test methods. Now
the total confidence of finding a part as counterfeit, CDC, becomes the ratio of the cumulative
sum of the resultant confidence of all the defects to the total number of defects. Mathematically
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it can be expressed as:
CDC =
∑nj=1(xR j)
n
×100% (2.4)
where xR j denotes the resultant confidence for defect j and n denotes total number of defects.
Equation 2.4 (shown above) treats all the defects as equally likely in the component
supply chain. However, some defects are more frequent than others, and we need to incorporate
defect frequency in the calculation of CDC. Therefore, the modified equation of CDC becomes,
CDC =
∑nj=1(xR j×DFj)
∑nj=1 DFj
×100% (2.5)
where DFj represents the defect frequency for defect j.
2.3.2 Counterfeit Type Coverage
Defects are not equally visible in all counterfeit types. Some defects may be present in some
particular counterfeit types, but, not in other types, which is captured in defects mapping (DM)
matrix, and for some counterfeit types, the probability of finding any defects are extremely
small, which is captured in decision index (DI). For example, overproduced parts may be as
good as new authentic parts and be free from any counterfeit defects. As such, the detection
of defects does not necessarily provide the correct test coverage, CDC, which was introduced
in Section 2.3.1. We will now introduce, counterfeit type coverage (CTC) to represent the test
coverage for individual counterfeit types by a set of test methods.
CTC is defined as a measure to detect a counterfeit type given the test methods per-
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formed. CTC can be expressed as:
CTC = DI× Probable Detectable Defects for a Counterfeit Type
Total Defects for a Counterfeit Type
×100% (2.6)
where, DI represents the decision index.
CTC can be expressed as the total confidence of finding a part that belongs to a particular
counterfeit type. Taking CTC for a counterfeit type, k becomes the ratio of the cumulative sum
of the resultant confidence of all the defects detected by the test methods to the total number of
defects belonging to that counterfeit type and expressed as:
CTCk = DIk×
∑nj=1(xR j×w jk)
∑nj=1(w jk)
×100% (2.7)
where,
CTCk : CTC for counterfeit type k;
DIk : DI for counterfeit type k;
xR j : Resultant confidence for defect j;
w jk : The presence of defect j in counterfeit type k ( ∈ {0,1}).
Equation 2.7 (shown above) treats all the defects as equally likely in the component
supply chain. However, some defects are more frequent than others, so we need to incorporate
defect frequency in the calculation of CTC. The modified equation of CTC becomes
CTCk = DIk×
∑nj=1(xR j×DFj×w jk)
∑nj=1(DFj×w jk)
×100% (2.8)
where, DFj: Defect frequency of defect j.
55
2.3.3 Not-Covered Defects
A set of test methods will not necessarily detect a particular counterfeit defect. A defect is
called as a not-covered defect (NCD) when a set of test methods cannot detect it. A counterfeit
defect j will be a NCD if
xR j = 0 (2.9)
2.3.4 Under-Covered Defects
A defect is called an under-covered defect (UCD) when a set of test methods cannot provide the
desired confidence level. Defects belong to this category when the resultant confidence level
for detecting a defect is less than the target defect confidence level. A defect j will be a UCD if
xR j < TC (2.10)
2.4 Assessment Framework
Different sequences of test methods have been developed by organizations for the detection of
counterfeit parts. The assessment framework evaluates the effectiveness of a sequence of test
methods used to screen for counterfeit parts. This framework works in two different modes. In
the static assessment, it performs the assessment of a sequence of tests under evaluation. The
output of this mode produces the test metrics (CDC, CTC, NCD, and UCD). In the dynamic
assessment, the framework receives all the current available test methods as input and recom-
mends (i) the best set of tests and (ii) an optimum set of tests that provides maximum coverage
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within a certain test time and cost budget. Then the assessment is done on the basis of the same
test metrics.
2.4.1 Static Assessment
The static assessment provides the test labs with an evaluation of the effectiveness of a specified
test plan consisting of a sequence of tests, as it is necessary to evaluate the capability of the test
labs. The term “static” suggests that, in this kind of assessment, the test methods put into this
framework do not change, and the assessment is performed on the whole set of test methods.
Assessment of Test Methods
Algorithm 1 shows the flow of this assessment framework. The user specified test methods are
provided to this framework as inputs. It selects the target confidence from the user specified risk
category (tier level breakpoints). It then reads the confidence level matrix (CL), decision index
(DI), and defects mapping matrix (DM) from a secured database. The function CALCULATE()
in line 2, calculates the resultant confidence level for all the defects. The CALCULATE()
functions in lines 4-7, calculate CDC, CTC, NCDs and UCDs.
Example 1
Let us assume that we want to assess five test methods for critical tier level (tier 4, described in
Table 2.1). We also assume that there are five test methods ({M1, M2, M3, M4, M5}) present
for counterfeit detection and five counterfeit defects ({D1, D2, D3, D4, D5}) present in the
counterfeit parts with a given confidence level (CL) matrix and defect frequency vector of
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Algorithm 1: Procedure Static Assessment
Report test metrics for a preexisting test plan.
input : User specified test methods (MS), confidence level matrix (CL), Tier Level (T L),
decision index (DI), and defects mapping matrix (DM)
output: Report CDC, CTC, NCDs and UCDs
1 for j :=1 to n in D do
2 Calculate xR j, xR j← CALCULATE (X , MS) ;
3 end
4 Calculate counterfeit defect coverage, CDC← CALCULATE (xR, DF) ;
5 Calculate counterfeit type coverage, CTC← CALCULATE (xR, DF , DI, DM) ;
6 Calculate not-covered defects, NCDs← CALCULATE (xR) ;
7 Calculate under-covered defects, UCDs← CALCULATE (xR, TC) ;
CL =

D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
M1 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
M2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.5
M3 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
M4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M5 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0

, and DF =

D1 1
D2 1
D3 1
D4 1
D5 1

This matrix can be interpreted as follows: Each row represents a test method (e.g., the
first row represents the test method M1, the second row represents the test method M2, and
so on). Each column represents a defect (e.g., the first column represents defect a, the second
column represents defect b, and so on). Each entry denotes the confidence of detecting a defect
58
using a test method. This means that test M1 has a 0.9 probability of detecting defect D1, a 0.5
probability of detecting defect D2, and a 0 probability of detecting defects D3, D4, and D5.
We also assume that there are three counterfeit types ({x,y,z}) with defect mapping (DM)
matrix and decision index (DI) vectors of
DM =

x y z
D1 1 0 1
D2 0 0 1
D3 1 1 0
D4 1 1 0
D5 1 1 1

, and DI =

x 0.9
y 0.5
z 0.1

Table 2.4 summarizes the assessment process. The CDC is 68.8%, whereas the CTC for
counterfeits x, y, and z is 55.8%, 24.8%, and 8.1%, respectively. The lower value of CTC for
counterfeits y and z points to the fact that the defects related to those counterfeit types are not
visible as we can see from the DI vector that the probability of finding any counterfeit defect is
0.5 and 0.1, respectively.
2.4.2 Dynamic Assessment
We need to identify a set of test methods targeting critical risk applications in order to maximize
the test confidence in our ability to detect counterfeit parts. At the same time, when the risk
category level is low, the user does not need to engage in exhaustive testing. In this case, test
time and cost is more important, and we need to find the best set of tests that can give the
maximum coverage under these test time and cost constraints. In the following, we will first
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Table 2.4: Example for the Static Assessment.
Step Name Description
Read Inputs Read MS, T L, CL, DI, and DM
Line
1-3
Compute
resultant
confidence (xR)
using Equation
2.1
xRD1 = 1−{(1−0.9)(1−0)(1−0)(1−0.9)(1−0)}= 0.99
xRD2 = 1−{(1−0.5)(1−0)(1−0.9)(1−0)(1−0)}= 0.95
xRD3 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0.9)(1−0)(1−0)(1−0.9)}= 0.99
xRD4 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0)(1−0)(1−0)(1−0)}= 0.00
xRD5 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0.5)(1−0)(1−0)(1−0)}= 0.50
Line 4
Compute CDC
using Equation
2.5
CDC = 100∗ 1∗0.99+1∗0.95+1∗0.99+1∗0.00+1∗0.501+1+1+1+1+1 % = 68.6%
Line 5
Compute CTC
using Equation
2.8
CTCx = 0.9∗ 1∗0.99+0∗0.95+1∗0.99+1∗0.00+1∗0.51+0+1+1+1 ×100%= 55.8%
CTCy = 0.5∗ 0∗0.99+0∗0.95+1∗0.99+1∗0.00+1∗0.50+0+1+1+1 ×100%= 24.8%
CTCz = 0.5∗ 1∗0.99+1∗0.95+0∗0.99+0∗0.00+1∗0.51+1+0+0+1 ×100% = 8.1%
Line 6
Compute NCDs
using Equation
2.9
NCD: Defect D4 as xRd = 0
Line 7
Compute UCDs
using Equation
2.10
UCD: Defect D5 as xRe < TC (0.50 < 0.90))
present the method selection technique and then we will assess those selected test methods.
Selection of Test Methods
The objective of the method selection algorithm is to find an optimum set of methods to maxi-
mize counterfeit defect coverage while also allowing for a consideration of the test time, cost,
and risk category constraints for certain applications. A counterfeit defect can be detected by
multiple methods with different levels of confidence. Thus, the problem becomes that of se-
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lecting the most suitable methods for achieving the highest CDC possible given the presence of
practical constraints.
The problem can be formulated as follows:
Select a set of methods MS ⊂M to Maximize CDC
Subjected to:
xR j ≥ TC, ∀ j ∈ {1 : n} for critical applications
or

xR j ≥ TC, ∀ j ∈ {1 : n}
M1C1+M2C2+ . . .+MmCm ≤Cuser for non-critical applications
M1T1+M2T2+ . . .+MmTm ≤ Tuser
where,
xR j: Resultant confidence for defect j;
TC: Target confidence;
Mi: Test method i, Mi ∈ {0,1}= {Not Selected, Selected};
Ci: Test cost for test method i;
Ti: Test time for test method i;
m: Number of test methods;
n: Number of defects;
Cuser: User specified total test cost;
Tuser: User specified total test time;
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Algorithm 2 describes the selection of the test methods. It starts by initializing the rec-
ommended test set to null. It then gets the defect frequency (DF) and the target confidence level
(TC) for each defect. Next, it prioritizes the defects by sorting them according to DF , as we
want to capture high-frequency defects first to achieve a higher CDC.
For critical risk applications, our primary objective is to obtain the maximum CDC re-
gardless of test cost and time. On the other hand, for low and very low risk applications, test
time and cost are more important than getting the maximum CDC. For medium- and high-risk
applications, we can get a higher confidence level by setting a higher test time and cost limit.
For critical applications, the SORT() function (line 7) takes M and CL as arguments and sorts
them according to xi j and discards the method i when xi j = 0. Equation 2.1 has been imple-
mented by the CALCULATE() function (line 8). The SELECTMETHODS() function (line 10)
takes xR j and TC as arguments and selects methods until the condition, xR j ≥ TC, is met. If
this condition is not met after iterating all the methods, then the defects belong to the UCDs. If
xR j = 0, then the defects become NCDs.
For other applications, the SORT() function (line 15) takes M, T , and C as arguments and
sorts according to linear combinations of ti and ci (0.5ti+0.5ci) and discards the method i when
xi j = 0. The resultant confidence level has been calculated by the CALCULATE() function (line
16) through the implementation of Equation 2.1. The SELECTMETHODS() function (line 18)
takes xR j, TC, tuser, and cuser as arguments and selects the methods that require the minimum
test time and cost to achieve xR j ≥ TC. If this condition is not met after iterating all the methods
(as was the case for the critical applications, as well), then the defects belong to the UCDs and,
if xR j = 0, then the defects become NCDs.
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Algorithm 2: Procedure Method Selection
Select a sequence of test methods to maximize test coverage.
input : Test methods (M), confidence level matrix (CL), Tier Level (T L), decision
index (DI), and defects mapping matrix (DM)
output: Report a sequence of test methods MS
1 Initialize selected methods, MS←{φ} ;
2 Specify cost limit set by the user cuser except for critical risk applications ;
3 Specify test time limit set by the user tuser except for critical risk applications ;
4 Sort defects according to defect frequency, D← SORT (DF) ;
5 if (T L == critical) then
6 for j := 1 to n in D do
7 Sort methods according to xi j, M′← SORT (M, CL) ;
8 Calculate xR j, xR j← CALCULATE (CL, M′) ;
9 for i := 1 to m in M’ do
10 SELECTMETHODS (CL, M′, xR j, TC) ;
11 end
12 end
13 else
14 for j := 1 to n in D do
15 Sort methods according to test time and cost, M′← SORT (M, T , C) ;
16 Calculate xR j, xR j← CALCULATE (CL, M′) ;
17 for i := 1 to m in M’ do
18 SELECTMETHODS (CL, M′, xR j, TC, tuser, cuser) ;
19 end
20 end
21 end
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Assessment of Test Methods
After the selection of the test methods, the assessment is done on those methods. It invokes
Algorithm 1 with DI, DM, and selected methods by Algorithm 2 as inputs to compute CDC,
CTC, NCDs, and UCDs.
Example 2
Let us now start with an example to explain the dynamic assessment. All the data used for this
example are the same as the data used in Example 1. In this example, we will consider low risk
categories. The target confidence (TC) corresponding to this risk category is 0.5 (described in
Table 2.1). For simplicity’s sake, we are not considering test time and cost in this example.
2.5 Results
We have developed a web-based tool, Assessment Framework, to perform the assessment of the
efficiency of a test plan. The tool is currently deployed in the server of University of Connecti-
cut’s CHASE Center. This tool can be accessed at htt p : //ece−chaseweb.engr.uconn.edu/cdc−
site/index.php. The user of this tool needs to have the required authentication to access the tool.
2.5.1 Static Assessment
In static assessment, the evaluation of a preexisting test plan is performed. For example, a test
lab wants to assess a test plan, which consists of 11 test methods (see Table 2.6) for moderate
risk applications. Column 3 of Table 2.6 represents the CDC. General EVI alone contributes the
coverage of 17.6%. General EVI and detailed EVI contribute a combined coverage of 41.34%.
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Table 2.5: Example for the Dynamic Assessment.
Step Name Description
Se
le
ct
io
n
(A
lg
or
ith
m
2)
Read Inputs Read T L, CL, and DF
Line
4
Sort DF No sort needed as all the defects are treated equally
Line
14-
20
Select Methods
Defect D1: Select method M1
Defect D2: Method M1 already selected and xRD2 = TC, No
extra methods are necessary.
Defect D3: Select M2
Defect D4: No test methods can detect D4.
Defect D5: Method M2 already selected and xRD5 = TC, No
extra methods are necessary.
Selected methods are M1 and M2.
A
ss
es
sm
en
t(
A
lg
or
ith
m
1)
Read Inputs Read DI, and DM
Line
1-3
Compute
resultant
confidence (xR)
using Equation
2.1
xRD1 = 1−{(1−0.9)(1−0)}= 0.9
xRD2 = 1−{(1−0.5)(1−0)}= 0.5
xRD3 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0.9)}= 0.9
xRD4 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0)}= 0.0
xRD5 = 1−{(1−0)(1−0.5)}= 0.50
Line
4
Compute CDC
using Equation
2.5
CDC = 100∗ 1∗0.9+1∗0.5+1∗0.9+1∗0.0+1∗0.51+1+1+1+1+1 % = 56%
Line
5
Compute CTC
using Equation
2.8
CTCx = 0.9∗ 1∗0.9+0∗0.5+1∗0.9+1∗0.0+1∗0.51+0+1+1+1 ×100% = 51.75%
CTCy = 0.5∗ 0∗0.9+0∗0.5+1∗0.9+1∗0.0+1∗0.50+0+1+1+1 ×100% = 23.3%
CTCz = 0.5∗ 1∗0.9+1∗0.5+0∗0.9+0∗0.0+1∗0.51+1+0+0+1 ×100% = 6.3%
Line
6
Compute NCDs
using Equation
2.9
NCD: Defect D4 as xRd = 0
Line
7
Compute UCDs
using Equation
2.10
None
The combined coverage of the total 11 test methods gives a final CDC of 66.48%. This signifies
the fact that we are 66.48% confident of finding a part as counterfeit after performing these
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test methods. There are 6 defects that cannot be detected by these tests and become NCDs.
In addition, there are 16 defects that are properly covered (target confidence for moderate risk
category is 65%) and become UCDs.
Table 2.6: Static Assessment of Test Methods for Moderate Risk Category (CDC, NCDs, and
UCDs)
# Test Method CDC (%) NCDs UCDs
1 General EVI 17.6
6 16
2 Detailed EVI 41.34
3 Testing for Remarking (EVI) 41.96
4 Testing for Resurfacing (EVI) 42.51
5 Lead Finish Analysis (XRF) 44.11
6 Lead Finish Thickness (XRF) 44.15
7 Material Composition (XRF) 45.33
8 Internal Inspection (DDPA) 58.24
9 2D Radiological Inspection (RI) 62.88
10 PEMS-External Only (AM) 63.98
11 DC Test at ambient temperature 66.48
Table 2.7 shows the CTCs for all the counterfeit types. As we explained before, detecting
defects can help us identify a component as counterfeit. However, this cannot provide the
necessary confidence that the counterfeit component belongs to a particular type. CTC gives
what is desired for finding a counterfeit type. The CTCs for recycled and remarked types
are close to CDC, as the probability of finding any counterfeit defects is close to 1 (i.e., 0.98
and 0.9 for recycled and remarked types indicated in the DI vector in Table 2.2). However, in
overproduced and cloned types, the CTCs are quite small and are 1.4%, and 5.71%, respectively.
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The probability of finding counterfeit defects in these counterfeit types is extremely small. This
signifies that we need a different set of measures (designed for anti-counterfeit, DFAC) to detect
these counterfeit types. We use the term “not applicable” (N/A) in the CTC field for tampered
types in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Static Assessment of Test Methods for Moderate Risk Category (CTC).
# Counterfeit Type CTC
1 Recycled 65.81
2 Remarked 61.21
3 Overproduced 1.4
4 Out-of-Spec./Defective 27.28
5 Cloned 5.71
6 Forged Documentation 60.58
7 Tampered N/A
2.5.2 Dynamic Assessment
In dynamic assessment, the best set of test methods are determined based on the user specified
test time and test cost. For example, a test lab wants to find the best set of tests for moderate risk
applications. Table 2.8 shows the dynamic assessment of the test methods for the moderate risk
category. Column 2 shows the recommended test methods. The test cost and time budgets are
not mentioned here due to the confidentiality agreement between the CHASE Center and the
G-19A group. However, the total test cost and time for these six recommended test methods are
well below compared to the static assessment. Columns 3, 4, and 5 represent the CDC, NCDs,
and UCDs, respectively.
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The first recommended test method, general EVI, contributes a coverage of 17.6%, as
before. The second recommended test method, internal inspection combined with general EVI,
contributes 41.34% coverage. The combined coverage of the total 7 test methods provides a
final CDC of 66.4%. We can see that there is a significant reduction in the total number of test
methods (11 to 7) in the dynamic assessment. The NCD or UCD values are comparable for both
the assessments.
Table 2.8: Dynamic Assessment of Test Methods for Moderate Risk Category (CDC, NCDs,
and UCDs).
# Test Method CDC (%) NCDs UCDs
1 General EVI 17.6
8 13
2 Detailed EVI 41.34
3 Part Dimensions 43.24
4 Internal Inspection (DDPA) 56.22
5 Bond Pull (DDPA) 57.72
6 2D Radiological Inspection (RI) 62.5
7 RAMAN 66.4
Table 2.9 shows the CTCs for all the counterfeit types in the low risk category. Here we
can observe the similar CTC values for the dynamic and static assessments for all the counterfeit
types, as both assessments provide similar CDCs.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a comprehensive framework for assessing currently available
test methods by introducing test metrics such as counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), counter-
feit type coverage (CTC), under-covered defects (UCD) and not-covered defects (NCD). The
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Table 2.9: Dynamic Assessment of Test Methods for Moderate Risk Category (CTC).
# Counterfeit Type CTC
1 Recycled 65.27
2 Remarked 57.04
3 Overproduced 1.4
4 Out-of-Spec./Defective 27.33
5 Cloned 5.76
6 Forged Documentation 59.28
7 Tampered N/A
framework provides two types of assessments: static assessment that helps in the evaluation
of test methods based on the aforementioned metrics, and dynamic assessment for selecting an
optimum set of test methods to maximize the test coverage. Static assessment can be used to
estimate the counterfeit detection capabilities of a test lab based on their equipment and test
methods. The dynamic assessment can be used by test labs to determine how much they can
improve their capabilities by adding different equipment and test capabilities. It can also illus-
trate the trade-off between test time, cost, and counterfeit coverage. Both types of assessment
can determine what counterfeit defects are partially covered or missed, what counterfeit types
are not well covered, etc. This information can be used to guide in the development of new test
methods for counterfeit detection.
Chapter 3
Combating Die and IC Recycling
The technologies (ECID, PUFs, HM, and SST) discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.6, are not
suitable for detecting recycled ICs as long as the counterfeiters maintain the same grade (e.g.,
commercial grade component remains same). In addition, many of these technologies cannot
be implemented on small parts because of their large area overhead. They are also inapplicable
on analog and mixed-signal components due to the difference in technologies. DNA and NR
have their own challenges for use in IC authentication. In this chapter, we present very low-
cost structures that can be implemented in the full spectrum of components to detect recycled
and remarked types. These technologies are added to the die, making them suitable for new
components.
Along with DfAC measures, several approaches have been proposed to detect recycled
ICs. Zhang et al. proposed path-delay fingerprinting, where used components can be differ-
entiated from their genuine counterparts as their path delay distribution changes [85]. This
technique, however, presents several shortcomings, one of which is that it requires data from
genuine ICs and cannot be easily applied to analog/RF/mixed-signal devices. Huang et al. pre-
sented a statistical approach to distinguish recycled ICs by measuring electrical parameters and
using a one-class support vector machine (SVM) [86]. Like path-delay fingerprinting, this tech-
nique requires a large number of genuine samples for SVM training. This may not be feasible
as there are thousands of different types of components available in the supply chain, making
it difficult to find large numbers of genuine samples. Thus, it is of utmost importance that we
develop a new, practical DFAC structures that will enable easy counterfeit detection without
the need for existing expensive test methods and/or genuine ICs. Zheng et al. utilized dynamic
current analysis to determine the aging difference between high-activity and low-activity por-
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tions of symmetric structures [87]. However, this approach requires at least a year of aging for
reliable detection of recycled ICs.
The above discussion highlights the major challenges that must be overcome in order to
realize more effective DfAC measures. In this chapter, we address the shortcomings of prior
work by (i) developing separate measures for analog and digital components as they are of
different sizes and use different manufacturing technologies; (ii) keeping the cost/overheads
of adding the DfAC measures as low as possible; and (iii) enabling fast authentication with
low-cost test devices that do not require genuine ICs for the purpose of comparison.
We meet these objectives by presenting several new combating die and IC recycling
(CDIR) structures. In Section 3.1, we present a lightweight ring-oscillator-based CDIR structure
suitable for both large and small digital ICs. The CDIR was first presented by Zhang et al. in
[1] and we call this as simple RO-CDIR [1]. We have proposed an improved version and we call
this as NBTI-aware RO-CDIR [15]. Our proposed NBTI-aware RO-CDIR exploits aging much
better than the simple RO-CDIR so that it is able to capture very short usage time for a chip.
In Section 3.2, we present two fuse-based CDIR (F-CDIR) structures primarily aimed at analog
and small ICs. A very low-cost measurement device such as a multimeter can authenticate the
component with these F-CDIRs.
Depending on the size of the chip and the accuracy required in measuring the IC usage,
one can select one or a combination of these CDIR structures for recycled IC detection. Note
that in this chapter, we only address the remarking of recycled ICs, not the remarking of new
ICs.
3.1 RO-Based CDIR Sensor
The first set of avoidance measures are to be taken by placing ring-oscillator-based CDIRs (RO-
CDIRs) in the digital ICs. This simple elegant structure utilizes aging efficiently to authenticate
ICs as counterfeit or not. In the following, we will describe aging phenomenon in detail, and
then present two different versions of RO-CDIR.
Recycled ICs are characterized by aging, i.e., prior usage has taken its toll on the com-
ponents’ life and performance. A shift in the components’ parameters due to aging will occur
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when they are used in the field for some time, which leads to the development of parametric de-
fects and anomalies in the component. Aging of a component used in the field can be attributed
to two major, distinct phenomena (which are becoming more prevalent as the technology scales
down). They are negative-bias temperature instability (NBTI) and hot carrier injection (HCI)
which are prominent in PMOS and NMOS devices, respectively. NBTI occurs in p-channel
MOS devices stressed with negative gate voltages and elevated temperatures due to the genera-
tion of interface traps at the Si− SiO2 interface. Removal of the stress can anneal some of the
interface traps, but not completely. As a result, it manifests as the increase in threshold volt-
age (Vth) and absolute off current (Io f f ) and the decrease of absolute drain current (IDSat) and
transconductance (gm). HCI occurs in NMOS devices caused by the trapped interface charge at
Si− SiO2 surface near the drain end during switching. It results in non-recoverable Vth degra-
dation. These two aging mechanisms lead to the increased delay in the components’ internal
paths, which ultimately reduces the component’s operating speed. Now the obvious question is
can aging help us to detect recycled ICs? And, the answer is yes!
Prior approaches [85] [86] for the detection of recycled ICs, have exploited this aging
phenomenon. These approaches require that the performance measurements of fresh chips be
collected and analyzed, a challenge for legacy parts when golden ICs may not be available.
Furthermore, large process variations in lower technology nodes can make it very difficult to
separate recycled ICs from a batch when the process variation outpaces aging degradation.
3.1.1 Simple RO-CDIR
A different approach was proposed in [1] based on ring oscillators (ROs) that avoided the data
collection altogether and applied a “self–referencing” concept to the measurement of use time.
Specifically, [1] embeds two ROs within the chip and compares them to detect prior IC usage.
The first RO is called the reference RO and is designed to age at a slow rate. The second RO is
referred to as the stressed RO, and it is designed to age at a much faster rate than the reference
RO. As the IC is used in the field, the stressed RO’s rapid aging reduces its oscillation frequency
while the reference RO’s oscillation frequency remains largely static over the chip’s lifetime.
Thus, a large disparity between the two ROs’ frequencies implies that the chip has been used.
To overcome global and local process variations, the two ROs are placed physically very close
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together so that the process and environmental variations between them are negligible.
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of this simple RO-CDIR, which is composed of a control
module, a reference RO, a stressed RO, a MUX, a timer, and a counter. The counter measures
the cycle count of the two ROs during a time period controlled by the timer. The system clock is
used in the timer to minimize the measurement period variations due to circuit aging. The MUX
selects which RO is going to be measured and is controlled by the ROSEL signal. The inverters
in the ROs can be replaced by any other types of gates (NAND, NOR, etc.) only if they can
construct a RO. It will not change the effectiveness of the RO-CDIR significantly, according to
prior analysis in [1]. In 90nm technology, a 16-bit counter can operate at a frequency of up to
1GHz, which means that an inverter-based RO must be composed of at least 21 stages [1]. 130
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Fig. 6.6: The structure of the RO-based sensor.
signal. The Reference and Stressed ROs are identical; both are composed of HVT
components. The inverters in Figure 6.6 could be replaced by any other types of
gates (NAND, NOR, etc) only if they can construct a RO. It will not change the
effectiveness of the RO-based sensor significantly. We use smaller-stage ROs in
our RO-based sensor considering the counter’s measurement speed limits given a
technology. For example, in our 90nm technology, a 16-bit counter can operate
under frequency of up to 1GHz; an inverter-based RO of at least 21 stages is then
required.
Sleep transistors are used to connect the ROs to the power supply in the RO-
based sensor; PMOS sleep transistors control the connection between V DD and
the inverters and NMOS sleep transistors control the connection between V SS and
the inverters. Both the Reference RO and the Stressed RO work in three modes
that are controlled by the Mode signal: (i) when the IC is in manufacturing test
mode, the Reference RO and Stressed RO will be disconnected from the power
Fig. 3.1: Simple RO-CDIR sensor [1].
3.1 2 Limitations of Simple RO-CDI
Given the objective for designing RO-CDIR, the best RO-CDIR sensor (i.e., the one that detects
recycled ICs most accurately) should possess minimal aging for the reference RO and maximum
aging for the stressed RO. This cannot be achieved by the RO-CDIR proposed in [1] because,
in the RO-CDIR design shown in Figure 3.1, only half of the inverters in the stressed RO are
negative-bias temperature instability (NBTI) stressed in one oscillation cycle as shown in Figure
3.2(a). This implies that half of the inverters age while the other half recover some of their aging.
For example, at cycle time k, the even number inverters (e.g., inverters 2, 4, 6, ...) are stressed as
73
they receive zero at their inputs (zero causes the PMOS to age) while odd number inverters (e.g.,
inverters 1, 3, 5, ...) recover their aging. At cycle time k+1, the even number inverters recover
and odd number inverters age. This process continues during normal operations and results in
a slower aging for the stressed RO because the PMOS transistors partially recover every other
cycle. Hot carrier injection (HCI) will not contribute as much to the total degradation of this
sensor in the field since the sensors are kept in non-oscillatory mode. More details on the aging
and recovery process can be found in [88] [89].
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(a) Stressed RO in RO-CDIR sensor in stress mode.
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(b) Stressed RO in our proposed NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR sensor in stress mode.
Fig. 3.2: NBTI stress on stressed ROs.
This problem is overcome in [15] where all the inverters are NBTI stressed during the
entire operation of an IC where the RO-CDIR is deployed. Figure 3.2(b) shows the proposed
solution where all the inverters are stressed during normal operations. This is achieved by
breaking the connection of each inverter to its prior one and pulling down their inputs to ground.
NBTI stress occurs when the gate of a PMOS transistor is pulled down to ground. Thus, all the
inverters of the stressed RO are NBTI stressed during the entire time of the operation. As a
result, the aging recovery cannot take place. However, if the chip is completely powered off,
a partial recovery may occur. Nevertheless, the permanent degradation is proven to be much
larger than the recovery [90].
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3.1.3 Design and Operation of NBTI-aware RO-CDIR
Figure 3.3 shows the design of the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR sensor [15]. The stressed RO is
modified in such a way that all the inverters are stressed constantly during normal operation,
as explained above. To achieve this, a pass transistor is introduced in between every pair of
inverters, and the inputs of all the inverters are pulled down to ground using an NMOS network.
To match all the internal parameters (node capacitance, resistance, etc.), the same pass transistor
and NMOS are mimicked in the reference RO. This is to ensure that at time 0, when there
is no aging, the difference between the two ROs is minimal and is mainly impacted by the
manufacturing process variations present between the two ROs. A decoder is introduced to
generate all the internal signals for a specific mode. When EN = 0, both ROs oscillate while
the sleep transistors are ON. The signals EN and SRO EN can never be “1” simultaneously
as they would create a short circuit in the design. Similar to the design described in Figure
3.1, the NBTI-aware RO-CDIR also has a MUX, a counter, and a timer to select the ROs and
measure their frequencies during authentication. Also, sleep transistors are used to connect the
ROs to the power supply in the RO-based sensor as before. PMOS sleep transistors control the
connection between V DD and the inverters and NMOS sleep transistors control the connection
between V SS and the inverters.
Table 3.1 highlights the four distinct modes of operation. In the manufacturing and burn-
in tests, our objective is to protect both ROs from aging. In this mode, both ROs enter sleep
mode by being cut off from the power and ground lines. R SLEEP and S SLEEP are assigned
to “0” during this entire operation. In normal operation, the reference RO remains in the sleep
mode while the stressed RO is in the stressed mode. All the inverters in the stressed RO are
given a DC stress by pulling their inputs to ground. In authentication mode, the reference RO
is activated to measure its frequency (RO SEL to 0), which corresponds to the RO frequency
of a new IC. Then, the stressed RO is activated ( SRO EN to 0 and EN to 1) and its frequency
(RO SEL to 1) is measured.
75
M
U
XEN
ENB
EN
ENB
EN
ENB
COUNTER
TIMER
GND
EN/ENB
RO_SEL
RO_SEL
D
E
C
O
D
E
R
MODE 
(1:0)
VDD GND
VDD GND SYS_CLK
NBTI-Aware  RO-CDIR Sensor
R_SLEEP
S_SLEEP
STRESSED RO
EN
ENB
EN
ENB
EN
ENB
GND
REFERENCE RO
SRO_EN
Fig. 3.3: The proposed NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR sensor.
Table 3.1: Modes of operation.
MODE
Signals
Description
R SLEEP EN RO SEL SRO EN S SLEEP
00 0 X X X 0
Manufacturing and Burn-In Tests: Both
ROs are in sleep mode.
01 0 0 X 1 1
Normal Operation: Reference RO in sleep
mode and Stressed RO in stressed mode
(inverter input GND)
10 1 1 0 0 1
Authentication Mode: Measure frequency
of Reference RO
11 0 1 1 0 1
Authentication Mode: Measure frequency
of Stressed RO
3.1.4 ∆ f distribution versus ROs stages
Let us consider two n-stage reference and stressed ROs. The frequency of an RO becomes:
f = 12∑ tdi , where tdi is the delay for the i
th stage. We can express tdi as tdi = td0+∆i, where td0
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is the fixed delay for all the inverters and ∆i is the variable delay due to process variation. Thus,
the frequency becomes:
f =
1
2ntd0+2∑∆i
Now, ∆ f = fR− fS
=
1
2ntd0+2∑R∆i
− 1
2ntd0+2∑S∆i
=
(∑S∆i−∑R∆i)
(ntd0+∑R∆i)(ntd0+∑S∆i)
(3.1)
From Equation 3.1, it can be inferred that ∆ f ( fR− fS) tends to be near the mean ( 0
) of ∆ f distribution as n increases due to the numerator increases at the order of n, whereas
the denominator increases at the order of n2. This results in the reduction of the spread of ∆ f
distribution for a 51-stage RO and thus increase in the accuracy.
3.1.5 Registration and Authentication Flow
Figure 3.4 shows the registration and authentication flow. The objective of the registration
process is to determine a threshold (∆ fth), which will be used during the authentication process.
Here, ∆ f = fR− fS is the frequency difference between reference RO ( fR) and stressed RO ( fS).
∆ f of an IC are measured during authentication. If ∆ f of an IC is greater than ∆ fth, then the IC
will be treated as recycled, otherwise, it will be marked as new.
During registration phase, a number of new ICs are used to generate the distributions to
determine the threshold (∆ fth) after the manufacturing test process at the foundry. It is recom-
mended to select the samples from different wafers and lots to capture within-die and within-
wafer process variations. The larger this sample space is, the more accurate the ∆ fth will be. In
the following, we will describe the ∆ fth determination process.
Due to the process variations, the difference between the reference and stressed RO fre-
quencies (∆ f ) will not be zero even though we place these ROs very close to each other in
the circuit layout. We observe a Gaussian distribution of ∆ f when we perform a Monte Carlo
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Fig. 3.4: Registration and authentication flow for N-CDIR.
simulation with 1000 samples (see Section 3.1.7). Figure 3.5 shows a simplified representa-
tion of the two distributions (probability density functions) of ∆ f at times 0 and t (g0(∆ f ) and
gt(∆ f )). The x-axis represents the frequency differences between the two ROs (∆ f ) and the
y-axis represents the corresponding distribution function. The overlapping area represents the
misprediction of identifying new or recycled ICs. The red area represents the probability of
identifying recycled ICs as new whereas the green area denotes the probability of identifying
new ICs as recycled. These areas (θ1 and θ2) are represented by:
θ1 =
∫ ∆ fth
−∞
gt(∆ f )d∆ f , and θ2 =
∫ ∞
∆ fth
g0(∆ f )d∆ f (3.2)
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Fig. 3.5: Probability density function of frequency differences (∆ f ) between reference and
stressed ROs.
where, g0(∆ f ), and gt(∆ f ) correspond to the distribution of frequency differences for new and
ICs with t amount of usage, respectively. The decision threshold should be the point (∆ fth)
where both distributions intersect each other. This represents the frequency difference that
minimizes the total probability of error (θ1+θ2).
3.1.6 Overhead Analysis
The area overhead of both the RO-CDIRs is negligible for modern designs. The area overhead
mostly comes from the size of the counter and timer. The area of the remaining parts is neg-
ligible. Thus both the original and NBTI-aware designs offer similar area overhead. We can
also remove the timer and counter from the RO-CDIRs and measure the frequencies off-chip
making the area overhead even smaller.
Table 4.4 shows the area overhead analysis of the RO-CDIRs. We define area overhead
as the ratio of the size (area) of the RO-CDIR with the size (area) of the benchmark. Here, the
IWLS 2005 benchmarks are arranged from low to high sizes to compute the area overhead. The
timer and counter are excluded during the computation, as we assume the frequency measure-
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ment can be performed off-chip. As seen, the overhead is more than 1% for small benchmarks
(i2c, spi, and b14) for 51-stage NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR that could make it challenging to use
them in small designs. The area overhead for the 51-stage RO-CDIR is less than the 51-stage
NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR. The area overhead is comparably lower for the 21-stage RO-CDIRs.
For large designs, however, it hardly impacts the overall area overhead.
Table 3.2: Area overhead analysis of RO-CDIRs.
Area Overhead
Benchmark
Size
(# Gates)
Simple
21-stage
RO-CDIR
NBTI-Aware
21-stage
RO-CDIR
Simple
51-stage
RO-CDIR
NBTI-Aware
51-stage
RO-CDIR
i2c 1124 2.89 % 4.73 % 5.52 % 9.98 %
spi 3277 1.01 % 1.65 % 1.92 % 3.48 %
b14 8679 0.38 % 0.62 % 0.73 % 1.31 %
b15 12562 0.26 % 0.43 % 0.50 % 0.91 %
DMA 19118 0.17 % 0.28 % 0.33 % 0.6 %
DSP 32436 0.10 % 0.17 % 0.19 % 0.35 %
ethernet 46771 0.07 % 0.115 % 0.135 % 0.244 %
vga lcd 124031 0.03 % 0.044 % 0.051 % 0.092 %
leon2 780456 0.004 % 0.007 % 0.008 % 0.015 %
The power consumption of the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR is lower compared to the simple
RO-CDIR, as there is no switching during the normal operation due to the fact that all inputs of
the inverters in the stressed RO are pulled down to ground. However, both of them provide neg-
ligible power overhead when they are placed in modern industrial designs. As shown in Figure
1.12, RO-CDIRs are suitable for large digital ICs such as microprocessors, microcontrollers,
digital signal processors, ASICs, programmable logic devices, and memories. Such sensors can
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also be used in smaller digital ICs if the area overhead is acceptable.
3.1.7 Simulation of the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR
In order to verify the effectiveness of the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR, the design is implemented
and simulated using the 90nm technology node [91]. HSPICE MOSRA from Synopsys is used
to simulate and measure the impact of aging on this RO-CDIR. The nominal supply voltage is
1.2V. In this simulation, we select 21-stage and 51-stage ROs to compare the results. To model
the variation, Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is performed with 1000 samples of the NBTI-Aware
RO-CDIR in HSPICE. Here, we were mostly concerned with detecting ICs used in the field for
a very short period of time, so we set, the total aging time at 15 days in the increment of 3 days.
Larger usage times would be easily detected using this sensor.
Table 3.3: Process variations.
Process Inter-die Intra-die
Variations Vth L Tox Vth L Tox
PV0 5% 5% 2% 5% 5% 1%
PV1 8% 8% 3% 7% 7% 2%
PV2 20% 20% 6% 10% 10% 4%
Three different process variations are considered to investigate the impact of variation
on the detection of recycled ICs. Table 3.3 shows the different process variations used in the
simulation. Moving from PV0 to PV2, inter-die and intra-die variations both become larger.
That is because, as feature size decreases and die size increases, the complex semiconductor
manufacturing processes cause variations to the device parameters significantly. However, we
acknowledge that the impact of process variation on ROs will be minimal as they are placed
physically near to each other. PV0 represents the expected process variation between ROs
while the other two are the worst-case scenarios.
Figure 3.6 shows the simulation results of our proposed NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR sensor.
The x-axis represents the frequency difference (∆ f ) between the reference RO and stressed RO.
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(a) PV0: 21 Stage RO.
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(b) PV0: 51 Stage RO.
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(c) PV1: 21 Stage RO.
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 200
20
40
60
80
Frequency Difference (MHz)
O
cc
u
rr
e
n
ce
 
 
 T = 0
 T = 3D
 T = 15D
(d) PV1: 51 Stage RO.
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(e) PV2: 21 Stage RO.
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(f) PV2: 51 Stage RO.
Fig. 3.6: The distribution of frequency differences between the reference RO and the stressed
RO with different process variations, PV0, PV1, and PV2.
The y-axis represents the frequency of occurrence (i.e., # of Monte Carlo samples). The legend
in the figures denotes the aging time (for example, T = 3D denotes the RO-CDIR is aged for 3
days). The green (0D aging) distribution for ∆ f is centered at 0Hz while the pink and blue (3D
and 15D aging) distributions shift to the right. This is because the stressed RO has aged and
become slower resulting in larger ∆ f .
We can clearly identify recycled ICs when the two distributions (T = 0 and T = 3D/15D)
do not overlap with each other. The percentage of misprediction (new ICs detected as coun-
terfeit and vice versa) can be estimated as the area of overlap between these two distributions.
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We apply Gaussian fit to find the mean and variance of the distributions and then calculate the
overlapped area. We can certainly identify recycled ICs with aging more than 15 days in almost
all cases. Based on the figure, we expect a higher misprediction rate (i) as the process variations
increase and (ii) when the 21-stage RO is used rather than the 51-stage RO (see Appendix B).
As process variations increase, the variance in ∆ f grows resulting in larger overlap between 0D
and 3D/15D distributions. Similarly, since the 21-stage RO distributions have a larger spread
than the 51-stage RO (see Section 3.1.4 for the proof), we should also expect higher mispre-
diction rate. The best case scenario occurs for the 51-stage RO with PV0 where we can detect
recycled ICs in 3 days with negligible penalty of misprediction. This represents a substantial
improvement over the prior work [1] which required at least one month of aging to identify
recycled ICs. As we described in Section 3.1, the design in [1] only ages 50% of inverters in
each oscillation cycle while the other half of inverters recover. This results in a slower aging
of the stressed RO. In contrast, our proposed design ages all the inverters in the stressed RO
constantly (without recovering) during normal operation. Thus, we expect higher aging for the
stressed RO which allows our NBTI-aware RO-CDIR to detect recycled ICs used much less
than one month (as little as 3 days).
3.1.8 Misprediction Rate Analysis
In order to find the effectiveness of RO-CDIR, we present the misprediction rate analysis. We
define misprediction rate as recycled ICs identified as new (θ1), and new ICs identified as recy-
cled (θ2). Here we will only present the results for NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR.
Table 3.4: Misprediction Rate.
θ1 (%) θ2 (%)
3 Days 15 Days 3 Days 15 Days
PV0 PV1 PV2 PV0 PV1 PV2 PV0 PV1 PV2 PV0 PV1 PV2
21-stage RO 0.6 3.53 10.19 0 0.31 2.84 0.45 3.16 10.54 0 0.25 2.87
51-stage RO 0 0.32 2.79 0 0 0.21 0 0.3 2.85 0 0 0.18
Table 3.4 shows the misprediction rate i.e., recycled ICs identified as new (θ1) and new
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ICs identified as recycled (θ2) for 21-stage and 51-stage NBTI-Aware CDIR sensors, with pro-
cess variations mentioned in Table 3.3. The rate is higher in PV2 as stressed and reference ROs
frequencies differ significantly between two samples due to higher process variations. This re-
sults in a higher overlapped area between two distributions. However, we obtain significantly
lower θ for 51-stage RO. θ1 is 2.79% and 0.21% when the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR has aged 3
days and 15, respectively. For PV1, it is 0.32% and 0% for same use times. We can predict all
the samples as recycled or new when they are aged only 3 days. As we described earlier, with
these two ROs placed very close to each other, the variation will be well below PV1. Under dif-
ferent cases, we also observe similar misprediction rate (θ2) of identifying new ICs as recycled.
In both these cases, 51-stage RO outperforms the 21-stage RO.
In the simulation, we have only considered process variation. We did not include any
results for temperature and power supply variation. As the two ROs are placed very close in the
circuit layout and the temperature variation is a global phenomenon, the temperature variation
between the two is practically negligible (4T = 0). At higher temperatures, we would also
expect more rapid aging in the stressed RO, which should only improve our results. A similar
argument can be made for power supply variation.
3.1.9 Workload Analysis
It is also important to analyze different workloads that impact the detection of recycled ICs. We
define workload as the percentage of time per day that the IC is in use. The workload/usage
depends on the type of application being run. For example, the ICs used in – (i) mobile phones
may remain on during the entire day (workload may be 100%), or, (ii) televisions or laptops may
be ON for a fraction of day (workload may be well below 100%). We have considered 100%
workload for all the simulations unless specified otherwise. Table 3.5 shows the minimum usage
time of ICs under various workloads required for proper identification. Note we have shown the
results only for the 51-stage NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR, as it provides minimum misprediction.
The results show that the length of time required to detect the recycled IC increases as the
workload decreases. For example, a workload of 10% and 1% requires the IC be used for 30
days and 300 days respectively. With reduced workload, we can only identify ICs as recycled
if the system is used over a longer period of time because when the system is off (i.e., not in
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use), time passes, but the stressed RO does not age at all. Note that the impact of low-workload
environment would be similar for all prior approaches based on aging [85] [86] [1]. Hence, the
NBTI-aware RO-CDIR will outperform all other aging-based methods at any workload.
Table 3.5: Workload analysis.
Workload
100% 75 % 50 % 10 % 1 %
51-Stage RO-CDIR 3 Days 4 Days 6 Days 30 Days 300 Days
3.1.10 Attack Analysis
As we all know, counterfeiting is an evolving problem. The counterfeiters are continuously
improving their techniques through experience. We believe that this trend will continue and the
counterfeiters will continue to evolve and adapt their techniques to new detection and protection
methods. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to analyze all of the possible attacks on these RO-
CDIRs and their vulnerabilities in order to examine their robustness. There may be two types
of attacks possible on RO-CDIRs, and they are as follows:
• Removal/Tampering: The first attack on RO-CDIRs could be removal/tampering attacks.
However, it is fairly impossible for the counterfeiter to replace the stressed RO with a
new one or to tamper with the stressed/reference RO in order to match their frequency.
If we assume that a removal or tampering attack is possible, then the counterfeiter must
remove the old package and then again repackage and remark it according to its origi-
nal specifications. This removal and then repackaging may not be cost effective to the
counterfeiters. Hence, it is unlikely to be used in practice.
• Age Reference RO: In this attack scenario, the counterfeiter may try to intentionally age
the Reference RO to mask the difference between the ROs. The counterfeiter might
attempt to force the RO-CDIR to work in authentication mode (MODE 10, in Table 3.1)
for a period of time under accelerated stress conditions. With the accelerated aging at
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the same time, the frequency difference between the Stressed RO and the Reference RO
would shrink since both of them could asymptotically approach maximum degradation.
As we all know, burn-in is a very expensive process and the counterfeiter must have an
expensive setup for that. The primary incentive for counterfeiting is cheap recycling,
not adding extra cost to the components. There might not be any motivation left for the
counterfeiters when they are forced to add burn-in to their recycling process. As a result,
this attack might not be feasible as there is no cost incentive.
3.2 Fuse-Based CDIR
The RO-CDIR structures describe above, are most suitable for large digital ICs due to the area
required to implement them. However, the majority of components on the market today are
smaller analog, digital, and mixed-signal types. In this section, we are presenting an alternative,
low-cost structure that is based on semiconductor fuses [92] [93] and can be implemented into
almost any design, with the exception of discrete components, such as diodes, transistors, and
passive components. This structure can be fabricated along with the original design, and it does
not require the modification or addition of any steps to the manufacturing process.
Original Design
Test IOIO
IO IO IO
GNDVDD
CDIR Structure
Die
Package
Fuse
Fig. 3.7: F-CDIR: version I.
Figure 3.7 presents the design for the fuse-based CDIR structure. The structure consists
of a switch and a fuse. It is a three-terminal structure, having two terminals that are connected
to V DD and GND pins. The third terminal, the control terminal, is regulated by Test pin on the
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IC. In this design, the MOSFET acts as the switch. The design overhead is only one transistor
and a fuse. The design works as follows: During the manufacturing and burn-in test modes
Test pin will always be “0” which will provide no current flow through this structure. When the
component is placed in the printed circuit board (PCB) for normal operation, Test pin will be
connected to V DD. The MOS will be ON and a current will flow through the fuse, which will
result in an open circuit inside the structure. The device will then operate normally.
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Fig. 3.8: F-CDIR version I implemented in differential designs.
The detection of counterfeit (used in the field) components will be the measurement of
resistance between V DD and GND pins while setting Test pin to V DD. The measured resistance
between V DD and GND should be negligible for new component. If the component has been
used in the field, the measured resistance will be high (infinite). Here we are assuming the users
of the component are trusted and they design the PCB with Test treated as V DD. For the added
security, the Test pin can be named as V DD.
Figure 3.8 shows the implementation of this structure in differential designs. The struc-
ture is placed in between the differential output, O+ and O−, pins. The control pin is connected
to the Test pin. For the proper burning of the fuse, the differential design must provide the nec-
essary current to the fuse. During the manufacturing and burn-in tests mode, Test pin will be
assigned to “0” which makes the MOS off and the fuse remains intact. When the device op-
erates in field for the first time, the fuse will be burnt because of a current flowing through it.
The design will then operate according to its normal specifications. The measured resistance
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between O+ and O− should be negligible for new components, and it will be high (infinite) for
counterfeit components.
Original Design
Test IOIO
IO IO IO
GNDVDD
CDIR Structure
Die
Package
Fuse
Fig. 3.9: F-CDIR: version II.
Figure 3.9 presents a different version of the CDIR structure. The design consists of
only one semiconductor fuse. The terminals of the sensor are connected to Test and GND pins.
The fuse is isolated from the rest of the design. During the manufacturing and burn-in tests
mode, the Test pin will always be “0”. The fuse will be intact during these modes, as there is
no current flowing through it. In normal operation, this pin will be assigned to V DD. When
the chip operates in the field for the first time, the current will flow through the sensor and the
fuse will be burnt. The detection of used components will be based on measuring the resistance
value between the Test and GND pins. A simple multimeter can authenticate the components.
A component will be treated as counterfeit if this measured resistance value is high (infinite)
and new if this value is low.
Note that the successful implementation of F-CDIR relies on the trusted system integrator
as the burning of the fuse will only be asserted if V DD gets applied to the Test pin. If the system
integrator does not apply V DD to the Test pin in their systems, the fuse will then be intact. In
that case, we cannot identify recycled ICs by simply measuring the resistance.
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3.2.1 Area overhead analysis
Table 3.6 shows the approximate area overhead of the F-CDIRs. We have selected ITC’97
benchmark [94] for analog and mixed signal circuits. We have calculated the approximate area
overhead by the ratio of components used in the F-CDIR with benchmark circuits. For small
analog circuits, the overhead is about 20% for the F-CDIR Version I, whereas it is considerably
lower for the F-CDIR Version II. The F-CDIR II consists of only one component (fuse) com-
pared to two components (a fuse and a transistor) for the F-CDIR I. As mentioned earlier, both
F-CDIR structures also require one extra test pin. This might prohibit their use in cases where
the number of IO pins are limited as they are in smaller ICs. As for digital circuits (such as the
benchmarks used in Table 4.4), F-CDIR structures require virtually negligible area overhead
and the one extra pin may not be an issue either.
Table 3.6: Area overhead of F-CDIR.
Area Overhead
Benchmark Components F-CDIR I F-CDIR II
Operational Amplifier #1 11 18.18 % 9.09%
Continuous-Time State-Variable Filter 42 4.76 % 2.38 %
Operational Amplifier #2 10 20.00 % 10.00 %
Leapfrog Filter 77 2.60 % 1.30 %
Digital-to-Analog Converter 44 4.54 % 2.27 %
3.2.2 Attack Analysis
The design for the F-CDIRs is the simplest among the all three CDIRs, as it consists of only
one fuse (F-CDIR version II) or one fuse and one transistor (F-CDIR version I). However, this
design is also resistant to tampering. The possible attacks are as follows:
• Trust on System Integrator: For the proper operation of the F-CDIR, burning the fuse is
necessary, and this can only be done when V DD gets applied to the Test pin. Thus the
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successful implementation of the F-CDIR relies on the trusted system integrator.
• Tampering: The state of the fuse could be modified. However, a separate metal deposition
is necessary to make the fuse. This would require the decapsulation of the package and
then metal deposition. This is indeed a very costly process. Thus there should not be any
cost incentive for the counterfeiters to perform this process for every IC. The counterfeit-
ers would not get any benefit, as these structures would be placed in very low-cost analog
and mixed-signal ICs.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented two DFAC structures, RO-CDIRs and F-CDIRs, to detect
recycled and remarked ICs of different types and sizes. The NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR structure
can be implemented in any digital IC with new technology nodes as it takes the advantage
of higher aging in newer technology nodes. It can be placed even in smaller digital ICs with
few thousand gates, due to the low area overhead. The simple RO-CDIR requires three test
pins whereas the NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR needs two additional pins while also achieving better
performance. F-CDIRs can be implemented in any components (small, or large, and analog,
or digital) and any technology node. These CDIRs can authenticate ICs very effectively and
require a very low cost multimeter. F-CDIRs require only one test pin for IC authentication.
Finally, all these CDIRs are resistant to all types of known attacks. Together, these structures
provide excellent coverage for the full range of recycled ICs.
Chapter 4
Combating Die and IC Recycling with Multiple RO-Pairs
The NBTI-aware CDIR (N-CDIR) proposed in Chapter 3, can efficiently detect recycled ICs
with little misprediction when the chips are aged for a short period of time. However, when
the workload decreases (i.e., the chip is used less frequently in case of mobile and automotive
applications), we require the chips to be used much longer for detection, which eventually
results in a higher rate of misprediction. In addition, there may be a recycling activity from
the overstock of electronic systems where the recyclers extract components from never used
systems. The detection of these components can be performed with a CDIR that can detect a
small amount of aging (for example, the amount of aging caused during the test of a system).
When the application risk is critical [9] [12] [13], we do not have the luxury for any test escapes
as the system failure due to using recycled chips could cause significant financial loss, as well
as risks to safety and security. Thus, this necessitates further improvements of the N-CDIR.
To address these challenges, we present two different CDIR structures based on multiple
ring oscillators [16]. We propose a new N-CDIR with multiple reference and stressed RO-
pairs. We introduce an averaging approach to reduce the impact of process variations during the
estimation of a threshold which will be used in the authentication process (see Figure 3.4). We
call this design multiple-pair NBTI-aware RO CDIR with averaging (AN-CDIR). This design
provides a much better detection for ICs used for only few hours in the field with the cost of
small misprediction. In addition, we propose another modified design of N-CDIR by adding
multiple NBTI-aware reference and stressed RO-pairs like AN-CDIR. However, in this case we
propose a selection algorithm (see Figure 4.5) to find the best reference and stressed RO-pair.
We call this design multiple-pair NBTI-aware RO CDIR with selection (SN-CDIR). This CDIR
with the best selected RO-pair, provides even better detection (no misprediction) of recycled
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ICs, even if they have been used only for a few hours, unlike the AN-CDIR.
4.1 CDIR with Multiple RO-pairs
Figure 4.1 shows the process of reducing the rate of misprediction for identifying a recycled
IC as new and vice versa. Misprediction arises from the overlap of the reference and stressed
ROs frequency difference distribution at time 0 (g0(∆ f )) and the distribution at time t (gt(∆ f )),
which is the aged replica of g0(∆ f ). This overlapping area can be reduced by:
i) Increasing the separation of these two distributions. This separation (aging degrada-
tion, δ f ) can be increased by shifting the distribution g0(∆ f ) to the left (g
′
0(∆ f )) or shifting the
distribution gt(∆ f ) to the right g
′
t(∆ f ), or by doing both simultaneously (see Figure 4.1(a)). Our
proposed N-CDIR provides better detection of recycled ICs by shifting the distribution gt(∆ f )
to the right as compared to O-CDIR.
ii) Reducing the spread of these two distributions. This spread results from their vari-
ances (σ20 and σ2t ). Figure 4.1(b) shows no overlap between g
′
0(∆ f ) and g
′
t(∆ f ) (σ
′
0 < σ0 and
σ ′t < σt). Our proposed AN-CDIR utilizes this technique to reduce misprediction rate.
iii) Simultaneously reducing the spread and increasing the separation of two distribu-
tions. Figure 4.1(c) shows such case. The overall spread can be reduced by discarding the right
hand side, and reducing the left hand side spread of g0(∆ f ). The separation can be increased
by shifting gt(∆ f ) to the right. Our proposed SN-CDIR utilizes this technique and provides the
best detection of recycled ICs.
By introducing multiple RO-pairs in a CDIR, it becomes possible to achieve 1, 2, and/or
3, thereby reducing misprediction when the ICs are used only for a short period of time. In the
following, we will describe two different architectures utilizing multiple RO-pairs to minimize
the misprediction. It is also analytically proven that both approaches are better than the single
N-CDIR. In Section 5.4, simulations for all sensors support our conclusions.
To eliminate the confusion among different symbols, which will be introduced shortly,
we summarize the notations in Table 4.1.
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(a) Shifting two distributions away from each other. (b) Reduction of spread of two distributions.
(c) Reduction of spread and shifting of mean of two
distributions.
Fig. 4.1: Reduction of misprediction (overlapped area).
4.2 CDIR Sensor with multiple RO-pairs and Averaging Approach (AN-CDIR)
The AN-CDIR works based on the averaging of reference and stressed RO frequencies. In
the following, we will provide proof that the spread (σ) of g0(∆ f ) (see Figure 4.1(b)) is re-
duced significantly after averaging. In this method, one must measure all the frequencies of the
stressed and reference ROs consecutively and then take the average of the reference RO and
stressed RO frequencies.
4.2.1 Averaging to Reduce Spread
Let us assume that there are n ROs present in the reference and stressed block of an AN-CDIR.
We treat the frequencies of the reference ROs and stressed ROs as random variables, denoted
by X1,X2, . . . ,Xn, and Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yn, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Notations and their descriptions.
Notation1−3 Equation Description
∆ f ∆ f = fR− fS
∆ f is the frequency difference between reference RO
( fR) and stressed RO ( fS).
δ f
δ f = ∆ ft −∆ f0
= ( ftR− ftS)−
( f0R− f0S)
= −( f0R− ftR)+
( f0S− ftS)
= −δ fR+δ fS
δ f is the aging degradation.
∆ f0 and ∆ ft are the frequency differences at time
0 and t.
f0R and f0S are the frequencies of the reference and
stressed ROs at time 0.
ftR and ftS are the frequencies of the reference and
stressed ROs at time t.
δ fR and δ fS are the aging degradation of reference
and stressed ROs.
∂ fS ∂ fS =
f0S,VDD1− f0S,VDD2
f0S,VDD2
∂ fS is the percentage frequency difference of the
stressed RO with two different supply voltages
(VDD1 >VDD2) at time 0. f0S,VDD1 and f0S,VDD2 are the
frequencies at supply voltages VDD1 and VDD2,
respectively.
1 ˆ denotes minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator [95].
2 Boldface symbol denotes random variables.
3 ~ denotes vectors.
As the distribution of g0(∆ f ) is formed by the frequency differences of the reference and
stressed RO frequencies, we construct the following random variables,
Zi = Xi−Yi
Zis are Gaussian as all Xis and Yis are Gaussian. We also assume that these newly
formed variables have the same mean (µ) and variance (σ2), as all the ROs experience the same
process variations.
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The objective is to find the mean and variance of a newly formed random variable Wn,
where
Wn =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Xi− 1n
n
∑
i=1
Yi (4.1)
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(Xi−Yi) = 1n
n
∑
i=1
Zi (4.2)
As all Zis are Gaussian, the resultant random variable Wn will also be Gaussian and its
statistics will be completely determined by the mean and variance, which can be formulated as:
E[Wn] = E
[1
n
n
∑
i=1
Zi
]
=
1
n
(
E
[ n
∑
i=1
Zi
])
=
n×µ
n
= µ (4.3)
var(Wn) = var
(1
n
n
∑
i=1
Zi
)
= var
( n
∑
i=1
Zi
n
)
=
1
n2
n
∑
i=1
var(Zi)+
1
n2 ∑i 6= j
cov(Zi,Zj) (4.4)
In the above, E[A] denotes the expected value of random variable A which is equivalent
to the mean for a Gaussian random variable; var(A) denotes the variance of random variable A;
and cov(A,B) denotes the covariance between random variables A and B. Let us assume that the
frequencies of all the ROs are independent. This results in Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn being independent.
Then all of the covariances in Equation 4.4 are zero.
var(Wn) =
1
n2
n
∑
i=1
var(Zi) =
n×σ2
n2
=
σ2
n
(4.5)
Thus, the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ ) of Wn becomes:
µWn = µ (4.6)
σWn =
σ√
n
(4.7)
In Equations 4.3 and 4.6, the mean of the average difference Wn is unchanged when com-
pared to each Zi. However, the variance (spread) of Wn is a factor on
√
n smaller (see Equation
4.7). A similar treatment can be performed for the distribution gt(.) at time t to estimate the
resultant mean and variance. This implies that the overlap between the two distributions can be
made negligibly small by adding additional RO-pairs (as shown in Figure 4.1(b)).
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4.2.2 Architecture of AN-CDIR
Figure 4.2 shows our proposed architecture for the AN-CDIR. It consists of a reference RO
block and a stressed RO block. Each block again consists of equal numbers of NBTI-aware
reference and stressed ROs. The number of ROs in each block depends on the detection of
recycled ICs used for a minimum amount of time (we label this time as “resolution”). For
example, our results show that by placing four ROs in each block, we can detect recycled ICs
that have been used for only one day with 100% workload (see Table 4.3). Larger numbers of
ROs are necessary to achieve a superfine recycled IC detection resolution. The requisite number
of ROs can be determined based on the available area on the chip.
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Fig. 4.2: The architecture of our proposed AN-CDIR.
All the ROs in the reference block and stressed blocks are fed to a multiplexer (MUX).
The selection input of MUX is provided by a shift register of log2(2n) bit to minimize the I/O
pin count for this CDIR. This register is loaded through a serial in RO SEL pin. The rest of
the design is similar to the N-CDIR described in Figure 3.3. The DECODER generates all the
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internal signals (see Table 3.1) for the reference and stressed RO blocks. It is not necessary to
generate the control signals for each RO in the reference and stressed RO blocks. All the ROs
in each block utilize the same internal signals generated by the DECODER. The COUNT ER
and T IMER operate as described in N-CDIR.
The registration and authentication flow are very similar to the one described in Figure
3.4. The only difference is the measurement of ∆ f , where it is the difference of the average of
reference and stressed RO frequencies (see Equation 4.1).
4.3 CDIR Sensor with multiple RO-pairs and Selection Approach (SN-CDIR)
SN-CDIR is based on the selection of the best RO pair that minimizes misprediction. Increasing
the difference between the mean of two distributions (δ f ) for time t and 0 and reducing their
spread (σ0 and σt) are the key parameters for improving the detection of the recycled ICs. The
selection of the best RO pair is the primary objective for minimizing the level of misprediction.
As the reference RO remains quiet during normal operations, our objective is to find a stressed
RO that degrades the most among all of the available stressed ROs. At the same time, we need
to find a reference RO which is slower than the stressed RO at time 0. In the following, we will
present a novel RO selection flow to select the best RO-pair for minimizing the misprediction.
Let us start with a mathematical proof to find a maximum δ f , the aging degradation.
4.3.1 Correlation between aging degradation (δ fS) and normalized frequency
differences (∂ fS)
To find the maximum aging degradation (δ f ) of a CDIR, we have conducted an experiment to
observe how δ f varies with the percentage frequency differences (∂ fS) at different supply volt-
ages. As the reference ROs remain quiet during normal operations, we have selected stressed
ROs for this experiment. We have performed a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 stressed
RO samples implemented in PTM 90nm technology node [96] with two different supply volt-
ages (1.2V and 1.4V). Figure 4.3 shows the scatter plot of δ fS versus ∂ fS at time t, where
∂ fS =
f0S,1.4V− f0S,1.2V
f0S,1.2V
. Here, f0S,1.4V and f0S,1.2V are the frequencies of the stressed RO at 1.4V
and 1.2V supply voltage. We have observed a positive correlation (ρ) for aging degradation
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and normalized frequency differences (see Figure 4.3(a) and 4.3(b)). A theoretical proof will
be presented below in Section 4.3.2.
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Fig. 4.3: Scatter plot of percentage degradation (%δ fS) versus percentage frequency differences
(%∂ fS) of stressed ROs.
4.3.2 Proof of positive correlation between δ fS and ∂ fS
The amount of threshold voltage degradation (∆Vth) due to voltage profiles experienced by the
PMOS transistor can be represented by [97]
∆Vth ∝ exp
( |Vgs|− |Vt p|
E0tox
)
where tox is the gate oxide thickness, Vgs is the gate-source voltage and E0 = 2.0 MV/cm. Now,
differentiating ∆Vth with respect to |Vt p| results in
d∆Vth
d|Vt p| ∝
−1
E0tox
exp
( |Vgs|− |Vt p|
E0tox
)
< 0
Thus, ∆Vth is a monotonic decreasing function with |Vth| which results in higher degra-
dation in at low Vth corner. This will result in a higher δ fS for low Vth corner. We can prove a
positive correlation between δ fS and ∂ fS if we prove higher ∂ fS leads to the selection of a low
|Vth| PMOS transistor.
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For simplicity, let us consider a simple ring oscillator (see Figure 3.2(a)) with n inverters
consisting of one pMOS and one NMOS transistors. The frequency of that RO is f = 12∗n∗td ,
where td is the delay of an inverter. Clearly, the frequency of an RO is inversely proportional to
the delay of an inverter while assuming all the inverters are identical.
tf tr
Vin(t)
VDD
Vout(t)
VDD
t
t
Rp
Cout
VDD
nMOS off
+
Vout(t)
-
i
Rn
Cout
VDD
pMOS off
+
Vout(t)
-
i
Fig. 4.4: Transient response of an CMOS inverter.
Figure 4.4 shows the transient response of an inverter and the charging and discharging
circuits during its switching. The rise time tr depends on the charging of the output capacitor
Cout through Rp while the fall time t f depends on the discharging of Cout through Rn. The
RC time constants during charging and discharging are τp = RpCout and τn = RnCout . The rise
time and fall time are proportional to τp and τn respectively. Now, the propagation delay of an
inverter
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td ∝ (tr + t f ) ∝ (τp+ τn) = (Rp+Rn)Cout
where Rp =
1
βp(VDD+Vt p)
and
Rn =
1
βn(VDD−Vtn)
Thus, f ∝
1
Rp+Rn
=
k
Rp+Rn
where k is a constant.
Now the percentage frequency differences,
∂ fS =
f0S,VDD1− f0S,VDD2
f0S,VDD2
=
1
Rp1+Rn1
− 1Rp2+Rn2
1
Rp2+Rn2
=
(Rp2+Rn2
Rp1+Rn1
−1
)
(4.8)
Differentiating ∂ fS with respect to |Vt p|,
d
dVt p
(∂ fS) =
d
dVt p
(Rp2+Rn2
Rp1+Rn1
−1
)
=
(Rp1+Rn1) ddVt p (Rp2)− (Rp2+Rn2) ddVt p (Rp1)
(Rp1+Rn1)2
as Rn1 and Rn2 are constants.
Now,
(Rp1+Rn1) ddVt p (Rp2)
(Rp2+Rn2) ddVt p (Rp1)
=
( 1VDD1+Vt p +
1
VDD1−Vtn )×
[− 1
(VDD2+Vt p)2
]
( 1VDD2+Vt p +
1
VDD2−Vtn )×
[− 1
(VDD1+Vt p)2
]
=
VDD1−Vt
VDD2−Vt ,assuming Vtn =−Vt p =Vt ;βn = βp
> 1 as VDD1 >VDD2
Thus, ddVt p (∂ fS) > 0 signifies that ∂ fS is a monotonic increasing function with Vth. We
can infer that the selection of a higher ∂ fS leads to the selection of a lower |Vth| (higher Vth as it
is negative) PMOS transistor. This results in a positive correlation (> 0) between δ fS and ∂ fS.
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4.3.3 δ f Versus ∂ fS
Let us assume that a stressed RO is used for about time t in the field. Due to aging, it slows
down and the frequency ftS at time t becomes lower than the frequency f0S at time 0. Thus its
aging degradation, δ fs, becomes
δ fS = f0S− ftS
The RO is operated at two different supply voltages at time 0 to calculate the percentage
frequency differences
∂ fS =
f0S,VDD1− f0S,VDD2
f0S,VDD2
where, VDD1 >VDD2.
There exists a positive correlation ρ (see Figure 4.3(a)) between δ fS and ∂ fS. Now our
objective is to select a RO-pair that will maximize the aging degradation (δ f ) of the SN-CDIR
based on the stressed RO percentage frequency differences (∂ fS) at different supply voltages.
δ f ρ←− ∂ fS
Here, the aging degradation for a CDIR is expressed as:
δ f = ∆ ft −∆ f0 where, ∆ fi = fiR− fiS
Note that δ f and ∂ fS are random variables due to process variations.
Since we have shown above that a positive correlation exists between δ fS and ∂ fS, it is
possible to find an optimal estimate ˆδ f for δ f . Specifically, the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) estimator [95] for the stressed RO degradation can be expressed as:
ˆδ fS = ρ
σδ fS
σ∂ fS
(
∂ fS−µ∂ fS
)
+µδ fS
where ρ represents the correlation between the δ fS and ∂ fS; σδ fS and σ∂ fS represent the stan-
dard deviations for δ fS and ∂ fS respectively; and µδ fS and µ∂ fS denote means for δ fS and ∂ fS
respectively.
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The MMSE estimator for the CDIR degradation (δ f ) can be written in terms of ∂ fS as
follows:
ˆδ f = ∆ˆ ft − ˆ∆ f0 = ( fˆtR− fˆtS)− ( fˆ0R− fˆ0S)
= −( fˆ0R− fˆtR)+( fˆ0S− fˆtS)
= fˆ0S− fˆtS, Assuming fˆ0R= fˆtR as reference RO
ages very little.
= ˆδ fs = ρ
σδ fS
σ∂ fS
(
∂ fS−µ∂ fS
)
+µδ fS
As ρ is positive, maximizing ∂ fS will maximize δ f , which is the separation between
the two distributions at t = 0 and t = t. This implies that in SN-CDIR, where we have several
RO-pairs to choose from, it is optimal to choose the one with the largest ∂ fS at t = 0. This
will maximize the distance between the two distributions of frequency difference as depicted in
Figure 4.1(a), resulting in lower probability of misprediction than single N-CDIR.
4.3.4 Proposed Registration and Authentication Flow
Figure 4.5 shows the proposed registration flow of the SN-CDIR. The registration flow consists
of the selection of the best reference and stressed RO-pair. During registration, a large number
of new ICs are used to generate the distributions to determine the threshold after the manufac-
turing test process at the foundry. It is better to select the samples from different wafers and lots
to capture the actual process variations. The larger this sample space is, the more accurate the
process variations will be. In our simulation, we selected PV2 (mentioned in Table 3.3) as the
extreme case, and we believe that any process variations will be well below PV2. The environ-
mental conditions during measurement should be as uniform as possible to reduce measurement
errors. However, we believe that the environmental variations should not impact the measure-
ment as the reference and stressed ROs are placed close to each other so that environmental
conditions will impact all of the ROs uniformly.
The objective of the registration phase is to find the best reference and stressed RO-
pair. During this phase all the ROs in the CDIR are selected and their frequencies are cap-
tured. Let us assume that there are n reference and n stressed ROs in a CDIR. Two vectors
102
New ICs
Select a sample
Collect all the frequencies of 
reference and stressed ROs
fR=[fR1 fR2 ...fRn] and  fS=[fS1 fS2 ...fSn] 
All samples 
covered?
Select a reference RO
Calculate the frequency 
differences
Δfi=[Δ fi1 Δ fi2 … Δ fin]
All reference 
ROs covered?
All frequency differences
Δ f=[Δf1  Δf2 … Δ fn]
T
Select all RO pairs with Δfij < 0
Select a stressed RO (j=j’) 
with max(∂ fS) to maximize 
aging degradation (δf)
All Δfij > 0 
Select a RO pair with 
min (Δfij ) to reduce the 
spread of g(.)
Select a reference RO (i=i') 
with max(Δfij’) to reduce the 
spread of g(.)
Selected RO-pair
Burnt fuse
Data analysis to determine 
threshold (Δ fth)
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
→ → 
Fig. 4.5: Proposed registration flow for SN-CDIR.
~fR = [ fR1 fR2 . . . fRn] and ~fS = [ fS1 fS2 . . . fSn] are formed to store all the reference and stressed
RO frequencies. Now all the frequency differences are stored in a matrix ∆ f = [∆ fi j]n×n, where
∆ fi j = ~fR(i)−~fS( j), ∀(i, j). If all the ∆ fi j are positive, a reference-stressed RO pair is selected
with min(∆ fi j), otherwise ∆ f is updated with only negative ∆ fi j values. The resultant distribu-
tion g
′
0(.) by applying these treatments can be visualized in Figure 4.1(c) where the spread has
been reduced significantly.
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It is now necessary to shift the distribution at time t, gt(.) to the right in order to increase
δ f even further (see Figure 4.1(a)). A stressed RO is selected which has maximum ~∂ f S( j) =
~f0S,VDD1 ( j)−~f0S,VDD2 ( j)
~f0S,VDD1 ( j)
. The corresponding reference RO is selected with max(∆ fi j) to reduce the
spread of both g0(.) and gt(.) distributions. Once the best RO pair is selected, the frequency
difference (∆ fi j) is stored to form the distribution (g0(.)). A fuse block is used to select these
two ROs permanently. All the ICs go through a similar treatment to find out the best RO pair.
Finally the threshold is calculated, which will be used later for the detection of recycled ICs.
Note that in the worst case, there may not be a correlation present between δ fS and ∂ fS,
as some researchers reported a very weak or zero correlation between the aging degradation with
threshold voltage [98]. However, this will not impact the result significantly as the removal of
right hand side and the reduction of the spread of the distribution at t=0 (g0(.)).
The authentication flow is exactly same to the one described in Figure 3.4. The frequency
differences (∆ f ) of the reference and stressed ROs of an IC under authentication are measured
and compared with the threshold (∆ fth) to determine whether the IC is recycled or not. The
CDIR will experience more degradation once it has been used longer in the field, and ∆ f will
be much larger than ∆ fth making it easier to identify.
4.3.5 Proposed Architecture of SN-CDIR
Figure 4.6 shows our proposed architecture for the SN-CDIR. It also consists of reference RO
and stressed RO blocks like AN-CDIR. Each block consists of an equal number of NBTI-aware
ROs. The number of ROs in each block depends on the recycled IC detection resolution. For
example, it is required to place four ROs in each block when we want to detect recycled ICs
aged for only 12 hours with a 100% workload (see Table 4.3). Larger numbers of ROs are
necessary to achieve a superfine recycled IC detection resolution. Like AN-CDIR, the required
number of ROs can be determined after observing the available area on a chip.
All the ROs in the reference and stressed blocks are fed to two different multiplexers
(MUXR and MUXS) respectively. The selection input of MUXR and MUXS are provided by the
LSBs and MSBs of a shift register. If there are n ROs in each block, the selection input of each
multiplexer will be log2(n). Thus the size of the shift register will be 2log2(n). This shift reg-
ister can accept data from the MUX SEL pin or a 2log2(n) bit fuse/antifuse block. During reg-
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Fig. 4.6: The architecture of our proposed AN-CDIR.
istration phase, all the ROs are selected to measure their frequencies. In this phase, MUX SEL
selects each RO. At the end of the registration phase, the best RO-pair is determined. The
selection bits corresponding to these ROs are programmed in a 2log2(n) fuse/antifuse block.
V PROG provides the programming voltage to the fuse/antifuse block.
The rest of the design is similar to the N-CDIR described in Figure 3.3. The DECODER
generates all the internal signals (see Table 3.1) for the reference and stressed RO blocks. It
is not necessary to generate the control signals for each RO in the reference and stressed RO
blocks. All the ROs in each block utilize the same internal signals generated by the DECODER.
The MUX , COUNT ER, and T IMER operate as described before.
4.4 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this section, we will present the simulation results for the AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR structures.
We present the simulation results for the process variations PV2 (see Table 3.3) to evaluate the
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performance of the CDIRs in the most extreme cases. We believe that these CDIRs will perform
better than standard manufacturing processes, as these ROs are placed very close to each other.
As in the case of the N-CDIR, we have implemented and simulated these CDIRs using the 90nm
technology node [96]. HSPICE MOSRA from Synopsys is used to simulate and measure the
impact of aging on this CDIR sensor. The nominal supply voltage is 1.2V. In this simulation,
we selected 51-stage ROs as they outperform the 21-stage RO (see Table 3.4). To model the
variation, the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation was performed with 1000 samples of the CDIRs.
First we will present the results when the CDIRs are aged for only 3 days with a 100% workload.
Larger usage time than 3 days would be easily detected using these sensors.
Figure 4.7 shows the histogram plot of the average frequency difference between the
reference and stressed RO-pairs for different number of RO-pairs in an AN-CDIR. We have
observed that the spread of the distributions at time 0 and 3 days reduced significantly while
increasing the RO-pairs in the CDIR. However, the separation between the two distributions
remains the same. The threshold (∆ fth) for determining whether the ICs under tests are new
or recycled is the same for all the different RO-pairs in a CDIR and is µt=0+µt=3D2 = 2.77MHz.
Figure 4.8 also reveals the same fact that to detect recycled ICs aged fewer than 3 days requires
more than 2 RO pairs in a CDIR. The higher the number of RO pairs, the better the likelihood
that we will be able to detect recycled ICs that have been used less in the field.
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Fig. 4.7: The frequency difference distribution at PV2 of AN-CDIR with different number of
RO-pairs.
106
It is relevant to analyze how the mean (µ) and variance (σ2) of the frequency difference
distribution of the AN-CDIR changes with an increased number of RO pairs to estimate the
misprediction accuracy and the number of RO-pairs required to achieve nearly a zero mispre-
diction rate. By using the norm f it MATLAB function [99], we measure the actual mean and
variance (denoted as Act. in Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Table 4.2) of different distributions with
different numbers of RO pairs in a CDIR, and compare them (denoted as Exp. in Columns 2,
4, 6, and 8 of Table 4.2) with Equations 4.6 and 4.7 to measure the accuracy of our averaging
algorithm. Table 4.2 shows the values for µ and σ . We have observed an error in the expected
value (Exp.) compared to the actual value (Act.), which is less than 0.5% for µ and less than
9% for σ .
Table 4.2: Mean and variance f distribution of AN-CDIR.
# g0(.) gt=3D(.)
RO µ σ µ σ
Pairs Exp. Act. Exp. Act. Exp. Act. Exp. Act.
2 0.000 0.004 0.986 0.987 5.553 5.551 0.994 1.007
4 0.000 -0.016 0.697 0.695 5.553 5.533 0.703 0.722
6 0.000 0.003 0.569 0.580 5.553 5.551 0.574 0.608
10 0.000 -0.005 0.441 0.452 5.553 5.542 0.444 0.488
Now we will analyze the performance of the SN-CDIR. Figure 4.8 shows the histogram
plot of the frequency difference between the selected best reference and stressed RO pair. We
have observed that there is no overlap between the two distributions at time 0 and 3 days for
all the figures, Figure 4.8(a) - 4.8(d). However, the separation between the two distributions
increases as the number of RO-pairs increases. The threshold (∆ fth) (see Figure 4.5) for de-
termining whether the ICs under tests are new or recycled is 2MHz for all the CDIRs with
different RO pairs. Figure 4.8 reveals that, to detect a recycled IC aged for only 3 days with
zero-misprection, does not require more than 2 RO pairs in a CDIR. However, there will be an
inevitable overlap between the two distributions when the ICs are aged for fewer than 3 days.
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In that case, a higher number of RO-pairs in a CDIR would be required.
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Fig. 4.8: The frequency difference distribution at PV2 of SN-CDIR with different number of
RO-pairs.
Table 4.3 shows the prediction accuracy of the AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR. The rate of
misprediction (i.e. recycled ICs identified as new (θ1) and new ICs identified as recycled (θ2))
is also estimated by using Equation 3.2 for the AN-CDIR. We cannot apply this equation to
estimate the rate of misprediction for the SN-CDIR, as the distributions are no longer Gaussian.
These mispredictions are calculated as:
θ1 =
#samples with ∆ f < ∆ fth
Total samples
×100%
θ2 =
#samples with ∆ f > ∆ fth
Total samples
×100%
Column 1 represents the duration for the two CDIRs that are aged. Column 2 represents the
number of RO-pairs in a CDIR. In this simulation, we have implemented a maximum of 10
RO-pairs in a CDIR. We observe from this table that a larger number of RO-pairs are required
to detect ICs that have been aged less amount of time. We can identify all ICs (recycled or new)
without any error for both CDIRs with 2 RO-pairs when the aging duration is more than 15
days. All ICs with 3 days of prior usage can be detected by using SN-CDIR with 2 RO-pairs
without any error whereas the prediction errors for AN-CDIR with 2 RO-pairs are 0.2938%
108
and 0.2511%. We require 4 RO-pairs for both CDIRs to identify ICs with only 1 day of aging.
However, SN-CDIR provides better prediction accuracy. We require 6 and 4 RO-pairs for SN-
CDIR and AN-CDIR to identify ICs with only 12 hours of aging. For SN-CDIR, we need to set
the threshold (∆ fth) carefully such that θ1 and θ2 are of similar value.
If there is no overlap between the two distributions (g0(.) and gt(.)), then one can select
a threshold (∆ fth) greater than 0. For example, one can select ∆ fth = 2MHz for Figures 4.8(b)
- 4.8(d). However, in this table, we mention fth = 0 even though there is no overlap. When
the ICs are aged with less amount of time the distribution (gt(.)) shifts very little to the right
and there might be a possible overlap by the tail of gt(.) with g0(.). Thus it is wise to select a
threshold (∆ fth) near 0.
When the ICs are used for a very small amount of time, the performance of SN-CDIR
outperforms AN-CDIR. For example, θ1 and θ2 are 13.07% and 12.85% for a AN-CDIR with
2 RO-pairs whereas they are 7.3% and 7.5% for a SN-CDIR. We can detect recycled ICs with
2 hours of aging by using a SN-CDIR with 6 RO-pairs whereas it requires a AN-CDIR with 10
RO-pairs. In addition, the misprediction rate is also higher for the AN-CDIR.
4.4.1 Area Overhead Analysis
Table 4.4 shows the area overhead analysis of all the CDIRs. We simulated several IWLS 2005
benchmarks ranging from low to high sizes to compute the area overhead. The area overhead
is defined as the ratio of the size/area of the CDIR with the size/area of the benchmark. We
have not considered the size of the timer and counter while calculating the area for the CDIRs
as we assume the frequency measurement can be performed off-chip. We also assume that the
area for the AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR with the same number of RO-pairs is almost same. The
additional area for the SN-CDIR comes from the fuse/antifuse block, and we can neglect this
for simplicity’s sake.
As seen above, the overhead is more than 1% for small benchmarks (i2c, spi, and b14)
for the 51-stage NBTI-Aware RO-CDIR (N-CDIR) that could make it challenging to use them
in small designs. The area overhead for the 51-stage O-CDIR [1] is less than our 51-stage
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Table 4.3: Misprediction Analysis of AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR.
Aging RO- AN-CDIR SN-CDIR
duration pairs (n) θ1(%) θ2(%) ∆ fth θ1(%) θ2(%)
2 13.07 12.85 0.4 7.3 7.5
2 4 5.46 5.51 0.1 0.8 1.0
Hrs 6 2.73 2.77 0 0.0 0.1
10 0.62 0.81 0 0 0
2 9.0 8.9 0.7 4.5 4.8
4 4 2.8 2.79 0.2 0.5 0.7
Hrs 6 1.1 1.15 0 0 0
10 0.13 0.2 0 0 0
2 5.58 5.38 1.0 3.1 2.9
8 4 1.24 1.12 0.5 0.2 0.2
Hrs 6 0.32 0.34 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0
2 3.91 3.75 1.0 1.7 2.9
12 4 0.64 0.58 0.5 0.1 0.2
Hrs 6 0.12 0.14 0 0 0
≥ 8 0 0 0 0 0
2 1.82 1.65 1.4 0.7 0.7
1 4 0.14 0.14 1.0 0.0 0.1
Day ≥ 6 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0.29 0.25 0 0 0
days ≥ 4 0 0 0 0 0
15 days ≥ 2 0 0 0 0 0
N-CDIR. However, for medium and large designs, the area of the O-CDIR or N-CDIR would
hardly impact the overall area of the design.
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Table 4.4: Area overhead analysis.
Area Overhead (%)
Benchmark Size (# AN-CDIR/SN-CDIR
Gates) O-CDIR [1] N-CDIR n=2 n=4 n=6 n=10
i2c 1142 5.52 9.98 19.44 38.35 57.3 95.1
spi 3277 1.92 3.48 6.774 13.37 20 33.1
b14 8679 0.73 1.31 2.558 5.047 7.54 12.5
b15 12562 0.50 0.91 1.767 3.487 5.21 8.65
DMA 19118 0.33 0.60 1.161 2.291 3.42 5.68
DSP 32436 0.19 0.35 0.684 1.35 2.02 3.35
ethernet 46771 0.135 0.24 0.475 0.936 1.4 2.32
vga lcd 124031 0.051 0.09 0.179 0.353 0.53 0.88
leon2 780456 0.008 0.01 0.028 0.056 0.08 0.14
The area overhead for the AN-CDIR and SN-CDIR is comparably high for higher num-
bers of RO-pairs. Both CDIRs with 2 RO-pairs can be implemented in designs larger than
the benchmark DMA with minimum area overhead. On the other hand, these CDIRs with 10
RO-pairs can only be implemented in large designs. As the size of most current system-on-
chips (e.g., microprocessors, digital signal processors, microcontrollers, etc.) are comparable
or larger than vga lcd benchmark, we can successfully implement these CDIRs without affect-
ing the area overhead. In summary, the designers can select a CDIR depending on the area
budget that can satisfy the requirements on minimum usage time for detection.
4.4.2 Attack Analysis
Due to the evolving nature of IC recycling activities, it is of utmost importance to analyze
all of the possible attacks on these CDIRs and their vulnerabilities in order to examine their
robustness. Recyclers are always in the process of improving their old technologies through
experience and adopting new methodologies. In this section we will analyze all the possible
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attack scenarios and their impact on our CDIRs.
• Removal or tampering of the CDIR: The first attack on the CDIRs could be removal or tamper-
ing attacks. In this scenario, the attacker tries to replace the stressed RO with a new counterpart
or tries to tamper with the connections inside the multiplexer. However, it is fairly impossible to
replace the stressed RO with a new one. Currently, recyclers have the capability to tamper with
the connections by using FIB circuit edit [100]. If we assume that the tampering is possible,
then the counterfeiter must remove the old package and again repackage and remark it accord-
ing to its original specifications. This removal and repackaging may not be cost effective to the
counterfeiters. Hence, it is unlikely to be used in practice.
• Age Reference RO: The attacker will try to intentionally age the Reference RO to mask the
frequency differences between the reference and stressed ROs. In this scenario, the attacker
forces the CDIR to work in authentication mode (MODE 10, in Table 3.1) under accelerated
stress conditions. However, in this mode, the stressed RO will also be in oscillation resulting
similar amount of aging. To mask the initial aging difference, the recycler must age the chip
for a long period of time. Burn-in is very expensive as there are hundreds of different IC types,
and the recycler must have an expensive setup for all different ICs. The primary incentive for
counterfeiting is cheap recycling, not adding extra cost to the components. There might not be
any motivation left for the counterfeiters when they are forced to add burn-in to their recycling
process.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented three different structures based on NBTI-aware ring oscil-
lators to detect recycled ICs used only for very short period of time. The reference ROs in
these CDIRs remain quiet during the normal operation of the IC while the stressed RO gets
aged at an accelerated pace utilizing NBTI of PMOS transistors. This helps to get a reasonable
frequency difference between the reference and stressed ROs even though an IC is used only
a very short duration. We proposed two different versions of CDIRs with multiple RO-pairs
where the designer can select the number of RO-pairs depending on their area budget. These
CDIRs provide better prediction accuracy compared to N-CDIR. AN-CDIR with 10 RO-pair
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can detect recycled ICs aged only for 2 hours with a very little misprediction rate. SN-CDIR
provides even better accuracy than AN-CDIR. We can detect recycled ICs with certainty even
though they have been used only for 2 hours in the field.
Chapter 5
Establishment of Forward Trust for Protecting IPs and ICs
In Chapters 3 and 4, we have discussed the detection and avoidance of recycled ICs. However, a
large number of counterfeit ICs belongs to the overproduced, out-of-spec/defective and cloned
types. In this chapter, we focus on developing design-for-anti-counterfeit (DfAC) measures to
prevent IP piracy, IC cloning, IC overproduction, and sourcing of out-of-spec/defective ICs into
the supply chain. We begin by discussing the vulnerabilities associated the first three phases
(e.g., design, fabrication, and assembly) of the supply chain (see Figure 1.3), where these coun-
terfeit types are originated.
The complexity of IC design has grown exponentially due to the persistent trend of device
scaling, which enabled designers to fit more and more functionality on a system-on-chip (SoC)
to reduce overall area and cost of a system. It is fairly impossible to design a complete system by
an SoC designer alone. Therefore, the semiconductor industry has shifted gears to the concept
of design reuse rather than designing the whole SoC from scratch. Nowadays, the SoC designers
obtain licenses for various functional blocks (known as intellectual properties or IPs) for their
SoCs to optimize the design process and decrease time-to-market.
In parallel, the increased complexity of the fabrication process has resulted in a majority
of SoC designers no longer maintaining a fabrication unit (foundry or fab) of their own. Build-
ing and maintaining such foundries for modern SoCs are reported to cost more than several
billions of dollars and increasing as technology further scales [101]. Given the increasing cost,
the semiconductor business has largely shifted to a contract foundry business model (horizontal
business model) over the past two decades. In this business model, the SoC designers first get
licenses for 3PIPs to be used in their SoC designs, design the SoCs by integrating the various
3PIPs and then outsource the SoC design to the foundries and assemblies for fabrication and
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packaging to reduce time-to-market and manufacturing costs.
Fig. 5.1: Lack of trust between the IP owners, SoC designer, and foundries/assemblies in SoC
design and fabrication process.
In the modern SoC design and fabrication flow, forward trust does not exist between the
participating entities. The IP owners cannot have complete trust on the SoC designers, whereas
the SoC designers may not trust the foundries or assemblies. The lack of transparency and the
resulting lack of trust may lead to the following vulnerabilities, as shown in Figure 5.1.
• IP overuse: The SoC designer may produce more ICs and report a lesser amount to
the IP owners to escape the licensing cost. At the same time, the SoC designer may
illegally use an IP that was licensed to be used in a different design. In the current
manufacturing practice, the IP owners have no or little means to verify how many chips
have been manufactured with their IPs and where they have been used. When an untrusted
party overuses the IPs and sells the extra chips in the open market, the IP owners lose any
possible revenue that could have been gained from those chips.
• IP piracy: An SoC designer may legally purchase a third party IP core from an IP owner
and then make clones, or illegitimate copies of the original IP [102] [103] [68] [104].
Similarly, untrusted foundries may sell illegal copies of the GDSII files that they receive
from SoC designers for fabrication. Further, the integrity of the IP may be at risk as an
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untrusted SoC designer can potentially add some extra features to those 3PIPs to make
them look like a different one and then sell them to another SoC designer. An SoC
designer may also modify a 3PIP in order to introduce a backdoor or hardware Trojan
into the chip to leak secret information to the attacker or disable a system at some critical
point in time.
• IC overproduction: Untrusted foundries and assemblies may produce more than the num-
ber of chips they are contracted to manufacture [24] [65] [104]. As no R&D cost are
incurred for these chips and the masks are developed with SoC designer’s expenses, they
can receive illegitimately larger profits by selling these chips with the name of SoC de-
signer. In addition, they can also overbuild chips practically at zero cost by reporting a
lower yield (i.e., percentage of defect-free chips to the total number of chips) to the SoC
designer [25] [69]. Along with the financial loss of the SoC designer, an even bigger
concern with these ICs is that of reliability. Overproduced ICs may simply end up in the
market with minimal or no testing for reliability and functionality. These ICs may also
find their way into the supply chain for many critical applications, which raises concerns
for safety and reliability. Since these ICs have the same name of the SoC designers, their
failure would tarnish company reputation.
5.1 Prior Work
The existing work on preventing IP piracy and IC overproduction can be classified into three
major categories.
5.1.1 Logic obfuscation
This is a technique where a design is transformed to a different one to obfuscate the inner details
of the original design, thus preserving the original functionality [105]. In [68], the authors
proposed a methodology which can be integrated into the SoC design and manufacturing flow
to simultaneously obfuscate and authenticate a design. In this approach, the circuit operates in
a normal mode when it receives a predefined sequence of patterns, known as a key, at its input.
However, it is not clear how this key will be hidden from the foundries or assemblies as it is
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necessary to prevent overproduction. In addition, this technique does not address IP overuse.
The authors in [65] first proposed to encrypt a netlist by using a lock (a set of XOR/XNOR
gates) and it can only be unlocked by using a chip unlock key (CUK). The design is not re-
sistant to reverse engineering as key gates are directly related to the key bits (XOR and XNOR
gates indicate 0 and 1 at CUK location, respectively) and vulnerable to key sensitization attacks
[106]. The authors in [106] addressed those problems by proposing different logic encryption
techniques. The authors in [107] has shown that any logic encrypted circuit can be broken.
However, they assume that an attacker can use scan-chain to read/write the values of all flip-
flops in the design. This assumption does not conform to today’s designs. Every design now use
test compression architecture to significantly reduce the test cost by reducing test time and test
data volume [108–110]. Test responses are compacted many folds before it becomes available
for off-chip access. As the modern EDA tools provides diagnostic support (high defect coverage
and accurate fault diagnostics) with compression in place [108–110], it is impractical not to in-
corporate test compression in the design. It is now impossible to access the individual flip-flop
values (the output of the combinational circuit, Y for a solution to a QBF) for chips where the
design uses test compression. It is impossible to find a key using the approach suggested by the
authors by looking at the compacted scan output values. Thus, it is still safe to use the scheme
proposed in [106] to encrypt netlist.
Recently, Design Automation Standards Committee of the IEEE developed the standard
P1735 [111] to provide the guidance for encryption and management of IPs, which has been
adopted by most IP and EDA vendors. In the encryption approach, the IP is encrypted with
a random symmetric session key. This session key is then encrypted with the public keys of
different EDA vendors and attached to the IP such that these vendors can later reconstruct the
original IP. Figure 5.2(a) shows a very simple IP which performs AND operation in every clock
cycle. To protect from any unwanted modification, the IP is encrypted by using Synopsys
encryptP1735.pl script [112]. In this encryption process, the code inside the ‘pragma protect
block (encircled in red in Figure 5.2(a)) will be encrypted. The encrypted IP is shown in Figure
5.2(b), where the code inside the ‘pragma protect block (encircled in red) is not recognizable to
anyone. During decryption, the session keys are decrypted by using the private key of the EDA
vendor and then encrypted portions of the IP is decrypted by using this session key. One can
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find this process in detail in [112] [113]. Unfortunately, this encryption approach cannot prevent
placing additional features to an existing IP as it does not provide any integrity verification.
Figure 5.2(c) shows this modified encrypted IP where the attacker adds an extra feature (OR
operation) to the existing one (AND operation). We will provide a solution by adding an IP
digest resulted from a cryptographic hash function [114] in the IP header (see Section 5.3.5)
to prevent any unauthorized modifications. In addition, the encrypted IP does not provide any
protection against copying of the whole IP to make an exact clone. As our solution uses an
encrypted netlist, copying the entire IP will not help an attacker unless he possesses a valid
CUK (see Section 5.3.2).
module secret (a, b, clk, y);
    input a,b,clk;
    output y;
`pragma protect begin
    reg y=0;
always @(posedge clk) begin
    y = a & b;
end
`pragma protect end
endmodule
module secret (a, b, clk, y);
    input a, b, clk;
    output y;
`pragma protect data_block
EopI45Xzfd9MCrd6bQoMzZpf0J5X7U0e
Q3SiPiPt3uuZhYazA5xZQS+aD7ySO+rV
Q/msi5/CE5VsxtCSc8SVhFeniUj1sp 
IjMKpVHvv+2pw=
`pragma protect end_protected
endmodule
module secret_modified (a, b, clk, y, q );
    input a, b, clk;
    output y, q;
assign q=a | b;
`pragma protect data_block
EopI45Xzfd9MCrd6bQoMzZpf0J5X7U0eQ3SiPiPt3uuZhYazA5xZQS+aD7ySO+rVQ
/msi5/CE5VsxtCSc8SVhFeniUj1spIjMKpVHvv+2pw=
`pragma protect end_protected
endmodule
a) An IP. b) Encrypted IP.
c) Modified encrypted IP.
Fig. 5.2: Vulnerabilities associated with an encrypted IP.
5.1.2 Hardware watermarking
This approach has received much attention in the recent years for validating the authorship of
an IP. Watermarking techniques uniquely identify an IP by creating a unique fingerprint in it
[115] [116] [117] [102] [118] [119]. As the watermarking technique is passive, one cannot use
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it to prevent IP overuse, IP piracy, and IC overproduction. Rather, it can only be used to verify
proof of IP use.
5.1.3 IC metering
The existing metering approaches prevent IC overproduction by attempting to give an SoC
designer control over the number of ICs manufactured. These approaches can be either passive
or active. Passive approaches uniquely identify each IC and register the ICs using challenge-
response pairs. Later, suspect ICs taken from the market are checked for proper registration
[60] [61] [50] [62] [48] [59].
For passive metering techniques, one major limitation is that they cannot “actively pre-
vent” overproduction. PUF-based detection techniques relies on the matching unclonable IDs/signatures
generated by the PUF. The challenge-response pairs are stored in a secure database and verified
later whether the responses are listed in the database or not. In the context of our problem,
the SoC designers have to count on the foundries/assemblies to send them all defect free chips
and trust them blindly on yield information. An untrusted foundry/assembly can hide actual
yield information and practically build huge amount of defect free chips. They can literally
send these unregistered chips to many different places (subsidiary companies, rogue system in-
tegrators, and many others who look for low cost parts). These untrusted entities might not care
about the authenticity of ICs.
Active metering approaches lock each IC until it is unlocked by the SoC designer [65]
[53] [63] [64] [66] [67]. The PUF-based active metering technique presented in [120] has an
applicability limitation. In this proposed scheme, foundry needs to capture the initial power-up
state through the scan-chains and send that state to the design house to receive the passkeys. The
authors did not provide solutions with test compression architecture in place. Test compression
is being adopted by the community to significantly reduce test data not out of preference, but
of necessity. Every designs now use test compression architecture [2]. Test responses (the
flip-flop values) are compacted many folds before it becomes available for off-chip access. It
is impossible to access the flip-flop values unless there is a bypass of the compression module.
This may create additional overhead. Similar analysis is also applicable to the scheme presented
in [53,64].
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In [25] [69] the authors proposed secure split-test (SST) to prevent overproduced, out-
of-spec/defective, and cloned ICs. SST enables the design house to participate in the manufac-
turing test process by placing a set of security measures in the design and controlling the test
flow. However, the major disadvantage is the back and forth communication between the SoC
designer and the foundry/assembly, which increases delay in the test process.
In [65], the authors used an on-chip TRNG to generate a public-private key-pair for RSA
encryption. This approach suffers from three major issues. First, there is large design overhead
due to the on-chip RSA key generation. The keys (e.g., 1024 bit to achieve 80-bit security) are
derived by a complex algorithm from two large prime numbers, p and q, which are generally
512 bits long each [121]. A prime checker is also required to verify these numbers are indeed
prime. Second, the scheme assumes a secure transfer of public key from the chip to the SoC
designer which creates a vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks. The foundry can always
intercept the public key from the chip (more interestingly, foundry initiates the communication)
and replace it with a new key, which nullifies the objective of creating on-chip key-pairs. Third,
the scheme suffers from the key sensitization attacks [106].
5.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we will present FORTIS, a comprehensive solution for establishing forward
trust for protecting IPs and ICs against the attacks discussed above. We address each issue as
follows:
5.2.1 IC overproduction
We develop a novel communication protocol for activating chips after fabrication. The protocol
is similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) by Phil Zimmermann, which is commonly used today
in email delivery systems and has demonstrated excellent secrecy over the years [122]. In
our approach, the design is locked by using a set of key gates and can only be unlocked upon
receiving a CUK. To encrypt a design by using a CUK was first introduced in [65]. An improved
version which is resistant to reverse engineering and various attacks, was presented in [106].
FORTIS uses one of this attack resistant encrypted netlist to prevent IC overproduction.
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The major challenge here is to transfer this CUK to the chip from the SoC designer
without being intercepted by any untrusted party (including untrusted foundry). Our proposed
approach addresses this problem of key transfer from SoC designer to the foundry/assembly.
Every chip has two static RSA keys (same for all chips) and a dynamic session key (different for
everyone). Our approach does not require on-chip key generation which significantly reduces
the area overhead compared to previous techniques.
As discussed above, prior approaches also have major limitations when testing is per-
formed. Either the chip has to be unlocked [65] or test responses to be sent to the SoC designer
[25] [69] [12] create additional vulnerabilities in the design flow. In our proposed approach, it
is not required to provide CUK during test pattern generation (see Section 5.3.2). This helps us
to perform manufacturing tests without unlocking the chips. Our proposed approach does not
impact manufacturing tests and prohibit unwanted activation of ICs during test.
5.2.2 IP overuse
We address IP overuse by introducing a trusted authentication platform (TAP) in the SoC. This
TAP is trusted by all parties involved in the SoC design, and can be imported as a trusted third
party IP. In our proposed approach, each IP is locked with key gates. The synthesis and test
pattern generation flow is very similar as before. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed IP
metering approach addresses the third party IP (3PIP) metering problem for the first time in a
forward trust manner.
5.2.3 IP piracy
We use IP encryption [111] in our design flow to encrypt the netlist. We propose IP integrity
verification (see Figure 5.9) to make it resistant to modification, whereby the malicious SoC
designer/foundry cannot modify a 3PIP by adding/disabling features. Along with this the netlist
is locked by using a set of key gates to prevent the cloning of IPs. One question that could arise
is that if a 3PIP is locked by using a secret CUK, then how an SoC designer will simulate an SoC
which uses that 3PIP. We address this issue by attaching CUK to the IP header and then encrypt
it by using EDA tool’s public key such that the tool can retrieve the CUK during simulation.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of different approaches to ensure forward trust.
Scheme IP Overuse
IP Piracy IC Overproduction Resistant to
Detection Prevention Detection Prevention Attacks
Logic Obfuscation 7 3 7 7 7 Low
Hardware
Watermarking
7 3 7 7 7 Low
IC Metering 7 7 7 3 3 Low
FORTIS 3 3 3 3 3 High
Table 5.1 shows the summary of our contributions compared to existing research. IP
piracy and IC overproduction are both categorized into detection and prevention categories.
An IP/IC can only be detected as pirated/overproduced by the detection approaches, whereas
prevention approaches prevent pirated IPs or overproduced ICs from entering into the supply
chain. Our proposed approach, FORTIS, addresses the challenges for establishing forward
trust, whereas the other approaches try to address the problem partially. The 3PIP owners
protect their IPs from untrusted SoC designers and foundries when they use FORTIS in their
design flow. Similarly, the SoC designers protect their SoCs from untrusted foundries. Further,
FORTIS is the only approach that prevents modifications to any 3PIPs. Our proposed design
flow inherently assures forward trust in the SoC design and fabrication process.
5.3 FORTIS: A Comprehensive Solution for Establishing Forward Trust for Protecting
IPs and ICs
With increasing SoC design complexity, design reusability has become an integral part of the
SoC design process. Unfortunately, this creates the risk of overuse of 3PIPs by untrusted
SoC designers and foundries. In addition, the SoC designers lose profits once an untrusted
foundry/assembly overproduces chips and sells them under their name. Thus, forward trust is
extremely important to the entities involved in the SoC design. The IP owners need to trust
the SoC designer, whereas the SoC designers must trust the foundries and assemblies. In this
section, we present a comprehensive solution for establishing forward trust between the enti-
ties involved in SoC design and fabrication for protecting IPs and ICs. FORTIS automatically
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ensures the forward trust among these entities.
5.3.1 Proposed Design Flow of FORTIS
Figure 5.3 shows our proposed design flow for establishing forward trust between various en-
tities involved with the SoC design process. The design flow is very similar to the existing IC
design flow except for the lock insertion and functional activation steps. Our design process
starts with the insertion of locks by using a set of key (XOR/XNOR) gates using an existing
secure logic encryption technique [106], where the authors already has investigated how/where
to insert these gates. The circuit produces functionally correct output when it receives a chip
unlock key (CUK). The number of XOR or XNOR gates depends on the level of security one
wants to achieve. We now modify the gate level netlist to enable manufacturing tests before the
activation of chips.
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Fig. 5.3: FORTIS for enabling IC/3PIP metering to ensure forward trust in the SoC design and
fabrication.
Each 3PIP owner inserts key gates to lock their design and then generates test patterns.
The SoC designer receives all these locked IPs and integrates them in the design. The SoC
designer also inserts a lock in one of the in-house IP to protect against IC overproduction. The
SoC designer collects all the test patterns from different IP owners and stores them in a pattern
repository for future wafer and package tests. As all the 3PIPs are locked, the simulation may
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be a challenge for an SoC designer. We address this in Section 5.3.5.
The GDSII file corresponding to the SoC design is now sent to the foundry. The foundry
first processes wafers, which generally contains hundreds of dies in a single wafer. Foundry
then performs wafer test to inspect dies to find gross defects. If there are too many dies on
a wafer that are defective, the foundry sometimes rejects the whole wafer. After wafer tests,
the defect-free dies are sent to assembly for packaging. The good chips are then sorted out by
using package tests and the chips that have been damaged during the packaging process are
discarded. Our proposed design flow does not modify the existing fabrication, packaging and
test processes. Finally, each chip is unlocked using a valid CUK by the entity who perform the
final manufacturing test (foundry, assembly, or SoC designer) before supplied to the market.
5.3.2 Enabling Manufacturing Test before Chip Activation
It is absolutely necessary to activate the chips after the tests have been performed, which will
prevent an untrusted foundry/assembly to pile up defect free ICs by hiding actual yield to the
SoC designer. In this section, we will present an architecture that enables structural tests before
the activation of chips.
In the previously proposed architectures, the structural test patterns are generated con-
sidering a predetermined CUK value. This is due to the existent of forward implication of the
key gates. A forward implication exists when the inputs of a logic gate are assigned in a way
that the output is uniquely identified [123]. For a two input XOR gate, the other input must be
specified to either 1 or 0. If we do not assign a value at CUK[i], the ATPG tool will consider
this input as X, and all the faults before the gate ki (logic cone shown in shaded grey color) will
be untestable due to the non-existence of the forward implication.
Let us illustrate this point with an example by considering a fault D, shown in Figure
5.4(b). This fault will be testable if it is being propagated to the output Y1m. If CUK[i] is 1 then
the output of the gate ki becomes D¯, otherwise it becomes D. The corresponding Y1m will be D¯
or D depending on the CUK[i].
Y1m =
 D i f CUK[i] = 0D¯ i f CUK[i] = 1
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Fig. 5.4: Modification of an obfuscated netlist to enable manufacturing test before the func-
tional activation of chips.
To maintain a forward implication, we need to provide a CUK value during test pattern
generation. Thus, the previously proposed designs need a CUK (for example, CUK[i] = 0 or
CUK[i] = 1) before the structural test pattern generation to test all the faults before the key gate.
It is now necessary to load the same key into the chips before the manufacturing test begins. If
we activate the chips before manufacturing tests then the objective of preventing overproduction
will be unsatisfied. An untrusted foundry/assembly can overbuild chips by asking for more keys
and reporting a lower yield to the SoC designer.
In our proposed netlist, the ATPG tool assigns a unique value at the I1 input to maintain
the forward implication (assign 1 for example) for the key gate to transfer the fault D¯ to the
output Y1m. Thus, the ATPG tool can generate test patterns without knowing the key. In this
thesis, we refer structural or scan test patterns as patterns. These patterns will be used later
during wafer and package tests to find defect free chips from a manufacturing unit.
Figure 5.4(c) shows our proposed netlist, where the key bit CUK[i] is connected to a scan
flip-flop (FFi). The output of FFi drives the key gate k1. In the test mode, when the scan enable
(SE) signal is asserted, this flip-flop becomes a part of the scan chain. The ATPG tool generates
test pattern for this modified netlist with n+1 inputs (A1,A2, ...,An, I1) rather than the original
netlist (Figure 5.4(a)) with n inputs (A1,A2, ...,An) or obfuscated netlist (Figure 5.4(b)) with n
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inputs (A1,A2, ...,An) and CUK[i] = 0/1.
Let us now consider key sensitization attack presented in [106]. In key sensitization
attack, the key bits are treated as Xs and propagated to the output. As the unlocked chips
contain 0 or 1 at a key bit location, these key values are visible at the output and the attacker can
recover the key. For traditional DFT, where there is no compaction of test responses, the key
sensitization attack works. However, this attack may not be feasible in any design, which uses an
on-chip test response compaction module. On-chip test response compaction is very common in
today’s designs [108–110]. Almost every chip uses response compaction to significantly reduce
test data not out of preference, but of necessity.
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Fig. 5.5: An example of the compressor logic structure for 8-to-4 compressor [2].
Figure 5.5 shows an example of a compressor logic structure with a compression ratio 2.
The effect of Xs (FFs captured the key bits) will be suppressed at the output dout if at least two
of the inputs of the XOR gates in the compressor are Xs. In this example, we can select scan
chain 3,4, and 5. At ith clock cycle three key bits (k−1,k,k+1) will be at dout simultaneously
and their individual effect cannot be separated.
126
dout[0] = din[4]⊕din[3]⊕din[2]⊕din[0] = k⊕ (k−1)⊕ . . .= X⊕X⊕ . . .
dout[1] = din[5]⊕din[3]⊕din[2]⊕din[1] = (k+1)⊕ (k−1)⊕ . . .= X⊕X⊕ . . .
dout[2] = din[6]⊕din[5]⊕din[4]⊕din[2] = (k+1)⊕ k⊕ . . .= X⊕X⊕ . . .
dout[3] = din[7]⊕din[5]⊕din[4]⊕din[3] = . . .⊕ (k+1)⊕ k⊕ (k−1) = . . .⊕X⊕X⊕X
The key propagation will be failed as there is no forward implication for these XOR
gates. Thus, by selecting the scan chains carefully and place key gates at the same location on
these scan chains, we can circumvent key sensitization attack.
One could argue that the diagnostics done for failure analysis may be impacted due
to the compressed test responses. However, modern EDA tools provide diagnostic support
(high defect coverage and accurate fault diagnostics) with compression in place [108–110].
The compacted responses collected during the test can be used for diagnostics without going
back to the traditional DFT (without compressions). So with this added feature, we do not see
any reason why the SoC designers will not use test compression in their SoCs.
It is worthwhile to mention here that our proposed key insertion flow does not impact the
test process using JTAG [124] in the field as the test patterns are generated after the insertion
of the key gates and has no impact on CUK. No modifications to the design are made after test
pattern generation.
5.3.3 Communication Flow of FORTIS for Preventing IC Overproduction
The success of the proposed design flow lies in the secure transfer of CUKs to the chips without
interception by any untrusted entity in the supply chain. In the following, we will describe the
transfer of CUK from SoC designer to the chips to prevent IC overproduction by the untrusted
foundry. Then we will extend this communication protocol from 3PIP owners to prevent IP
overuse by the untrusted SoC designer.
To ensure the safe transfer of CUK from the SoC designer to the chips, the following are
required:
• Message integrity: The SoC designer must ensure the integrity of the request received
from the chips. If the SoC designer detects an altered request, either modified by an
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Fig. 5.6: Architecture and communication flow of FORTIS to prevent IC overproduction.
attacker or errors in the transmission, it is necessary to stop the transmission of the en-
crypted CUKs.
• End-point authentication: The SoC designer must verify that the request was initiated by
the chips and not by an untrusted foundry or any other entity in the supply chain. As the
chip cannot communicate by its own, the foundry only gets the information from the chip
and forwards it to the SoC designer.
• Confidentiality: Only the SoC designer and the chip should understand the contents of
the transmitted messages.
All these can be achieved by using a combination of asymmetric and symmetric key
encryption. The widely used Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm [125] is used as the
asymmetric key encryption algorithm to provide message integrity and end-point authentication.
Note that Discrete logarithm or elliptic curve algorithms [121] can also be used instead of RSA.
Depending on the area budget, one can select one of the algorithms from the above. One-time-
pad (OTP) [121] is used for symmetric key encryption to provide the confidentiality. OTP has
low area overhead as it only requires a simple XOR network for the encryption and decryption.
Figure 5.6 shows our proposed protocol to securely transfer CUK from SoC designer to
the fabricated chips. To achieve this we need the keys (public key of the SoC designer (KDpub)
and private key (KCpri) of the design) to be embedded in the design. Thus all the fabricated
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chips have the same CUK, KDpub, and KCpri. The SoC designer has the other two keys, KDpri,
and KCpub. The steps for transferring the CUK from the SoC designer to the chip are listed
below:
1) The on-chip TRNG generates a message (m) which is unique for each and every chip.
2) The message m is encrypted with the private key KCpri stored in the chip to form a
signature, i.e., sig(m) =KCpri(m). This signature will be used to validate message integrity and
verify end-point authentication.
3) The message m and its signature sig(m) are concatenated.
4) The TRNG generates a random session key (KS), which is unique for every communi-
cation. This session key can be stored in a non-volatile memory for future decryption to receive
CUK. If the entire activation is performed while the chips are powered on, we can even store
KS in a volatile memory. This unique session key helps us to prevent replay attacks.
5) A one-time-pad (OTP) encrypts the concatenated message (m) and its signature (sig(m))
with KS.
IK = KS({m,sig(m)}) = KS⊕{m,sig(m)}
6) The session key, KS, is encrypted with the public key, KDpub, of the SoC designer.
7) The transmission key is formed by concatenating encrypted KS and IK. T K = {KDpub(KS), IK}.
The foundry receives T K from the chip and forwards it to the SoC designer.
8) Upon receiving the T K from the foundry, the SoC designer separates encrypted KS
and IK.
9) Session key KS is retrieved by decrypting KDpub(KS) with KDpri.
KS = KDpri(KDpub(KS))
10) A one-time-pad is used to decrypt IK to retrieve the concatenated m, and its signature
sig(m).
IK⊕KS = KS⊕{m,sig(m)}⊕KS = {m,sig(m)}
11) The SoC designer retrieves the message from the signature by using chip’s public
key, KCpub.
KCpub(sig(m)) = KCpub(KCpri(m)) = m
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12) A comparison is performed to match m and decrypted signature sig(m). This step
verifies the integrity of m and end-point authenticity. The SoC designer now knows that the T K
is originally coming from the chip if m equals to the KCpub(sig(m)), not from an attacker.
13) After verifying the authenticity of the sender, the SoC designer encrypts CUK by
using an OTP with the session key KS and sends another transmission key (T K′) to the foundry.
T K′ = KS(CUK) = KS⊕CUK
14) The foundry applies this T K′ to the chip. The chip now reconstructs the correct CUK
after decrypting T K′ by using the OTP with its stored session key, KS.
KS(T K′) = KS⊕CUK⊕KS =CUK
This correct CUK is then stored in a non-volatile memory (NVM) [126] to provide inputs
to the key gates. The size of the NVM depends on the size of the CUK. One needs to make sure
that the CUK values are not accessible by the JTAG [124] in the field.
5.3.4 Architecture of FORTIS for Preventing IP Overuse
The overuse of IP occurs when an SoC designer makes a foundry manufacture extra chips
(including IC overproduction) without the knowledge of the 3PIP owners, which results in a
loss of revenue. In this section, we will present an approach to prevent 3PIP overuse.
 Chip
Trusted Authentication 
Platform 
(KApri 
K1pub, K2pub, ….Knpub)
In
-h
o
u
se
 I
P
s
S
o
C
 D
es
ig
n
er
IP Owners
IP1(CUK1)
KApub, K1pri
IP2(CUK2)
KApub, K2pri
IPn(CUKn)
KApub, Knpri
[TK1,
TK2, 
…,
TKn]
[TK’1,
TK’2, 
…,
TK’n]
TK1
TK’1
TK2
TK’2
TKn
TK’n
CUK1 CUK2 CUKn
IP1 
(CUK1)
IP2 
(CUK2)
IPn 
(CUKn)
Fig. 5.7: Architecture of FORTIS to prevent IP overuse.
130
Figure 5.7 shows our proposed FORTIS architecture to prevent IP overuse. The IC con-
tains a trusted authentication platform (TAP), which is introduced in the SoC design in order to
reduce the area of each 3PIP by eliminating individual encryption/decryption blocks for each
IP block, and is trusted by all the 3PIPs in that SoC. In addition, TAP can be encrypted by our
propose approach (see Section 5.3.5) such that inner details are hidden to the SoC designer and
it is modification resistant. The connection details between the TAP and 3PIPs are also obfus-
cated by the EDA tool such that SoC designers cannot add additional circuitry to observe CUKs
and provide them to the 3PIPs directly. Note that, we assume trusted EDA tools throughout this
chapter and it cannot be modified to get an undue advantage by the SoC designers.
Each IP contains a lock (i.e., the key gates) which can only be unlocked by using the
correct chip unlock key CUKi of IP i. This CUKi is only known by the ith IP owner. The IPs only
receive CUKis from the TAP for the activation. TAP holds its own private key (KApri) and public
keys ({Kipub}) for all the IPs in the design. TAP generates the transmission keys (T K1, T K2,
. . . , T Kn) and sends them to the SoC designer. The SoC designer forwards each transmission
key (T Ki) to the corresponding IP owner. In return, the IP owners send the encrypted chip
unlock key (T K′i) to the SoC designer. Upon receiving all the T K′is from the IP owners, the
SoC designer sends them to the foundry to unlock each IP in the fabricated chips.
Figure 5.8 shows the generation of transmission keys by the trusted authentication plat-
form. TAP has a built-in TRNG, which generates a message (m) and separate session keys (KS)
for all different IP owners. First, the signature of m is generated and then concatenated with its
signature. This ensures the message integrity and end-point-authentication for all the IP owners
and also that the request is indeed coming from the TAP and not from a tampered TAP used by
an attacker. TAP then generates one transmission key in each step. At step 1, a session key (KS1)
for IP owner 1 is obtained from the TRNG. This session key helps to encrypt {m, sig(m)} and
the encrypted output is concatenated with the encrypted KS1 to form T K1. At step 2, a different
session key (KS2) for IP owner 2 is received from the TRNG. This session key is then used to
encrypt {m, sig(m)} and the encrypted output is concatenated with the encrypted KS2 to form
T K2. In a similar fashion, all the transmission keys (T Ki) are generated. Then the foundry
receives all the T Ki, sends them to the SoC designer, and waits for the encrypted CUKs.
After receiving the transmission keys (T K′is), the foundry applies them to the TAP. TAP
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Fig. 5.8: Architecture of TAP and communication flow to reconstruct CUKs for all 3PIPs in an
SoC.
decrypts these T K′is by using its session keys, KSs, to generate the chip unlock keys, CUKis,
for all different IPs.
5.3.5 FORTIS for Preventing IP Piracy
To establish a forward trust between the IP owners and SoC designers, foundries, and assem-
blies, it is necessary to add security measures in the IP to prevent IP piracy, such as, cloning,
and modification of IPs by untrusted SoC designers and foundries. FORTIS inherently prevents
the cloning of IPs. As each IP is locked by using a set of key gates, even if the attackers copy
the netlist completely, they cannot unlock it without the proper CUK. However, simulation of
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an SoC having these locked 3PIPs needs to be addressed, as these IPs will work properly only
upon receiving a proper CUK. At the same time, it is necessary to protect these CUKs from the
SoC designer. Otherwise, there is no point of adding them into the IPs in the first place. Our
objective of simulating a 3PIP will be successful if we provide a CUK securely to the simulation
tool without interception by the SoC designer.
We also propose IP integrity verification to prevent IP modification by the SoC designer.
We use a cryptographic hash function [114] to create an IP digest (see message digest [121]) to
make it resistant against modification. Any modification, including addition or deletion of extra
features, to a 3PIP will result in a different IP digest than the original one, which can easily be
detected by comparison in an EDA tool.
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Fig. 5.9: Proposed flow to prevent IP piracy integrated into FORTIS.
Figure 5.9 shows our proposed flow to prevent cloning and modification of 3PIPs. The
IP owners first compute IP digest which is the hash of the entire locked netlist. An IP header
is the created which contains the CUK for the simulation of an SoC and the IP digest. The IP
is then encrypted (the code inside the ‘pragma protect blocks) by using a symmetric encryption
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method (e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard - Cipher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) [127]) rec-
ommended in encryptP1735.pl script [112]. This symmetric key is now encrypted by the public
keys of different EDA vendors such that these vendors can later on decrypt them to get the IP.
We propose a new IP digest comparison flow during synthesis and simulation of SoCs.
The EDA tool first needs to decrypt the encrypted portion of the IP header and the IP body. An
IP digest has to be calculated from the decrypted IP by using the same hash function used before
to form the IP digest. A comparison needs to be performed with the IP digest retrieved from the
IP header and newly computed IP digest. If both of them are equal, then it is ensured that no
modifications to the program has been made, otherwise, the program has to be terminated.
a) Locked IP. b) Locked and encrypted  IP.
/* IP header */
`pragma protect version=1
`pragma protect encoding=(enctype="base64")
`pragma protect key_keyowner="Synplicity",key_keyname="SYNP05_001", 
key_method="rsa", key_block
`pragma protect data_method="aes256-cbc"
`pragma protect begin
CUK=128'h2f57373d6540485473597d67385b2048;
IP Digest = kQnoXeqalxXm0JGl9hjeSlJjOD6hpOxBfWToIaCKSqhXv 
BaAK5Zcm+zz0Sr4sMYIDCQyamEQDd36kQIej/a/A==
`pragma protect end
module leon3mp_locked (resetn, clk, sdclk, se, data, ..., address,CUK);
input resetn, clk, sdclk, se;
inout [31:0] data;
...
output [27:0] address;
/* Encrypted IP */
`pragma protect begin
/* Gate level netlist */
...
SDFFASRX2_RVT xorinserted_DFF_1 ( .D(CUK[1]), .SI(
        \scancontrolled_xor_net[1] ), .SE(se), .CLK(sdclk), 
.RSTB(resetn),
        .SETB(n396312), .Q(\scancontrolled_xor_net[3] ) );
SDFFASRX2_RVT xorinserted_DFF_2 ( .D(CUK[2]), .SI(
        \scancontrolled_xor_net[3] ), .SE(se), .CLK(sdclk), 
.RSTB(resetn),
        .SETB(n396310), .Q(\scancontrolled_xor_net[5] ) );
...
`pragma protect end
endmodule
/* IP header */
`pragma protect begin_protected
...
`pragma protect key_block
WO6V0dxtKTvGlWrAJ997h9sR4A7WzUi91wKPG5XkvVWwP+cb4wqRxi3KBp2Xu5BBBXh3iZzYWuMz
5eCm+fP5mzyhdFVieRx2s2ej/33hpzuyeHW3d+J2fr1PPwGQ+IGyI6NbWzUzLuFq7KQJCiNb5lon
qErka3O8Fj7Vt911BHj/41XlHtAt+buj7uOjCef5q0mau3/B2rNcb7AZgE0ieDAexP1uy3uevgkZ
touVu4XWRkCAqH0PvJJzCGUFBt/BpsEDug34KBKHRT2vSSGTntj0XvCSIRJGANkUYHpWj9/RlXAL
Mk6qaKOGjE2VSwLOaY1bPk4F7QkMNVkptBSOUQ==
`pragma protect data_block
VSuQBU3xHbqKjJiJvS9rJm9p9IhnE3oQwXZ2zToIYEKonVKFhZtNZewPZjmjs2tBc8HwQVX0KnTp
FLXwShCzjA==
`pragma protect end_protected
module leon3mp_locked (resetn, clk, sdclk, se, data, ..., address,CUK);
input resetn, clk, sdclk, se;
inout [31:0] data;
...
output [27:0] address;
/* Encrypted IP */
`pragma protect begin_protected
...
`pragma protect data_block
epuPYWD00pl3D40Uhd3/LAmB0/XO8R/erZePlK8fXgx/enSIcpFYszAZ5VdH/ZpkRj9WH8C4JBcf
2nQndKGr+TM8WTbOhEEDKI3IM6/0NX4sRgeC2R1bSSNIzECmjJcZC6+2eVpt3Deh8LhgKBujgb82
y0UZmBQfTk+Wj71qaYnJzQfXJT8YzmGG5RkNWqyQ/xwm6XcTIj4rVrPfF7QLR+D90pC97BDOrgfm
airKZNeWd3Lu6QBphDZuyXLuEObEWM4wQD6M2QS7HLkCsgzcBIiIzpkns3mdf2x5JgqyK6Y/b1zm
aUaUHoBrXBxPSfSdrkPqxKpgzkLKFHq7jRzchqYWemnPoDSYpCSfD2cu3F3wjddTmGQAmgt5IKsr
eMpVqzDp+yCa/iSMsa0ldi27JtxCEMd3RV/s7Gk1aQKUdOLq5sjWFur3suWQYtn290rXG6NCubx7
6jznIkMWZNC9XLSD8/153e8AORjPCZVjdS69PFGNgX/n5lDObKVFZLJ8XPWVt9etMAyG9Drpyn6e
0EkcDhGg9cXpctTJVGBeeO4TqEZWUYYMugcxojm7Yh/d
`pragma protect end_protected
endmodule
SHA-512
Fig. 5.10: IP header insertion for the simulation of a locked IP.
Figure 5.10 shows an example of our proposed encrypted IP. We use SHA-512 [114] to
form an IP digest, which is attached to the IP header along with the CUK. We use Synopsys
encryptP1735.pl script [112] to encrypt the IP header and IP body. Figure 5.10(a) shows a
locked IP. The encryption is carried out in two parts - (i) The IP vendor encrypts the IP data
(data block) using its own symmetric key which is called the data key. We use aes256-cbc as
symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the data block. (ii) The IP vendor then encrypts
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the data key with its public key by using asymmetric encryption to create a key block. The
encryption version, encode type, key owner, key name and key method need to be mentioned.
We use RSA as asymmetric encryption to generate the key block which is attached to the IP
header (see Figure 5.10(b)).
5.4 Results and Analysis
5.4.1 Test Metrics Analysis
The objective of analyzing the test metrics is to provide an evidence of the impact of our pro-
posed modification of the locks to enable manufacturing test before the activation of chips (see
Section 5.3.2). The proposed architecture is evaluated with implementations on large bench-
mark circuits from ITC99 [128], opencores.org [129], and OpenSPARC T1 processor core
[130]. In this evaluation, we have used SAED 32/28nm library [131] provided by Synopsys
to synthesize all benchmark circuits. Each synthesized benchmark circuit is then locked with
a 128 bit CUK. A total of 128 XOR/XNOR gates along with 128 D-flip flops are inserted for
each synthesized benchmark circuit. Scan-chain insertion is performed on both unsecured and
secured versions of the same circuits to evaluate and compare test metrics, such as test pattern
count and test coverage. A comparison between the unlocked and locked versions of these
benchmarks are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Test Metrics Comparison.
Pattern Count Test Coverage
Benchmark Gate Count Before After Change (%) Before After Change (%)
des 16,341 60 59 -1.67 100.00 99.78 -0.22
b18 25,397 404 388 -3.96 99.53 99.45 -0.08
ethernet 30,534 627 629 0.32 99.94 99.84 -0.10
b19 40,789 424 418 -1.42 99.34 99.40 0.06
vga lcd 43,346 1,710 1,721 0.64 100.00 99.94 -0.06
leon3mp 253,050 3,821 3,848 0.71 100.00 99.99 -0.01
sparc 836,865 3,220 3,185 -1.09 99.16 99.09 -0.07
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As shown in Table 5.2, the gate count of investigated benchmark circuits range between
16,341 to 836,865. We chose these larger benchmark circuits to better represent typical large in-
dustrial designs. We also present the pattern count and test coverage figures of the implemented
designs before and after applying our proposed architecture, in order to present the impact of
proposed architecture on circuit testability. We do not expect any major change in test pattern
count and test coverage, but there may be a minor improvement to test coverage as each key
gate with a D flip-flop adds a test point in the design. On the other hand, the XOR/XNOR gates
and D flip-flops create additional faults in the netlist, which may lead to the reduction of test
coverage. The shown pattern count change range between −3.96% and 0.71%, which means at
worst the proposed architecture would result in less than 1% overhead in pattern length. Simi-
larly, the change in test coverage ranges between −0.22% and 0.06%. Both impacts are minor
and would not significantly impact testability of the secured design.
5.4.2 Area Overhead Analysis
The area overhead of our proposed FORTIS consists of:
(i) RSA module: The RSA module used in our proposed design to encrypt the session
key and generate the signature makes up a major part of the area overhead. This area can be
reduced significantly depending on the speed of operation. As speed is not our major concern,
we can select a slower, but more area efficient RSA module. It is reported that a minimum size
RSA datapath can be implemented by using only 861 gates [132].
(ii) OTP module: The size of the one-time pad depends on the size of the CUK. For a
128 bit CUK, we need 128 XOR gates. The same OTP can be used for the encryption of {m,
sig(m)} and decryption of T K′.
(iii) Keys gates: The size due to keys also depends on the CUK. To implement one key
bit, we need one XOR/XNOR gate and a scan flip-flop.
(iv) RSA Keys: Extra storage or logic is needed to keep or generate at least 1024 bit KCpri
for chips or KApri for TAP. We can simply neglect the size of the public keys (KDpub or Kipubs)
as they can be as small as number 3 or 17 [121].
(v) TRNG: A single TRNG is used for generating the message, m and session keys,
KSs. We propose the use of an area efficient cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
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generator [133] or [134] depending on the implementation choice.
(vi) Non-volatile memory: The size of the non-volatile memory depends of the session
keys, KSs. We need a 128 bit non-volatile memory to store a 128 bit KS.
There is no area overhead of any 3PIPs for preventing IP overuse except for the key
gates. The trusted authentication platform (TAP) provides the CUKs to all different 3PIPs. The
primary motivation for implementing TAP in any design for an SoC designer is that they need
to prevent IC overproduction.
Considering all these modules, the total gate count is approximately 10K. Table 5.3
shows the overhead analysis. For benchmark circuits, it ranges from 24.52% to 1.19%. How-
ever, for industrial designs it becomes less than 1%. For Xilinx Artix-7 and Kintex-7 [135]
the overhead becomes 0.77% and 0.15% respectively. It becomes negligible for Virtex-7 [136].
The area overhead may further be reduced if the original design already contains a TRNG and
a RSA module, as is the case for most of the industrial designs.
Table 5.3: Area overhead analysis.
Design Gate Count Overhead (%)
Benchmarks
b19 40,789 24.52
vga lcd 43,346 23.07
leon3mp 253,050 3.95
sparc 836,865 1.19
Industrial Designs
Artix-7 1.3M 0.77
Kintex-7 6.6M 0.15
Virtex 7 20M 0.05
5.4.3 Security Analysis
The security of our proposed protocol is of prime importance to prevent the overproduction
of ICs and overuse of 3PIPs. In the following, we will perform the security analysis of our
proposed approach.
Exhaustive key search: The length of a chip unlock key, CUK, should be long enough such
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that it can withstand exhaustive key search or brute-force attacks. We need to achieve at least 80
bits of security as this is the lower minimum requirement for exhaustive key search [121]. To
achieve this, we require 80 key gates (XOR/XNOR). However, the key size may be increased
up to 256 bits for higher security, which will hardly impact the overall area of a modern design.
Encryption: In our approach, we use RSA to encrypt the session key and generate signature.
One can achieve 80 bit of security while the key length is 1024 bits. However, 128 bit security
can be achieved with the key length of 3072 bits [121]. Depending on the area budget one can
select a desired security level of n bits. We have used one-time-pad to encrypt {m, sig(m)}. As
the session keys, KSs, are generated from a TRNG, a perfect secrecy can be achieved. Thus, we
can achieve an overall RSA equivalent secrecy in our proposed protocol.
Man-in-the-middle attack: As the key-pairs for the RSA are generated by the IP owners and
reside in the circuit, no key transfer is required. This prevents an attacker (e.g., untrusted
foundry) from becoming a man-in-the-middle.
Replay attack: In this attack scenario, the attacker copies a message between two parties and
replays that message to one or more of them. Our proposed protocol is inherently resistant to
replay attacks as a new session key, KS, is generated every time during encryption. Every time,
the encrypted message will be different from the previous one. In addition, the message (m) is
unique for every chip, which also helps to make a unique transmission key for every chip.
Reverse engineering: As we use a secure logic encryption technique [106], it is extremely hard
for an attacker to find CUK by reverse engineering. Even if we assume that reverse engineering
is possible to find the key, an attacker cannot feed the CUK to a chip, as they do not know
the private key of the SoC designer (KDpri) to retrieve KS. As the session key, KS, is unique
for every chip, it is not economical for the attackers to retrieve KS for each chip by reverse
engineering. We also assumed that the attacker cannot model the TRNG to predict its output
after observing certain KSs. Finally, we believe that it is extremely expensive to perform reverse
engineering for modern designs manufactured with 22nm or lower technology nodes.
Tampering RSA Keys: In this attack scenario, an untrusted foundry reconstructs new masks to
replace the keys, KCpri and KDpub, with its own. This enables the foundry to unlock unlimited
number of chips when it receives the CUKs from the IP owners. Fortunately, this attack can
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easily be prevented by the IP owners. The SoC designer can request only one locked chip and
then verify the correct keys. If the foundry replaces KCpri and KDpub by its own, the SoC
designer will not be able to unlock the chip and consequently, it can detect mask modification.
Tampering TRNG: An untrusted foundry can modify the masks to bypass the TRNG and write
a permanent value for KSs and m. Once it knows the CUK, it can unlock any number of chips.
Fortunately, this attack can also be detected by the IP owners and can be prevented. Like before,
the SoC designer can request few locked chips to monitor the message, m and the session key,
KS. If either m or KSs from these chips are the same or biased, it will definitely be the indication
of the tampering of TRNG. As it is extremely expensive to design a new set of masks, there is
little economic incentive for an untrusted foundry to manufacture a product with two different
set of masks.
Tampering IP Digest: In this attack scenario, the attacker tries to tamper the IP digest by
replacing the original IP digest with the tampered IP digest. Fortunately, this tampering can be
detected. As the attacker does not have the private key of the EDA tool (we assume a trusted
EDA tool for synthesis and simulation), he cannot reconstruct the original IP from its encrypted
version. If the attacker try to modify the IP and then compute the digest, it will be different than
the original one.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented FORTIS, a comprehensive solution for establishing forward
trust for different entities involved in the SoC design and manufacturing process. FORTIS uses
a novel communication protocol between the fabricated chips and the SoC designers/IP owners
to activate the chips for preventing IP overuse and IC overproduction. FORTIS uses an existing
logic encryption technique to obfuscate the netlist of an SoC or a 3PIP and can only be unlocked
upon receiving a correct chip unlock key (CUK). A modification is proposed to the existing
obfuscated netlist to enable manufacturing tests before the activation of chips which is one of
the key requirement to prevent IC overproduction and IP overuse. Our proposed modification
does not have any impact on manufacturing test process.
To address IP overuse, we have introduced a trusted authentication platform in the SoC.
139
This TAP is trusted by the all parties involved in the SoC design and can be synthesized and
placed in an SoC by a trusted EDA tool automatically. To the best of our knowledge, the
metering approach we have presented to prevent IP overuse is the first in the literature. The
encrypted IP with additional IP digest check prevents the SoC designer from IP piracy. As an
IP is locked by using a set of key gates, even if the attackers copy the entire netlist, they cannot
make it work properly without a correct CUK, which prevents IP cloning. Finally, our proposed
design flow is resistant to all known attacks.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Integrated circuits are becoming increasingly vulnerable to counterfeiting and piracy due to the
globalization of the electronic component supply chain. To address this issue, we have presented
the complete treat space and evaluated the detection capability of the existing test regimen for
counterfeit detection. We have presented several design-for-anti-counterfeit measures for to
improve the trustworthiness, security, and reliability of different ICs. In this chapter, we present
a detailed summary of our major contributions, and then present the future research direction
for ensuring the security of the component supply chain.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
The detection and prevention of counterfeit components in the component supply chain be-
comes a major challenge that needs to be addressed in the near future. In this thesis, we have sys-
tematically addressed the problems of counterfeit ICs by - (i) presenting different taxonomies
of counterfeit types, defects, and test methods; (ii) proposing test metrics, and developing a
comprehensive framework for the assessment of test methods; and (iii) developing different
design-for-anti-counterfeit measures for all different counterfeit types.
We have classified the counterfeit ICs into seven distinct categories: recycled, remarked,
overproduced, out-of-spec/defective, cloned, forged documentation, and tampered. Our coun-
terfeit method taxonomy describes all the test methods currently available for the detection of
counterfeit ICs. The test methods are broadly classified into two distinct types: physical tests
and electrical tests. Counterfeit defects are those anomalies and changes that are not typically
found in authentic parts. Anomalies vary based on size, shape, type, number, etc., depending on
the capabilities possessed by the counterfeiters. The detection of one or more anomalies may
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be an indication of a component being counterfeit. Counterfeit defects are divided into four
categories: procedural, mechanical, environmental, and electrical.
We have proposed different test metrics for evaluating the capability of the test methods
for counterfeit IC detection. These metrics are counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), counterfeit
type coverage (CTC), under-covered defects (UCDs) and not-covered defects (NCDs). We
have developed a comprehensive framework to assess the test methods. We have developed
a web-based tool, Assessment Framework, for this purpose. The tool is currently deployed in
the server of University of Connecticut’s CHASE Center. One can access the tool at htt p :
//ece−chaseweb.engr.uconn.edu/cdc− site/index.php with proper user credentials. The tool
provides two options - (i) static assessment where a user can evaluate a preexisting test plan
based on the aforementioned metrics; and (ii) dynamic assessment where the user finds an
optimum set of test methods to maximize CDC.
We propose different lightweight structures for combating die and IC recycling (CDIR)
as a part of design-for-anti-counterfeit measures. These structures are of ring-oscillator (RO)-
based NBTI-aware, which exploits aging much more efficiently. The reference ROs in these
CDIRs remain quiet during the normal operation of the IC while the stressed RO gets aged at an
accelerated pace utilizing NBTI of PMOS transistors. This helps to get a reasonable frequency
difference between the reference and stressed ROs even though an IC is used only a very short
duration. We proposed two different versions of CDIRs with multiple RO-pairs where the
designer can select the number of RO-pairs depending on their area budget. In addition, we
also propose fuse-based CDIRs (F-CDIRs) can be implemented in any components (small, or
large, and analog, or digital) and any technology node. These CDIRs can authenticate ICs very
effectively and require a very low cost multimeter.
We present FORTIS, a comprehensive solution for protecting IPs and ICs by assuring
forward trust between all entities involved in the SoC design and fabrication process. We pro-
pose a novel design flow to prevent IC overproduction and IP overuse. We use an existing logic
encryption technique to obfuscate the netlist of an SoC or a 3PIP and propose a modification
to enable manufacturing tests before the activation of chips which is absolutely necessary to
prevent overproduction. We also propose to attach an IP digest (a cryptographic hash of the
entire IP) to the header of an IP to prevent modification of the IP by the SoC designers.
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6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Assessment of Test Methods
Chapter 1 briefly describes the defects and anomalies present in different counterfeit compo-
nents. These four categories - procedural, mechanical, environmental, and electrical - of defects
are originated either from the counterfeiting process or the deliberate test escapes after man-
ufacturing. The detection of one or more defects necessarily increases the confidence of a
component being counterfeit (Chapter 2). The question now becomes how efficiently we can
detect them. We need to monitor these defects very carefully, as counterfeiting is an evolving
problem. Counterfeiters are adopting new technologies to improve their process, and the shape
and size of these defects are also evolving. The easy to detect defects may not be present in
the counterfeit components in near future. The progress of the detection capability by our test
methods are needed to monitored to cope with this evolving problem.
The detection of counterfeit parts is still in infancy and the data for most of these key ele-
ments used in Assessment Framework (Chapter 2) does not exist today or change continuously.
First, the number of test methods may increase over the period and their detection capability
will change. Currently, the test cost and time data varies significantly in between test labs, thus,
we take an average of them for each test methods during the simulation. Second, the confidence
level (CL) matrix contains the values, generated by the subject matter experts (SMEs) participat-
ing in the G-19A group. Third, the defect frequency (DF) data does not exist today. However,
we are hoping that, in the near future, this data will be available as the two reporting agencies
ERAI [137] and GIDEP [138] are capturing the incidence of counterfeit parts worldwide. Forth,
the decision index (DI) in Table 2.2 was again generated by the SMEs as we do not have enough
information available regarding the visibility of different counterfeit types. Finally, it is impor-
tant that the Assessment Framework should be flexible enough to handle changes in the input
data regardless of its source. In future, we will continuously work on Assessment Framework.
6.2.2 Design-for-Anti-Counterfeit Measures
Different available technologies (see Figure 1.12) target different counterfeit types. Different
types of CDIRs can effectively detect recycled components irrespective of their sizes. However,
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there are no technologies available today to detect overproduced and out-of-spec/defective ICs,
which belongs to the analog and mixed-signal types. As the analog and mixed-signal ICs are
small in size, FORTIS cannot be applied to detect those ICs due its area overhead and different
process technologies. DNA and NR can be used to detect remarked and cloned ICs. However,
they are not free from various challenges and limitations. We further investigate new DfAC
measures to detect the complete spectrum of counterfeit ICs.
6.2.3 Counterfeit Electronic Systems
In this thesis, we have not considered counterfeit electronic systems, which is growing in scope
and magnitude in recent times. It is becoming increasingly difficult to assure the security and
integrity of an electronic system due to the globalization of semiconductor supply chain. This
is because the electronic systems today are assembled all across the globe and might consist of
components sourced from the different parts of the world. This makes it virtually impossible
to gauge the origin of these systems and their components, and track their route in the supply
chain. Today, the design companies do not manufacture their own products. The companies
responsible for manufacturing the products are located all across the globe. These offshore
companies can easily copy the drawings and specifications of the products they are contracted
to manufacture. This trend is very disturbing as these contract manufacturer can make clone
products on a separate production line. In addition, they can also ship defective systems which
did not pass system tests to different independent distributors. Numerous incidents have pointed
out the far-reaching penetration of such systems into the electronics supply chain, which are
presented in our book Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: Detection and Avoidance [12]. Thus,
it becomes absolutely necessary to verify the authenticity of an electronic system. In future,
our prime focus will be on developing solutions to detect these counterfeit systems and prevent
them entering into the supply chain.
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